Tense, aspect and relevance by Zegarac, V.
Tense, Aspect and Relevance
By
Vladimir egarac
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of PhD
University College London
1991
0
ABSTRACT
The main aim of this thesis is to consider some consequences of
the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson (1986) for explaining a
number of phenomena relating to verbal aspect. Chapter one
introduces some basic notions relating to aspect and illustrates the
interaction of aspect and tense and gives an outline of the main tenets
of relevance theory. Chapter two considers the aspectual categories
(simple-progressive) of English and (perfective-imperfective) of Serbo-
Croat in relation to each other, and also in relation to the the
classification of verbs according to the situation types they denote.
Problems of defining the aspectual categories of these two languages are
examined, and the suggestion is put forward that relevance theory
provides the framework which makes it possible to maintain a fairly
austere semantics of aspectual categories as well as to explain aspectual
choice. Chapter three examines the treatment of aspectual categories
in terms of subjectivity. It is argued that speakers' intuitions about the
aspectual categories being expressive of subjectivity can be explained
pragmatically, in terms of the notions of loose use and interpretive use.
In Chapter four, I argue that in addition to the feature of completion,
the semantics of aspectual categories of both English and Serbo-Croat
needs to be characterised in terms of reference to particular events
instantiating the property denoted by the predicate. I show how this
assumption makes it possible to explain a number of uses of the
English progressive. I then proceed to argue that the progressive of
English and the perfective of Serbo-Croat differ with regard to
completion but that they both point indexically, as it were, to a
particular event instantiating the property denoted by the predicate.
This assumption is shown to be crucial in explaining aspectual choice
in the two languages. Although the data discussed are drawn solely
from English and Serbo-Croat, the central ideas presented should carry
over to Slavonic languages in general.
Chapter five looks at situation type aspect in the light of Sperber
and Wilson's (1986) view that conceptual information is stored in three
types of entries. It is shown that the difference in the behaviour of
verbs which intuitively seems to correlate with dynamicness and
stativity, is best explained in terms of a three-way distinction
determined by meaiiing postulate-like rules in the logical entries of
concepts for individual verbs. I also give evidence in support of the
view that accomplishment VPs fall into two classes depending on
whether or not they grammaticalise completion, and I show that the
grammaticalisation of completion in some predicates of this type is
pragmatically explained.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Putting it in the most general terms, the main aim of this study
is to examine some issues pertRining to the category of aspect in the
light of the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson (1986) (S&W
hereafter). This chapter addresses some preliminary questions. Which
linguistic phenomena does the term aspect (or verbal aspect) refer to?
What distinguishes aspectual categories from the closely related
category of tense?
The term aspect, or verbal aspect, was originally used rather
narrowly in relation to the linguistic expression of semantic distinctions
presumed peculiar to Slavonic languages (cf. Forsyth (1970)), or as a
descriptive cover term for a number of language particular categories
characterised by partial semantic overlap and defined in terms of the
grammaticalisation or lexicalisation of certain features of rneining or
the combinations of these features. Only more recently has aspect been
considered from the point of view of general and theoretical linguistics,
although it should be mentioned that a well established tradition which
looks at aspectual distinctions as universal was, for a long time,
associated with philosophy. It will be ex ynined in the next chapter.
So, what could be the rationale behind the language particular and the
language universal approaches to aspect?
This chapter looks at some of the arguably defining semantic
features of aspectual categories, and considers the relation between
aspect and Aktionsart. The interaction of aspect and tense in
determining the temporal interpretation of the utterance is illustrated.
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The problem of characterising the meanings of aspect and tense and
explaining their interaction is shown to be largely due to the view of
verbal communication as an encoding - decoding process characterised
by strict isomorphism between the linguistic mepnings of natural
language expressions and the contents of the conceptual representation
which these expressions purport to communicate. It is Bhown that
(explicit or implicit) reliance on the code model of verbal communication
poses insurmountable difficulties for a plausible analysis of this
relation, and two basic tenets of the relevance theory of S&W (1986) are
introduced in order to indicate a way in which the problem could be
tackled. The first one is the claim that the linguistically encoded
meaning of the utterance characteristically severely underdetermines
the conceptual content of the mental representation which the utterance
purports to represent. This idea is known as the underdeterminacy
thesis. The second tenet is the distinction between two kinds of
semantics: linguistic semantics and real semantics (i.e. truth-conditional
semantics or the semantics of mental representations).
1.1. ASPECTUAL CATEGORIES
Aspectual categories are characteristically defined in terms of
the pairing of certain features of meaning with certain natural language
entities (words, derivational or inflectional affixes, or syntactic
constructions). Following is an incomplete list of these features. The
presence or lack of each has been taken by one author or another as
defining a pair of categories: (a) complete; (b) habitual; (c) durative;
(d) dynamic; (e) telic; (f) iterative; (g) ingressive; (h) resultative;
(i)progressive; (j)perfect. Let me ifiustrate them in turn.1
8
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(a) complete
(1)	 a.	 The cat ate the rat.
b.	 The cat sat on the mat all morning (and, for all I
know, she may still be sitting there).
Intuitively, (la) is most likely to be understood as describing a complete
event, and (ib) as describing a state of affairs in the past which lasted
for some time and was, probably, terminsted before speech time. This
feature is taken to be definitional of the aspectual categories
imperfective and perfective of Serbo-Croat (and Slavonic languages in
general), to be examined more closely in Chapter two.
(b) habitual
(2) a.	 Thecatsitsonthearmchairwhenitwautstobe
stroked.
b. The cat is sitting on the armchair now.
c. John walks to schooL
d. John is wplking to school at the moment.
The utterances (2a) and (2c) describe characteristic (or habitual)
behaviour of their subject referents and contrast with (2b) and (2d)
which are about events ongoing at the time of communication. But,
note the slight difference in the ways (2a) and (2c) depict habitual or
characteristic behaviour. In fact, it is not dear that (2a) is habitual at
all. On the assumption that habitual utterances are to be explained as
generalisations based on individual instances of events, it seems
obvious that (2c) should be considered habitual, whereas (2a) might stifi
be a statement about the causal connection between individual
9
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occurrences of the cat's sitting on the armchair and its desire to be
stroked.2
(c) durative
(3)	 a.	 John swam across the river in ten minutes.
b.	 John's swimming/swim across the river lasted ten
minutes.
c. John arrived home in ten minutes.
d. *flJohn's arriving/arrival home lasted ten
minutes.
The important observation here is that (3a) can be paraphrased by (3b),
while (3d) is rather unusual at best. What these examples show is that
events may be conceptually represented as taking time to take place,
(3a), or as momentary, i.e. as not involving duration at all, (3c).
(d) dynamic
(4)	 a.	 Mary ran on the beach.
b. The book lay on the table.
c. The cage contained the bird.
d. The box contained five chocolates.
The utterances in (4a) and (4c) describe processes, i.e. / states of affairs
which involve continuous change (more precisely, activities, since the
chpnge is caused by an agent); those in (4b) and (4d) describe states,
i.e. states of affairs which do not involve cbinge (but may be brought
about and altered by some chpnge which is external to them). The
distinction between state verbs and process verbs is discussed in some
detail in Chapter two and Chapter five.
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(e) telic
(5)	 a.	 He fell down.
b.	 He blinked once.
Telic predicates like fall down denote events with some clear
consequence(s) or outcome. With atelic ones the idea of outcome is
absent, although it could be argued that events with the feature
[+complete] always involve an outcome, which is more salient in some
cases (if one falls down on a surface, one ends up being on that surface
as a consequence of the fall) and less in others (making a blink is not
readily associated with the idea of outcome or consequence).
(f) iterative
(6)	 a.	 John was/kept blinking.
b.	 John blinked once.
The event in (6a) is made up of a series of events of the same kind. The
utterance (6a) is about one occasion on which John produced a series of
blinks which are seen as sub-parts of a single more inclusive instance
of blinking, in contrast to (6b) which is about one single blink.
(g) ingressive (inceptive inchoative)
	(7) a.	 They were about to leave.
	
b.	 They were on the point of leaving.
The feature ingressive is probably best characterised by reference to the
onset of an event or state and, possibly, the event or state itselL The
examples in (7) are only near English translations. In Serbo-Croat, for
11
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example, this feature is associated with the prefix uz-. So, the verb
pisati means 'to write', while its ingressive Counterpart pisati conveys
the idea of starting writing and getting fully engaged in this activity.
With verbs which do not involve change, the prefix uz- indicates merely
transition into the state. For example moéi means 'can', 'be able to',
and ymoéi means something like 'change from the state of not being
able to into the state of being able to'.
(ii) resultative
(8) a.	 John built a house.
	
b.	 John ran a mile.
The difference between the features telic and resultative is not always
easy to draw. If the distinction is to be useful at all, the feature
[+resultative] should be reserved for those verbal predicates denoting
events which bring about the existence of their object referents. By this
criterion, (8a) would be resultative, while (8b) would be merely telic.
The two categories would stand in a relation of indusion: all resultative
predicates would also be telic, but not all telic predicates would be
resultative.
(i) progressive
(9) a.	 The cat was sitting on the mat all morning.
b.	 The cat sat on the mat all morning.
One of the differences between the progressive and the simple is
illustrated by the overtones of dynamism and vividness conveyed by
(9a), in contrast to (9b), where these overtones are absent. Although
progressiveness is sometimes assumed to be a single feature, it should
12
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be clear from the examples given here that, at the semantic level, it
could be seen as resulting from the combination of the 5eatures
[-complete] and [+ dynamic].
(j) perfect
(10) a.	 I have seen that film.
b. I saw that film.
c. I have written a letter.
d. I wrote a letter.
Both pairs of utterances in (10) locate events in the past, but carry
different overtones. The present perfect highlights the idea of current
relevance of the event, the simple past tends to focus, as it were, on the
circumstances in the past related to the occurrence of the event.
There are two important and related questions regarding the
perfect which deserve to be mentioned here. First, what exactly is the
feature encoded by this grammatical form (if only one feathre is at
stake)? Second, does the perfect belong to the category of aspect, or to
some other category, such as tense? Clearly, the answer to the second
question will crucially depend on how the domains of aspect end tense
are defined, and how the meaning of the perfect construction is
characterised.
Ten seems a good number to stop at. To be sure, the list could
be expanded to include more categories. One possible objection might
be that this great number of allegedly aspectual distinctions is arrived
at by failing to put emphasis on the notions of lexicalisation and
gramniaticalisation, on the expression of aspectual contrasts by
derivational affixes and syntactic constructions, and by conflating the
13
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notions of aspect and Aktionsart. In so far as aspectual categories
concern the linguistic expression of conceptual contrasts, one could
dismiss the distinction between syntactic and morphological means of
expressing these contrasts as irrelevant. But what would be the
difference between aspect and Aktionsart? The distinction between
these two terms is examined briefly in the following section.
1.2 ASPECT ANI) AKTIONSART
The term Aktionsart has been used very inconsistently, causing
considerable confusion. It could be used to capture the distinction
between grammaticaiisation and lexicalisation (as Lyons (1977:705-706)
suggests). The term aspect could be reserved for the former, and
Aktionsart for the latter. For example, the progressive grimmaticalises
incompletion. Hence, it would be an aspect. A verb like play denotes
continuous activity. As incompletion is part of the lexicalised meaning
of the verb, the feature (- complete] would in this case pertain to
Aktionsart, and not to aspect.
Another possibility is to use the term aspect to cover only
inflectional markers of certain meAning contrasts, while reserving the
term Aktionsart for the marking of aspectual distinctions by derivation.
A fairly clear example of an a8pectual distinction by this criterion would
be the contrast between the passé simple and the imparfait of French:
the former denotes an event as a whole, the latter, as an ongoing
process in the past.
(11) a.	 II reigna trente ans.
b.	 II reignait treute ans.
He reigned/was reigning for thirty years.
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By these same criteria, the contrasts between pairs of verbs like camp -
encamp of English, battre - abattre ('beat' - 'demolish') of French, and tél
-oti61 ('go' - 'go away') of Serbo-Croat, fall within the scope of Aktionsart
on formal grounds, and in the scope of aspect, on semantic grounds
(because the first member of each pair indicates incompletion, while the
second one indicates completion).
One possibly useful way of maintaining the distinction is to
confine the term Aktionsart to the contribution that various markers of
(in)completion and change (the typical example being the prefixes of
Slavomc) make to the lexicalised mesning of the verb, as illustrated by
the opposition between verbs of Serbo-Croat tél ('go'), t ('come'), Q.ftii
('go away'), pjéi ('go through'). Aspectually, the last three verbs would
all be perfective (i.e. completive), but each would have a different
Aktionsart. In contrast to these prefixes, the perfectivising suffix -nu,
as in metnuti ('put'), as opposed to meatati (roughly, 'be putting'), is
strictly aspectual, since it does not change the lexical meRning of the
verb beyond indicating completion.
Aktionsart seems a somewhat confusing, and, therefore, not
particularly useful term. On the one hand, it has been used in many
different ways. On the other hand, if one decides, following Lyons'
suggestion, to introduce the term in order to draw the distinction
between lexicalisation and grammaticalisation, Aktionsart will be found
to overlap with the well established, and fairly consistently used term
situation type aspect, to be xmined in Chapter two. Regardless of the
way in which this terminological quibble is resolved, the question of
what caused the massive proliferation of aspectual distinctions imposes
itself. The answer is obvious, at least in part. When the meaning of
aspectual categories is defined in terms of semantic features such as
completion, the picture may be complicated in two main ways.
15
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First, given a particular feature, say [+1- complete], the following
situations may arise in a language: (a) both the positive value [+
complete] and the negative value [- complete] may be grammaticalised,
as illustrated by the perfective - imperfective contrast of Slavonic
languages; (b) only one value may be grammaticalised while the other
one is unspecified, e.g. the -ing suffix of English with the value [-
complete], in contrast to the simple aspect, which is (so one could argue
at least) unspecified with respect to the feature in question, and (c) it
is possible, in principle at least, that neither value of a particular
feature is gramniaticalised or lexicalised in a language. Given the
possibilities (a) and (b), the apparent differences across languages could
be attributed (i) directly to differences in the values which are
grammaticalised, and (ii) to the ways in which the aspectual choices
available in the language system interact with the pragmatic
principle(s).
Second, an objection to the language universal view of aspect,
particularly widespread among Slavicists, is that the choice of an
aspectual category in one language, e.g. the imperfective in Slavonic,
does not (or does not systematically) convey the same idea as the
arguably corresponding category in another non-Slavomc language, e.g.
the English progressive. Hence, the following argument: (a) there is
no strict correspondence between aspectual categories across (different
groups of) languages, therefore (b) aspectual categories are language
particular. Forsyth (1970) is a representative exponent of this view. Of
course, once the argument is spelled out it becomes obvious that it
doesn't hold. The conclusion from (a) to (b) is simply not warranted.
When a semantic feature is seen as definitional of a binary pair of
categories then, given the potential grammaticalisation of its values, the
following contrasts illustrated above could arise: [+1-], [01-], [+10] and
[010] (where '0' indicates that the value is not granimaticalised). For
16
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example, assuming that the simple - progressive contrast of English is
adequately characterised as [0/- complete] part of the difference is in
the ideas and overtones conveyed by the choice of the progressive in
English, and the choice of the imperfective in Slavomc would (in some
way which needs to be pragmatically explained) follow from the
differences in the aspectual choices available in the two languages, the
choices which determine what I will call the functional identity of
aspectual categories within the language system. For example, the
interpretation of a form with the value I- complete] will predictably vary
depending on whether the value [+ complete] is also grammaticalised
or not. This question and other closely related issues are discussed in
more detail in the chapters to follow. The main point here is to
emphasise that the reasoning behind the language particular view of
aspect is flawed. The Slavicist's possible response to these objections
would be that they are misplaced and that aspect is not to be defined
only in terms of semantic features which never appear in isolation from
other less salient facets of verb mepning. Completion and incompletion
are, arguably, merely the most salient elements of aspectual semantics
but do not exhaustively define the aspectual categories of perfective and
imperfective. This leaves a range of apparently closely related
meanings as an unexplained residue of the more salient and
systematically gr2mmaticalised contrast between completion and
incompletion, a residue which, seemingly, happens to be peculiar to
Slavonic languages. Of course, one way of dealing with problems is to
eschew them, but it is not a particularly interesting one.
The discussion in the chapters to follow rests on the fairly
uncontroversial assumption that the feature 1+/- complete] is indeed
definitional of the aspectual categories perfective - ixnperfective of
Slavonic and simple-progressive of English. Moreover, this feature
plays a part in the interpretation of sentences in which neither of the
17
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values can be said to be determined by the linguistic meaning of the
predicate, such as John read the newspaper, for example. Depending
on the context in which it is used this sentence can be taken to convey
two thoughts with different truth conditions, roughly: John spent some
tune reading the newspaper and John read the whole
newspaper/finished reading the newspaper. This example shows that
aspectual distinctions are crucially related to the temporal
interpretation of the utterance. Most strikingly, on one interpretation
the past event of John's reading the newspaper could be construed as
extending over the time of communication, whereas on the alternative
interpretation the event would be completed in the past and, therefore,
could not be extending over the present. So the interaction of aspect
and tense seems worth looking at in some detaiL
1.3. TENSE AND ASPECT
It is traditionally assumed that tense is a deictic category
whereas aspect is not Tense arguably determines the temporal location
of a state of affairs or event relative to the time of communication,
while aspect determines the temporal properties internal to the state
of affairs or event. At the end of section 1.2 I hinted at the need for
looking at aspectual distinctions at the level of the conceptual
representations, whether they are grammaticalised in a gwen language
or not. In this section I further illustrate this point and show that on
a par with what could be tentatively called grammatical and semantic
aspect, there is a case for drawing a distinction between grammatical
and semantic tense. This section considers two well known analyses of
tense. My main aims are to highlight the relevance theoretic
distinctions between pragmatics and semantics, on the e hand, and
two kinds of semantjce (linguistic semantics and truth-conditional
18
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semantics), on the other, by looking at examples which ifiustrate the
contribution of tense and aspect to utterance interpretation.
1.3.1 Jespersen's analysis of tense
In terms of traditional grammar tense is a verbal form
expressing time. We conceive of time as past, present and future, and
tense forms tell us which of these three is being talked about. In
Jespersen's own words:
It is important to keep the two concepts time and tense
strictly apart. The former is common to all mankind and
is independent of language; the latter varies from
Language to Language and is the Linguistic expression of
time-relations, so far as these are indicated in verb jbr,ns;
By the essence of time itself, or at any rate by a necessity
of our thinking, we are obliged to figure to ourselves time
as something having one dimension only, thus capable of
being represented by one straight line.
(Jespersen (1961:1))
The relevant conceptual temporal distinctions on the time line are
schematically represented in Figure 1:
Ai	 Ah A	 B	 (	 eb ('
A: past	 C: future
Fig.1.
19
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The subdivisions read as follows: 	 - before past (e.g. John
had already left at five); - past (e.g. John left at five); - after past
(e.g. John was to leave at five); B - present (e.g. John is at the party);
- before future (e.g. John will have left by five); Q - future (John
will leave at five) Q - after future (e.g. If John arrives, Mary will soon
be leaving). Jespersen also recognises that 'we have other time
relations which do not fit into the series because they imply something
else beside the pure idea of time' (p.360). He calls them prospective and
retrospective, and indicates them by means of arrows. For example,
(4—B) is retrospective present (as in John has arrived), (B—p) is the
prospective present, (as in John is about to leave). As Jespersen's own
examples show, the temporal location of states of iffir8 or events
described by the utterance is largely determined by the context, both
extra-linguistic (e.g. in John left at five, when exactly did John leave?
At five on the day of the utterance, the day before, or the Tuesday before
the day of the utterance) and linguistic (e.g. in If John arrives, Mary
will soon be leaving, it is not clear whether Mary's leaving is to take
place soon after the time of communication or soon after John's arrival).
The good side of Jespersen's system is that it can accommodate
a wide range of temporal distinctions. It also turns out to be its nuin
disadvantage. The system is efficient, but - and precisely because - it
is ad hoc. Potential exceptions can always be handled by introducing
new symbols, whose number is unconstrained, or at best not
constrained enough to allow for theoretically interesting predictions and
explanatory insights. However, traditional grammar at its best, as
practised by Jespersen, had an important merit. It was explicit enough
to provide the basis for accounts which would not suffer from (some of)
its deficiencies. One such analysis of tense was proposed by
Reichenbach.
20
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1.3.2 Reichenbach's analysis of tense
Reichenbach (1947) developed a system of tense according to
which the temporal relations expressed by utterances can be
represented exhaustively in terms of ordering relations between three
universals: speech time (S), reference time (R), and event time (E). Let
me illustrate just a few combinatorial possibilities.
	
(12) a.	 E_R__..$ John had already left at five.
	
b.	 E,R_$ John left at five.
c. E_R,S John has left.
d. E,R,S	 John is eating pancakes.
e. S_L..._.R John will have left by five.
The past perfect, in (12a), by virtue of its grimniaticalised me2ning,
locates the event in the past relative to a reference time in the past, i.e.
a reference time preceding the time of speech. In (12b), the adverbial
at five specifies the reference time in the past at which the event
occurred. The present perfect in (12c) locates the event in the past, but
speech time is the reference time. This is presumably determined by
part of the grRmmaticalised mepning of the present perfect. Hence the
incompatibility of the construction with past time adverbials (*John has
left at five o'clock). On the most natural interpretation of (12d) the
three points coincide. The future perfect reading of(12e) is somewhat
misrepresented. The reference time must be in the future relative to
the time of speaking, but the event itself needn't be located in the
future relative to S. The event time may precede S or be simultaneous
with it Consider the following situation
	
(13) k	 Has John left?
	
B:	 Fm not sure, but he will have left by five.
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Speaker B guarantees merely that John will leave before five, not that
John has not left before or that John might not be leaving at the time
of speiking (cf. Comrie (1985:128)). This may be merely a notational
problem. However, there are other temporal contrasts which
Reichenbach's framework does not capture. Consider the fbllowing
examples:
	
(14) a.
	
John has done his homework.
b. John has lived in London (but now he lives in
New York).
c. John has lived in London (for three years now).
There are some significant differences between (14b) and (14c). While
(14a)normally conveys the idea that John's homework was due for the
day of the utterance, or the like, (14b), especially with the continuation
in brackets, does not carry the overtone of current relevance. In
contrast to (14b), (14c) clearly relates the situation to the present, but,
unlike (14a), the utterance (14c) describes a state of afflirs which
actually obtains at the time of communication. However, in Jespersen's
notation all three are instances of the retrospective present (t —B),
and on Reichenbach's, they are E_R,S configurations. If Jespersen's
and Reichenbach's systems are taken to represent the meanings
encoded by the tense forms of natural languages, they are clearly
inadequate. The main point here is that the two analyses of tense, even
when they are successful in representing temporal relations, do not
really capture the distinctions which can plausibly be regarded as
encoded in the language, but those that natural language expressions
receive in use. This is what I tried to illustrate by the contrast between
(14b)and (14c). Given different contextual information, as explicitly
stated in the brackets, one and the same sentence, may be used to
convey two different thoughts. The same point is exemplified in (15):
22
	(15) A:
	
What did you do on Sunday morning?
	
B:	 (i)	 I read the Sunday Times.
(ii)	 I read Robyn's review of Gavagai.
Each of B's answers may be taken to mean two different things: (a) B
spent some time reading the newspaperithe review, and (b) B read the
whole newspaper/review. Also, lbr some reason which needs to be
spelled out, (a) is probably, the preferred understanding of the answer
in (1), and (b) for the one in (ii). The apparently easy way out is to
say that these are not distinctions pertaining to tense, but to aspect,
and that the feature of completion is crucially involved. But there is a
clear sense in which this aspectual feature should be recognised as
significant for the temporal interpretation of the utterance. Consider
the examples in (14) again. (14b) is clearly about a state of affairs in
the past, while (14c) is at least partly about a state of affairs which
obtains at the time of the utterance. Thus, in a number of languages,
such as French or Serbo-Croat, (14b) would be translated by a past
tense sentence (Jean a vécu a Londres...; Jovan je weo u Londonu...),
and (14c) by a present tense one (Jean vU a Londres depuis tmis ans;
Jovan Evi u Londonu veé fri godine). Now, the examples in (14) could
be explained in terms of ambiguity. It may seem reasonably plausible
to assume that the present perfect is simply three (or more) ways
ambiguous. However, this would be a partial explanation. One would
still have to explain how disanibiguation is carried out, how the hearer
decides which of the meanings the speaker intends to convey by using
a particular form. In addition to this, the multiple ambiguity solution
presents a general methodological problem for anyone committed to a
Gricean pragniatics. It has become something of a truism that, other
things being equal, a simple theory is preferable to a more complex one.
In a line with this position Grice put forward the requirement (his
'modified version of Ockham's rasor') that ambiguities should not be
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multiplied beyond necessity. In other words: other things being equal,
the simpler the semantics, the better the analysis. I will show ]ater
that relevance theory which provides a reasoned account of the relation
between the meaning encoded by natural language expressions and the
meanings that they are used to communicate, constrains the
proliferation of ambiguities in a principled way, thereby making it
possible to maintain a fairly simple semantics. Moreover, the same
principle which provides the explanation of the relation between the
linguistically encoded mepning of an expression and the conceptual
content which that expression is used to communicate also provides an
explanation for disambiguation. The examples in (14) and (15) were
intended to show that the problem of expbiining the relation between
the linguistic meaning of a natural language expression and the
information communicated by that expression is a real one.
Reichenbach'8 notion of reference time is also of interest in this
connection.
The term reference time, which Reichenbach left undefined, is far
from dear, as illustrated by the examples below.
(16) a.	 John arrived too.
b.	 Tolstoy wrote many novels.
(17) That will be John at the door.
(i) John is at the door now.
(ii) If the hearer opens the door (or the like) be will
find out that John is at the door.
In both (16a) and (16b) reference time is in the past, but it is im1icit.
The speaker does not say when John arrived or when (Chakespear)
wrote many play) However, the specific point of time is intuitively
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more significant in (16a) than in (16b). In addition to information about
where John arrived, and who else arrived at the gathering which is
talked about, the hearer will want to know something about the time
of John's arrival, or at least about the time at which the gathering took
place. In (16b), very vague assumptions about the pastness of the state
of affairs described would normally be quite sufficient. So, the
questions are: How specific a representation of R must the hearer
arrive at? What does that depend on? In (17) there really seem to be
two reference times rather than one. The speaker is asserting his
commitment to the truth of the present tense proposition in (i) (hence,
the contradiction in That will be John at the door, but I am not quite
sure that he is here at this vely instant), as well as to the future tense
proposition in (ii). Not only is reference time partly determined on the
basis of contextual information, but more than one R may be conveyed
by a sentence with one tense form. What the -ed suffix and the modal
verb will indicate by virtue of their mepnings does not amount to a full
temporal specification of the propositions expressed by the utterances
in which they are used. In terms of truth conditional semantics
tensedness is a requirement for propositionalisation. For a
representation to be capable of being true or false, it must be
temporally interpreted, i.e. tensed. It would then seem that
Reichenbach's reference time is a way of thiking about this
requirement. If temporal interpretation of the utterance to the level of
a fully fledged proposition is a pragmatically driven process, like
reference assignment in the case of pronouns, and is in some way
guided by the meanings of natural language tense forms, the notion of
reference time seems superfluous. What is really there are the
meanings of the morphological tense markers, and tensedness as a
property of propositions. A possible way of preserving the notion of
reference time might go as follows. In (17), for example, the sentence
has present tense (assunilng that modal verbs such as will have present
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tense), the tense of the proposition expressed by the utterance of (17)
is present, as indicated in (1), while the reference time is future - it is
an indication encoded by the present tense modal will that future tense
assumptions should be brought to bear on the contextualisation of the
proposition expressed by the utterance (in other words, the derivation
of the consequences of integrating the proposition with other
assumptions in the encyclopaedic knowledge of the hearer). On this
view, it would be the reference time which somehow or other leads the
hearer to interpret the proposition (i) against a context which includes
(ii) and/or other future tense propositions. However, this leaves us with
the problem of expbining those uses of will in which the proposition
expressed by the utterance has future tense. On the assumption that
every utterance expresses only one proposition, one should be able to
test the tense by constructing examples like (17'):
(17) a.	 *That will be John at the door, but he may not be
there now.
b.	 That will be John at the door, but he'll be gone if
you don't open the door immediately.3
Clearly, the epistemic use of will in utterances like (17) communicates
two reference times: present and future. Examples like (lTa) and (1Th)
show that (17) expresses a present tense proposition. If(17) had future
tense, (lTa) would not be contradictory, but (lTb) would. I assume
that tense, in the semantic sense, is, roughly, that part of a mental
representation concerning the time at which the truth conditions for the
state of affair which that mental representation purports to represent
are guaranteed to be met. Obviously, the Reichenbachian notion of
tense as a relation between reference time (R) and speech time (S) is
not correct, because utterances like (17) have two reference times
(present and future), but only one tense (present). The characterisation
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of tense in terms of the relation between reference time and speech
time is simply too vague to be useful.
My aim in this section was to make the following points. First,
the meanings of morphological or other tense markers only partly
determine the temporal specification of the propositions expressed by
natural language utterances. Second, I hope to have shown with
sufficient clarity that aspectual distinctions may interact with
morphological tense markers and play a crucial part in constraining the
temporal relations conveyed by the utterance, i.e. in determining tense
as a semantic property of propositions. Third, the examples in (14) and
(15) show that the semantic contrasts pertaining to aspect, may play a
crucial role in the temporal interpretation of the utterance without
being grammaticalised. Fourth, Jespersen's and Reichenbach's
analyses, as well as those in terms of formal semantics, and many other
approaches for that matter, fail to do justice to the observation that the
linguistically encoded meaning of an utterance characteristically
severely underdetermines the content of the proposition expressed by
the utterance. This last point, the view that the content of a natural
language expression severely underdetermines the content of the
mental representation which that expression communicates is known
as the underdeterniinacy thesis. It is central to the relevance theory of
S&W (1986), the framework for the analysis to be presented in the
following chapters.
1.4 THE UNDERDETERMINACY THESIS - TWO KINDS OF SEMANTICS
The view of natural language as a code and of verbal
communication as being primarily an encoding - decoding process is
deeply rooted in common sense. It was taken for granted in traditional
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grammar and semiotic approaches to communication and still survives
in more or less moderate or disguised forms.
On the common sense view of verbal communication words and
utterances convey meaning. When a speaker produces an utterance the
hearer knows what the speaker intended to communicate by virtue of
his knowledge of the language. Proof: when someone addresses you in
a foreign language which you don't know, you are imlikely to be able to
work out what they meant because you don't know the language. The
common sense view has permeated the study of language over
centuries. Various definitions of the term sentence are ifiustrative in
this connection. According to Fries (1959), the following definition of
sentence was proposed (at around 500 A.D.):
A sentence is a group of words expressing a complete
thought.
(Fries (1959:9))
This definition survived for a very long time in traditional and
pedagogical textbooks of grammar, and was originally challenged on the
grounds that the term complete thought could not be adequately defined
and should, therefore, be dispensed with. The question of how ideas are
actually communicated by means of language was postponed for better
times and sometimes not considered central to the linguistic enterprise.
However, some definitions of the term sentence come quite close to what
would appear to be a plausible characterisation of the notion complete
thought. Thus, Ries (1894) defines the term sentence as follows:
A sentence is a grammatically constructed smallest unit
of speech which expresses its content with respect to this
content's relation to reality.
(in Fries (1959:17))
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Towards the middle of this century Sundén (1941) suggested the
following definition:
A sentence is a portion of speech that is putting forward
to the listener a state of things (a thing meant) as having
validity, i.e., as being true.
(in Fries (1959:18))
With slightly different emphases, both definitions are near
characterisations of complete thought as a propositional mental
representation. However, what matters to me here is that sentence
meaning is plausibly characterised in terms of conceptual content, and
that the relation between the meaning content of a sentence and the
conceptual content of the thought communicated by the utterance of
that sentence is not one of identity. It is the observation that sentences
communicate different thoughts when uttered on different occasions and
its consequences which are of interest here. The examples considered
in section 1.3 show that the temporal information at sentence level is
less determinate than at the level of the proposition expressed by the
utterance both with respect to tense and aspect. Other mples which
illustrate the same point are considered in this section. It is shown
that an inferential theory of communication can explain the gap
between sentence merning and utterance meaning, which cannot be
accounted for on the code model view of verbal communication.
S&W (1986) argue that pragmatics plays a crucial part in
establishing the propositional content of the utterance, and that its role
is by no means confined to reference assignment and disambiguation,
but is, in fact, far more significant than that. On their view the
decoding of the linguistic meaning of the utterance yields a mental
representation which they call the logical form of the utterance. The
logical form is characteristically a less than fully propositional
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representation, a structured string of concepts which needs to be
further enriched and completed to the level of a fully fledged
proposition, a mental representation (i.e. thought) capable of being true
or false. Carston (1988) gives a detailed discussion of this point.
(18) He went to the edge of the big rock and jumped.
(adapted from Carston (1988:165))
(1)	 He went to the edge of the big rock and jumped
over the edge of the big rock.
(ii) He went to the edge of the big rock and jumped,
but he didn't jump over the edge of the big rock.
What could the speaker have intended to communicate by the utterance
in (18)? On the most natural interpretation, i.e. the interpretation of
the utterance in the most readily conceivable immediately accessible
contexts, (18) would be taken to convey a thought like (i), although,
given the appropriate context, it could also be used to convey a thought
like (ii). The point is that one and the same utterance is used to
express two propositions which are not truth-conditionally equivalent:
the state of affairs which makes (i) true makes (ii) false, and vice versa.
Consider (19):
(19) A: Is John very badly injured?
B: The man went to the edge of the rock and jumped.
premise: If John went to the edge of the rock and
jumped from the edge of the rock, he is
probably very badly injured.
conclusion: John is probably very badly injured.
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The information that John jumped over the edge of the rock, as well as
the premise and the conclusion in (19), could only be derived
pragmatically (i.e. by inference), and not by decoding. But, the
assumption that John jumped off the rock has a different status from
the other two. it is construed as part of the explicit content of the
proposition expressed by the utterance, what is said in Grice's terms,
and plays a crucial role in the formation of both the premise and the
conclusion in (19). In relevance theory terms this representation which
is arrived at by the process of pragmatic enrichment and completion of
the logical form of the utterance is called the propositional form of the
utterance. The derivation of the premise and the conclusion in (19)
crucially depends on whether one assumes that the information John
jumped off the rock is part of the propositional form, the proposition
expressed by the utterance, and that it is an explicature (i.e. a
proposition which, in addition to being a development of the logical
form, is one which the speaker intended to communicate by his
utterance).
The premise and the conclusion in (19) are arrived at by
inference, as implicatures, implicated assumptions which the hearer
believes the speaker could rationally have intended to communicate by
the explicature of his utterance when interpreted in context. It seems
crucial to observe that implicatures have a different status from
explicatures. Upon answering A's question B may continue: By miracle
he's got only a few bruises, thereby canceffing the implicated
information, but not the explicature (in Grice's terms 'what is said'), i.e.
that John went to the edge of the rock and jumped over the edge. The
blocking of the implicature does not lead to a change in the hearer's
construal of the content of the intended explicature. But, once A has
assumed that John jumped over the edge of the rock, B's continuation:
He didn't jump over the edge, or He didn't jump over the edge of the
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rock will cause a major revision of A's assumption about what B had
actually said, the explicit content of his utterance. My point here is
that one and the same sentence can be used in describing two different
situations in the world, and that this difference cannot be explained
plausibly in terms of the linguistic menning of the sentence. The
knowledge that the verb jump, can only be followed by certain
prepositional adverbs such as over, up, down, and that the sentence is
possibly elliptical, does not undermine this point. The decision about
the manner in which John jumped, the dtrection in which he jumped,
and the like are not to be regarded as determined by the linguistic
meaning of the utterance, but by inference: by the formation of
hypotheses on the part of the hearer about what the speaker could
rationally have intended to communicate by his utterance. These
hypotheses are partly constrained by the linguistic meaning of the
utterance and partly by the way in which humans go about interpreting
verbal (and other ostensive) stimuli. Central to S&W's theory of
communication are the following claims about cognition:
Humans pay attention to those phenomena which are relevant
to them. In other words they pay attention to phenomena when
doing so is likely to bring them some cognitive gain. The greater
the gain, the greater the relevance. In constructing and
processing representations in their cognitive environment, people
aim at achieving the greatest possible gain while investing as
little processing effort as possible. In a nutshell, relevance is a
positive function of cognitive effects and a negative function of
processing effort.
Utterances are ostensive stimuli, they are deliberate alterations of the
cognitive environment aimed at attracting the attention of other
individuals. This grants them a special status amongst all other
phenomena which may impinge on us. Like any other ostensive
stimulus, an utterance comes with the speaker's guarantee that it is
worth paying attention to. In other words, every utterance comes with
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a guarantee that the effort required for processing it will be offset by
the cognitive effects achieved. This claim S&W call the principle of
relevance. On a more technical formulation, it can be stated as follows:
The Principle of Relevance
Every utterance communicates the presumption of its own
optimal relevance.
According to S&W the principle of relevance is a generalisation about
the way humans go about processing utterances and other ostensive
stimuli and the key to an inferential theory of (verbal) communication.
S&W argue that ostensive communication including verbal com-
munication is essentially inferential. By using a given utterance the
speaker makes it mutually manifest to himself and to the hearer that
he intends by using that utterance to make manifest or more manifest
to the hearer a set of assumptions (I). (According to S&W (1986:39)
the manifestness of a fact to an individual is determined by that
person's ability (a) to represent that fact mentally and (b) to accept the
mental representation of that fact as true. The set of facts manifest to
an individual make up that individual's cognitive environnient.) But
how does the hearer identify the set (U?4 The hearer makes
hypotheses about what the speaker conforming to the principle of
relevance could rationally have intended to communicate by his
utterance. The intended interpretation is the first one which is found
to be consistent with the principle of relevance. The essentially
inferential process of utterance interpretation is helped by the natural
language code. The meaning encoded by the utterance provides
evidence for the construction of hypotheses about the speaker's
communicative intention. But, in principle, the code is not a necessary
prerequisite for communication. Consider (20):
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	(20) A:
	
Is John very badly injured?
	
B	 pretends to have collapsed
A realises that B is merely pretending and starts waking guesses about
why B is behaving in that particular fashion. He could be trying to
communicate that John is sick, that John has lost cransciousness, that
John is in a coma, or that John is exaggerating as he zsually does when
he is not feeling quite well, etc. All these hypotheses crucially depend
on A's realisation that B is behaving ostensively. STappose A assumes
that B is really feeling unwell and has actually collapsed. A will form
some assumptions about B's condition: B is veiy ill.,, I should call an
ambulance, B must have sunstroke, etc. But once A realises that B is
actually trying to communicate by exhibiting these particular
symptoms, A will be led to interpret B's behaviour as related to A's
question, and will form hypotheses consistent with this assumption.
The game of charades is illustrative in this connection. Ostensive
stimuli based on imitation are very vague, so vague that it may be very
difficult, sometimes impossible, to work out what is being
communicated. This is why in the game of charades good players are
usually those who have established some code-like conventions which
make the task of guessing easier. For example, if th€re is a convention
like: one finger means one word, it is easy to work out what the player
intends to communicate by raising one finger. What is more, if the task
is, say, guessing titles of films, the raised finger will be first decoded as
meaning one word, and this information will be completed into some
fully propositional representation like: The title of the film has one
word. Natural language is a code, and although it does not fully encode
the content of the communicated information, it pro7ides a lot of very
useful dues about the speaker's communicative intention. Thus, in
(19), B uses a simple utterance and informs the hearer about the cause
of John's injuries, as well as about their seriousness. The natural
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language code only boosts the chances of successful communication but
it does not guarantee success, and is not a prerequisite for
communication. In principle, human communication is possible without
coding, and, just as in the game of charades communication is helped
by, but not dependent on, code-like conventions, verbal communication
is eased by, but is not in principle dependent on, the natural language
code.
In the previous section utterance interpretation was
characterised as a process which has two stages. The first stage is the
decoding of the utterance. The output of decoding is the logical form of
the utterance, a less than fully propositional conceptual representation.
The second stage involves two steps. First, the logical form of the
utterance is further enriched and completed to the level of a fully
fledged proposition. The second step involves the contextualisation of
this proposition, its integration with the bearer's general or
encyclopaedic knowledge, i.e. the derivation of contextual effects, such
as the implicated premise and the implicated conclusion in (19). This
is summarily represented in Figure 2.
phoneticiphonological
form
linguistic semantics
	 j	 decodinglogical form
pragmatics
propositional form (explicature)
real semantics
state of iffsiir in the world
Fig.2.
inference
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Three relations are distinguished here: (a) the relation between an
utterance and its linguistically encoded logical form; (b) the relation
between the logical form and the fully propositional form; (c) the
relation between the propositional form and the state of affairs
described by that utterance. In relevance theory terms, the relation (a)
is the domain of linguistic semantics, the relation (b) is the domain of
pragmatics, and (c) the domtin of real semantics (cf. Wilson and
Sperber (1988:134)). The distinction between two kinds of semantics
has far reaching consequences. Let me ifiustrate briefly some of the
consequences of S&W's account for an analysis of the expression of time
in natural language and temporal interpretation in verbal
communication.
The range of tense and aspect choices made by speakers of
natural languages under quite normal circumstances of everyday usage
has led some authors to take the view that the grammar imposes on
language users the making of a range of temporal distinctions which
are redundant, which are, strictly speaking, not part of the speakers
intended meaning of his utterance. Thus, Whorf (1952) cbiims that
English is unnecessarily more time-bound than Hopi, for example.
Quine (1960) is also critical:
Our ordinary language shows a tiresome bias in its
treatment of time. Relations of date are exalted
grammatically as relations of position, weight, and color
are noL This bias is of itself an inelegance, or breach of
theoretical simplicity. Moreover, the /bnn it takes - that
of requiring that every verb form show a tense - is
peculiarly productive of needless complications, since it
demands lip service to time even when time is farthest
from our thoughts.
(Quine (1960:170))
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There are two interesting readings of the passage above. On the first
one, Quine is claiming that, when it comes to temporal distinctions,
human languages in general are encumbered with semantic
redundancies. On the second understanding, the criticism is aimed only
at some languages, and Quine is more or less reiterating Whorl's (1952)
remark that English grammaticalises (unnecessarily) many temporal
distinctions in comparison with languages like Hopi, for example. As
far as I can see, Quine's intended interpretation is the first one.
However, whichever reading one attributes to Quine, the view
expressed in the passage above seems to be untenable. The temporal
information encoded by tense and aspect markers is rather vague and
less specific than the conceptual content of the proposition expressed by
the utterance. Some constructions like the present perfect progressive
(e.g. Peter has been eating the jam) provide considerable evidence about
the temporal interpretation of the utterance, but they actually fall short
of being fully specific. Is the event described by the utterance still going
on at the time of communication (as in Peter's been eating the jam all
morning and obviously doesn't intend to stop, as opposed to Peter's been
eating the jam again, the pot's empty)? Is the event of short or long
duration? Did it take place in the relatively proximate or in the
relatively distant past? The linguistic meaning of the present perfect
progressive construction does not answer any of these questions.
Hence, Quine's and Whorl's claims appear to be dead wrong. Let me
consider just one more example which illustrates the temporal
underspecification of the utterance at the level of linguistic meaning.
(21) She gave him her key and he opened the door.
(Carston (1988:161))
The utterance of the sentence (21) may be taken to express a thought
like (22):
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(22) She1 gave him2
 [her1 key]3 at I and he2 opened the door at
t + n using [the keyl3
The meaning expressed by the utterance (21), represented in (22),
cannot plausibly be taken to be determined by its linguistic meaning.
Who gave which key to whom is pragmatically (Le. inferentially)
established. Depending on the context, the senteflce (21) may be used
to convey the idea: Mary gave Peter the key ... or Jane gave John the
key ... and so on, but not: Peter gave Marj the key ... or John gave Jane
the key .... These latter interpretations are precluded by the meaning
of the personal pronoun she, which requires that its referent be female.
Carston (1988:161) considers briefly the similarity between the
interpretation of personal pronouns and tense forms. Three
observations seem particularly important in this connection.
First, just as the linguistic meming of pronoune does not fully
determine their referents, the temporal information encoded by tense
forms does not encode reference to fixed moments in time. Therefore,
the t and the t+n in (22) are pragmatically established. The past tense
forms gave and opened explicitly indicate that past tame eveis are
talked about. At which times in the past the events occed, is
determined inferentially.
Second, the linguistic me pning of the tense forms in (22) are best
considered to be even less specific than the mesrnillgs of personal
pronouns, as illustrated by examples like (23).
(23) I didn't turn off the stove.
(taken from Carston (1988:161))
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While the personal pronouns she and he refer to some particular
individuals, the utterance (23) is not necessarily taken to mean that
there is some specific moment of time in the past at which the speaker
did not turn off the stove. In Chapter four I argue that the progressive
aspect of English and the perfective aspect of Serbo-Croat encode
specific reference to particular instances of events, and are in this
respect similar to personal pronouns. Consider (24), for example:
(24) I wasn't turning off the stove.
Unlike (23), (24) would normally be understood as referring to some
particular moment, at which the speaker claims not to have been
engaged in the activity of turning off the stove. My characterisation of
the meaning of the progressive makes it possible to give a reasoned
explanation for the iniplicature normally associated with (24), roughly,
The speaker was doing something else at the particular time referred to
by the utterance, as well as the absence or lesser salience of this
implicature when the simple is used, as in (23).
Third, as Carston (1988:162) points out, it seems that the
linguistic meaning of a tense form is very much like the meaning of
indefinite pronouns. It is sometimes pragmatically narrowed down to
refer to particular moments or intervals, and sometimes not. Thus the
utterance Someone has eaten the cake may be taken either to mean
that some specific individual has eaten the cake, or simply as indefinite.
Rather than encoding very specific information about the temporal
location of the event, tense and aspect forms provide fairly rough
guidelines on the basis of which the hearer may derive the optimally
relevant temporal interpretation of the utterance. While tense forms
encode (some) information about temporal interpretation, aspectual
categories provide evidence about the intended temporal interpretation
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without encoding reference to the temporal location of the state of
affairs described by the utterance.
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Chapter Two
TWO APPROACHES TO ASPECT
The following account is confined to a consideration of the main
characteristics of two long-standing traditions in analysing verbal
aspect The first is usually associated with the study of Slavonic
languages and is normally called the perfective-imperfective distinction.
The second is the classification of verbs according to the situation types
they denote. It was originally developed within the realm of philosophy
(by authors like Ryle (1949), Kenny (1963), Vendler (1967), Mourelatos
(1981)), and was taken over by those specifically concerned with the
study of language (Dowty (1979), Lyons (1977), C.S. Smith (1983; 1986),
and others). My purpose here is to ex2mine some examples of aspectual
phenomena in order to highlight and explain the common sense
intuitions behind the two approaches, and to indicate some relevant
problems.
2.1 PERFEcTIvrn AND IMPERFECTIVFrY
The perfective-imperfective distinction and the classification of
verbs according to the situation types they denote have a crucial point
in common. As a nile, both are characterised in terms of the notion of
time. Perfectivity is defined either as involving absence of duration or
(de)limited duration (in terms such as wholeness or completeness
(traditional grammarians), presence of temporal contour (Hockett
(1958)), boundedness (Allen (1964)), discreteness (Morris (1984)).
Definitions of imperfectivity fall into two groups. According to some
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authors, the imperfective is to be defined as the unmarked member of
the distinction, it is to be characterised as unspecified with respect to
the defining feature of the perfective. 5 Others find purely negative
definitions of the imperfective aspect inadequate. Thus, Comrie
(1976:24) proposes 'explicit reference to the internal temporal structure
of a situation, viewing the situation from within' as the defining
meaning of imperfectivity. Consider the Serbo-Croat and English
examples below.
(1)	 a.	 Jovan ide u kolu.
b. John is going to schooL
c. John goes to school.
(2)	 Jovanjedjak.
John is a pupil.
Process verbs in the so-called habitual use, exemplified by (la) as
translated in (ic), and state verbs like be in (2) do not meet Comrie's
definition, since they are not understood as iruiking reference to
anything one would want to call internal temporal structure of the
situation. Comrie's solution for this problem is to assume that
imperfectivity is 'subdivided into a number of distinct categories, and
yet others where there is some category that corresponds to part only
of the meaning of imperfectivity'(pp. 24-5), while maintzaining the claim
that 'these various subdivisions do in fact join together to form a single
unified concept' (p. 26). Thus, the imperfective is said to be typically
subdivided into habitual and continuous, and the latter is further
subdivided into non-progressive and progressive (with the subdivisions
varying across languages). But, unless this, arguably, unified concept
in which such intuitively disparate notions cluster together is further
specified and the nature of the connections that obtain between the
42
TWO APPROACHES TO ASPECT
notions making up that concept are explicated, this solution amounts
to no more than a convenient stipulation. To the best of my knowledge,
no such account exists.
Definitions of perfectivity in terms ofboundedness, completeness
and the like, seem to capture something crucial about the meaning of
perfective verbs in a rather straightforward way. In contrast to this is
the view that perfective verbs describe situations as punctual, i.e. as
lacking duration altogether, (an idea originally due to the neo-
grammarians Delbrück and Brugmann and taken over by quite a few
authors including Saussure). Such definitions are to be dismissed on
the grounds of examples like (3):
(3)	 Preplivali su reku za deset minuta.
They swam across the river in ten minutes.
The verb preplivati ('swim across') is perfective, and yet, the utterance
will probably not be taken to mean that the swimming across the river
took place ten minutes after some point in time, as one would expect,
if the perfective is correctly defined in terms of lack of duration. What
(3) says, is that the swimming across the river took ten minutes. This
definition of perfectivity seems too narrow, rather than completely
wrong, because it does cover some perfective verbs such as stidi
('arrive'):
(4)	 Stigli su za deset minuta.
They arrived in ten minutes.
(4) wouldn't normally be taken to mean that the arriving lasted ten
minutes, but that the arrival occurred ten minutes after some point in
43
TWO APPROACHF TO ASPECT
time. This is presumably due to the lack of duration associated with
situations described by verbs like arrive, blink, die, etc.
So, the characterisations of the imperfective aspect crucially rest
on (a) the notions of lack of completion, and duration, and, (b), for
some verbs (and uses), on reference to the internal structure of the
situation. The perfective aspect apparently invariably involves (a)
completion, i.e. (de)liniited duration, and, (b) only with some verbs,
lack of duration. The classification of verbs according to the situation
types they denote, which I now turn to, apparently does better justice
to the intuitions behind the definitions of the perfective and
imperfective aspects.
2.2 SiTUATIoN TYPES
As has been said already, the notion of time has a central place
in the definitions of situation types. According to the classification four
types of situations are usually distinguished: states, processes (also
called activities), accomplishments and achievements. In Vendlers
(1967:97-8) own words: 'the use of a verb may [also] suggest the
particular way in which that verb presupposes and involves the notion
of time? Although Vendler admits that other factors are involved as
well, he claims that '...one feels that the time element remains crucial',
and that situation types are to be defined in terms of '... the time
schemata presupposed by various verbs, ...'. These time schemata are
generally assumed in the literature to be universal and differently
realised in individual languages.
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2.2.1 States and state verbs
States are characteristically defined as situations which do not
change in time, which are stable and therefore do not indicate, either
explicitly or implicitly, the beginning or the end of the situation. Each
of the verbs know, believe, love etc. in the examples in (5) conveys the
idea that the predicate which it is part of (know mathematics, believe
in ghosts, love cakes) is true of the subject referent, without suggesting
that the situation takes place in time, being consequently conceived as
transient.
(5) a.	 Jane knows mathematics.
b. Mary believes in ghosts.
c. John loves cakes.
Verbs which are used to denote states are usually referred to as verbs
of state or stattves. I will call them state verbs, as I find this term both
reasonably short and sufficiently dear.
States differ from the other three situation types in that they do
not involve change. Processes, accomplishments and achievements all
make reference to change, but differ with respect to endpoints and
duration. Furthermore, processes and accomplishments differ from
achievements with regard to complexity of change (Comrie's internal
structure of the situation).
2.2.2 Processes and process verbs
Processes are situations made up of subevents, successive phases
which constitute their internal structure. To say that a situation is
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perceived as consisting of successive phases is to say that it is also
construed as lasting for a certain period of time. The idea of change is
intrinsically linked to the idea of time. If a situation is construed as
involving a series of phases (i.e. changes which are not simultaneous),
it will be conceptually represented as involving time. This is why
process verbs are taken to denote transient situations. These verbs are
felt to involve beginnings (initial stages of processes) and endings (final
stages of processes), although they do not denote complete events.
	
(6) a.	 Jane worked hard for hours yesterday.
b. Mary ploughed in the field all morning.
c. John ran until he got tired.
The sentences in (6) are taken to refer to the situations of working,
ploughing and running as termirnited. What they say is that the
subject referent was engaged in the activity described by the verb at
some time in the past and that that activity came to an end. But in
none of the examples in (6) is there a suggestion that the situation
described involves some definite endpoint to be reached. It should be
noted, however, that a change crucially involves a beginning and an
end. A process verb can be said to denote a state of RffsirS which
involves continuous change, and which, therefore, relates two states of
affairs: one in which the change has not yet occurred, and another one,
in which the change is fully actualised and in which the effects of the
change can be observed. So, although process verbs do not denote the
initial and final stages of the real world events which they are used to
describe, it would be a mistake to assume that assumptions about these
situations' having endpoints do not bear on utterance interpretation.
The 'non-complete' process verbs differ from accomplishment VPs which
denote delimited situations.
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2.2.3 Accomplishments and accomplishment YPs
Accomplishments are situations which have an outcome, a result,
and which are conceived as involving complex change, and as taking
place over a period of time. In English, they are usually expressed by
verb phrases which include a noun phrase with a singular count noun.
The contrast between process verbs and accomplishment VPs is
illustrated by the slight difficulty in providing an interpretation for (7)
below.
(7) (?)John ran a mile until he got tired.
(7) is acceptable on the interpretation that the subject referent kept
running distances of one mile until he got tired, but the utterance
cannot be understood as conveying the idea that John started running
a mile and stopped before having covered the whole distance. It is not
possible for the speaker to assert without contradicting himself that the
subject did cover a certain distance and that he didn't do it. But no
such contradiction arises in (6c), where no idea of end result or outcome
is expressed.
The second distinctive property of accomplishment Vi's is that
they denote situations conceptualised as taking time to take place.
(8) John ran a mile in five minutes.
The adverbial in (8) indicates the time it took John to run a mile. In
particular, it is important to observe that five minutes is not necessarily
the interval of time within which the event took place, but the exact
duration of the event. (A reading on which 'John's running of a mile'
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took less than five minutes is also available.) In this respect
accomplishments differ from achievements.
2.2.4 Achievements and achievement verbs
Achievements are situations which are like accomplishments
except that they take place over such a short time that they are
conceptualised as momentary, or punctual. The contrast between (8)
and (9)15 illustrative in this connection.
(9) John recognised Mary in five minutes.
What (9) says is that five minutes after some point in time John
recognised Marj. In particular, (9) does not say that the event of
recognising lasted five minutes. Only in (9), but not on the intended
interpretation of (8), can the adverbial in five minutes be parapharased
as after five minutes.
A caveat seems in order here. The classification of verbs
according to the situation types that they denote apparently crucially
rests on assumptions about the metaphysical status of states of Rffirs
in the world. It should be dear, however, that the aspectual categories
are determined by the conceptual content of verbal predicates, which do
not necessarily accurately reflect the way the world is made. It could
be that there is no strict demarcation line between state and process or
complex and single change. Such knowledge would still not undermine
the classification which takes into account only the way humans
actually conceptunlise the world. In what follows I will talk only about
state verbs, process verbs, achievement verbs and accomplishment VPa
(as opposed to states, processes, achievements and accomplishments)
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precisely in order to make it clear that I am talking about concepts
without making any claims about metaphysics.6
How does all this relate to the perfective-imperfective distinction
of Serbo-Croat? How much correspondence is there between the
treatment of aspectual distinctions in terms of the perfective-
imperfective opposition and situation types?
2.3 TuE PERFECTWE-ThIPERFECI1VE DISTINCTION AND SITUATION
TYPES
What has been said so far suggests that the overlap is complete.
Definitions of imperfectivity, which insist on the lack of endpoints (i.e.
boundedness, temporal contour, or whatever is assumed to be the
defining feature of the perfective), encompass state verbs and process
verbs, while those which take internal temporal structure as the
defining feature encompass process verbs, but not state verbs. Both
accomplishment and achievement predicates are subsumed under the
label perfective, if perfectivity is defined by the presence of endpoints
(or by other near synonyms), but only achievement predicates meet
those definitions which take the lack of duration as its essential
feature. So, it may seem that the difference between the two
approaches is purely terminological, and that the situation type
analyses have the advantage of being more explicit in distinguishing
four categories where the other tradition finds only two. However, it
has been emphasised time out of number in studies on aspect in
Slavonic languages that perfectivity and imperfectivity are terms used
to describe phenomena peculiar to these languages. But, if two
classifications of aspectual categories, one of which is arguably language
particular while the other one is putatively universal, are to be defined
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in terms of the same notions, the language specific character of the
former classification remains unaccounted for. In other words, the
definitions of the perfective and imperfective aspects flail to capture the
difference between the perfective and imperfective verbs of Slavonic
languages on the one hand, and the state verbs, and event predicates
(i.e. processes, accomplishments and achievements) m languages such
as English or French, on the other. The mistaken assumption
underlying so many writings on aspect in Slavanic languages is
sometimes illustrated by the following passage from Saussure's Cours
which, apparently, lends support to it:
Les langues slaves distinguent regulieremerit deux aspects
dii verbe: le perfectif reprsente l'action clans sa totalité
comine un point en dehors de tout d.evenir; 1'unperfectifks
montre en train de se faire et sur la lzgne du tmps. Ces
categories font difficulté pour un francais pctrce que sa
langue les ignore: si el/es étaient prédétennines, ii n'en
serait pas ainsi.
(pp. 161-2)
The lack of the perfective-imperfective distinction in a given language
has often been taken as indicative of the lack of the lexical meaning
characterising one or the other member of the distinction. What has
been said so far shows quite clearly that this view ss not warranted.
Whether Saussure himself subscribed to it or not is a issue of no great
interest. The observation to be made here is that it is not necessary to
interpret the above passage as expressing only this untenable position,
because Saussure speaks about the perfective and imperfective aspects
as an example of valeur as instantiated in the grmrnar, i.e. as an
illustration of how languages differ in the ways their grammars shape
the functional identity of certain linguistic entities (un this case verbs)
such that the latter are not functionally equivalent to the corresponding
entities of other languages (see Chapter one, p. 17). But this claim does
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not entail that there is anything peculiar to the lexical meaning of
perfective and imperfective verbs, as opposed to those of the so-called
non-aspectual languages. What distinguishes the aspectually marked
verbs of Slavonic languages from mere as8ignlnent to a situation type
are the ways in which the perfective and the imperfective constrain
utterance interpretation. Let me clarify and exemplify this point.
2.3.1 Valeur
How do languages shape the functional identity of linguistic
entities? What exactly is meant by valeur? I believe that the term
valeur was intended by Saussure to cover all there is to be said about
entities of a language which pertains to the position of one entity in the
system in relation to other entities in that language, rather than to
their intrinsic conceptual content. The following points seem
particu1arly important in this connection. First, the term valeur is used
to capture something crucial about the merning of linguistic entities.
Second, as part of word meaning valeur does not coincide with the
conceptual content of an entity. Valeur is psychological, in contrast to
signewhichisapurelyabstractterni. Itakethis to be expressedin the
following passage from one of Saussure's followers (A. Burger, 1969).
Par valeur, au contraire [i.e. as opposed to signe)
Saussure entend urie entité linguistique 'concrete' (au sens
saussurien de "ressenti par la conscience des sujets
parlants"; GOde4 op cit. p.257 sous 'concret); aingi CFS,
15, page 26: "La veritable nature de ces unites c'est d'être
des vsileurs. Ce système d'unités qu<'>est (qui est) un
système de signes est un système de valeurs.
(Burger (1969:233))
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Whatever the exact relation between valeur and signe may be, it seems
fairly clear that by thinking of valeur as 'concrete' in the sense of
'recognised by the mind' (which I think accurately translates ressenti
par La conscience) Saussure could only have intended to say that valeur
is psychologically represented, although people do not have direct
conscious access to it. However, our verbal behaviour provides evidence
for valeur. For example, the use of the word cheap, in English is
constrained in some way by the availability of the word inexpensive.
And, although the Serbo-Croat equivalent of cheap, jeftin, is used in
that language in the sense of inexpensive, it doesn't seem plausible to
assume that jeftin actually denotes a more inclusive concept which
encompasses the meanings of both cheap and inexpensive. What is
more, cheap, as well as jeftin for that matter, sometimes conveys the
idea of low quality, while inexpensive does not, as Illustrated by the
different implications normally associated with expressions like: a cheap
film and an inexpensive film. But the difference between the two words
which is of interest here is a truth conditional one, the fact that
something may be inexpensive without literally being cheap. Native
speakers of Serbo-Croat find it reasonably easy to grasp the conceptual
difference between cheap and inexpensive, and express it readily in
utterances like: It's not cheap, but it's not expensive, either. However,
in eveiyday usage jeftin does the job, as it were, of both cheap and
inexpensive. Now, the question is: How do people monitor the relations
between linguistic entities which determine their valeur? Saussure's
view of valeur as 'recognised by the mind', if my understanding of it is
correct, concerns the representation of the relation between one
linguistic entity relative to others such that this position constrains the
range of (conceptualised) meanings (i.e. Saussure's sgniflcations) that
that entity can be used to express. It is the fact that we (somehow or
other) monitor these relations between words that may make cheap
inappropriate for use in the sense of inexpensive, in certain contexts at
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least. When asked whether his new colour TV set is cheap, an English
speaker may well answer that it is not cheap, although it is
inexpensive, conveying the idea that his new TV did cost a substantial
amount of money by his own standards, but is low priced in comparison
with other TVs. The use ofjeftin in Serbo-Croat to cover the meaning
of inexpensive is to be seen as related to the absence in Serbo-Croat of
a word which would translate inexpensive, in contrast to cheap. This
example illustrates the valeur of a linguistic entity as determined
purely by the co-presence (or lack of it) of other lexical items of the
same rank as the entity in question (in this example the word meaning
inexpensive). Speakers of Serbo-Croat have the concept conveyed by the
English word inexpensive illustrated here, but lack a word which would
express it, and must resort to a more complex expression in order to do
so. It is, of course, possible to use the two words cheap and inexpensive
indiscriminately. My point is that there is a lexical as well as a
conceptual choice in English, whereas speakers of Serbo-Croat
conceptuaiise the difference, but normally use one and the same word,
rather than resorting to a more precise, but also more complex
expression when they mean inexpensive. In relevance theory terms,
speakers of Serbo-Croat use the word jeftin when they actually mean
inexpensive, because it is normally the optimally relevant choice. In
most readily conceivable circumstances, the use of a more complex
explicit expression would not give rise to any relevant contextual
effects, but would require a greater expenditure of processing effort.
Hence, the speaker would normally opt for the more economical one
word expression leaving it up to the hearer to work out his intended
mepning. In other words, it is up to the hearer inferentially to arrive
at the relevant conceptual representation: How cheap is the item
talked about? By what standard is it cheap? For example, is it cheap
by comparison with the speakers finnces, or relative to the cost of
other similar items on the market?
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The notion of valeur is apparently also intended to cover an
invariant, context independent part of the semantics of linguistic
entities, which does not correspond to the conceptual content conveyed
by the utterances in which they occur. In order to exemplify the notion
of valeur Saussure used the famous chess metaphor.
D'abord un etat du jeu correspond bien a un etat de La
langue. La valeur respective des pièces depend de leur
position sur l'echiquier, de inéme que dane La langue
chaque terme a sa valeur par son opposition avec tous lee
autres termes.
En second lieu, le système n'est jamais que momentané: ii
vane d'une position a l'autre. Ii est urnS que lee valeure
dependent aussi et surtout d'une convention iminuable, La
regle du jeu, qui existe avant le debut de Ia partie et
persiste après chaque coup. Cette règle admise une fois
pour toutes existe aussi en matière de langue; ce sont les
pnincipes constants de La sémiologie.
(pp. 125-126)
Essentially the passage above depicts valeur as having two facets. On
the one hand, valeur is seen as variable, on the other hand, it is seen
as constant. The first is readily and plausibly taken to be the context
determined side of valeur. The status of the second one seems more
problematic. Saussure's followers have (sensibly, I believe) taken this
constant aspect of valeur to indicate whatever is constant about the
language system, including the context independent contribution that
linguistic entities make by virtue of their meing, to expressions in
which they occur, but their accounts are not an integral part of a theory
of the way in which conceptual content is represented and used. Thus,
problems arise regarding the status of the invariant part of word
meaning which, arguably, pertains to valeur, as opposed to the one
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which pertains to signification. This is well illustrated by A. Burger's
(1969) analysis of the suffix .ç- in French.
Burger observes that four tense forms, imparfaU, conditionnel
present, plus-que-parfait, and conditionnel imparfait may be used to
locate the event in the past, to denote a hypothesised event, and,
finally, to refer to a thought preceding the time of communication. In
order to identify the (constant) valeur of the suffix -e-, i.e. its invariant
contribution to the meaning of the expression in which it occurs, Burger
considers the possible answers to the question: Quel temps fait-il ce
matin? (What is the weather like this morning?) and points out that
tense forms fall into two distinct groups depending on whether they are
acceptable in answering the question or not. The four mentioned above
are ruled out. The acceptable ones are summarily rendered in Table 1.
il neige	 the event is taking place at the time of
it is snowing	 commumcation
il a neigé	 the event has tenninated but the speaker can still
it has snowed/been	 see the snow on the ground
snowing
il neigera	 the event can be anticipated on the banis of
it will snow	 evidence available
ii aura neige	 the evidence available points to the possibility of
it would have	 there having occurred an event of snowing in the
snowed/been snowing	 past
Table 1
According to Burger the unacceptability of II neigeait, ii auait neige, ii
neigerait and il aurai.t neigé, in answering a question about the state of
affairs which the communicators regard as actual at the time of
communication, is evidence for positing two classes of forms, one
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having the valeur actuel, the other inactuel. (I win call them actual and
non-actual.) Here is Burger's conclusion of the analysis:
La voieur du suffixe '-ç-' est "l'Uactuel'; il indique que
l'événement si,gnifié par le radical verbal est en dehors de
l'actualzté du parleur au moment de la parole. De là
découlent les diverses significations de l'ünparfai.t ((1)).
II se combine wit avec le radical de l'auxiliaire, qul
indique l'accompli', ((2)1, soit avec le sUffixe '-r-' qul
indique le "pronostiqué" [(3)), soit avec tous lee deux 1(4)1;
de là les significations du plus-que-parfait et des deux
conditionnels. Ii ressort de là que le système du verbe
francais n'est pus construit sur l'idée logique ou
psychologique de temps. Les diverses notions temporelles
que lee syntagmes verbaux sont aptes 6 indiquer relèvent
des significations et non des valeurs. (pp. 242-3)
Two important points follow quite clearly from the condusion of
Burger's article: (a) valeur is in fact part of the encoded meIning of an
entity; (b) valeur is not to be identified with the conceptual content of
a given linguistic entity at the level of the mental representation
expressed by the utterance in which the entity in question is used,
although it stands in an intrinsic relation of some sort with the
conceptualised information which the entities in question (for example,
the temporal and modal interpretations of the four tense forms of the
non-actual in French) are used to express.
So, the notion of valeur seems incoherent at best. On the one
hand, valeur appears to be a function of the context. That is valeur as
the position of the entity determined by the presence and salience of
other entities in the system. On the other hand, valeur is a function of
an apparently non-conceptual meining encoded by natural language
entities (words and morphemes), and their combinations. The mepning
in question is apparently non-conceptual because Burger claims that
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the temporal notions pertain to significations and not to valeur. This
was illustrated by Burger's treatment of tense forms in French, what
I have called valeur determined by the absolute position of the entity
in the system. No matter what combinations it enters into, the suffix
-e- makes a constant contribution to the meaning (Saussure's
signification) of the whole expression, although it is not part of it.
Structuralist analyses in general have resulted in conclusions siniibr
to Burger's. Thus, Twaddell (1960:20) claims that 'English grammar is
not organised into a time system'. But, what does all this say about
Saussure's passage on aspect in Slavonic? In what sense are the
aspectual distinctions, perfective-imperfective of Slavonic and the
simple-progressive of English, examples of valeur as instantiated in the
grammar? To some extent, the answer is obvious. Saussure talks
about Slavonic aspect as an instance of the grammaticalisation of
valeur. So, it must be the invariant contribution that aspectually
marked verbs make to utterance interpretation which is meant by
valeur in connection with aspect. The tension between valeur and
signification cannot be resolved so long as one looks at the natural
language as a code which fully determines the contents of the thoughts
communicated by the expressions in that code. The structuralist
approach is rigorous enough to disclose the discrepancy between the
linguistically encoded meaning of linguistic entities and the mesning
they receive in use. However, the lack of a theoretically plausible
explanation of verbal communication has had some serious
consequences. On the one hand, people like Burger and Twaddell were
pushed by their structuralist framework into a reductionist view of the
meaning encoded by the language. Burger's way out lies with
Saussure's distinction between valeur and signification, whereby
encoded in the language are (a) the meaning which determines the
position of a linguistic entity relative to others, and (b) the mesining
which somehow or other affects the conceptual representation expressed
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by the sentence in which a given entity is used. People like Twaddell
seem happy to acknowledge that the linguistically encoded meaning of
a given linguistic entity (by virtue of which the entity in question
makes a contribution to sentence meaning and utterance meaning) is
far less specific than the meaning actually expressed by the utterance
of a sentence in which the item in question is used. But then, Twaddell
like so many stucturalists has nothing to say about the apparent
discrepancy between sentence meaning and utterance meaning which
follows from their analyses. On the other hand, the lack of a plausible
pragmatic theory, and, probably, assumptions about literalness and
truth, underlying the commonsense view of language use, meant that
the core meanings posited for categories like tense had to be very
vague. These meanings had to be compatible with all the instances of
the item in use. Even examples like The train leaves at five had to be
taken as conclusive evidence against the view that English has a
present tense. So, how does relevance theory look at the issues at stake
here?
Relevance theory views human communication as an essentially
inferential process whose chances of success and comparative efficiency
are made possible by the principle of relevance. The inferential
communication process is boosted by the partial reliance of verbal
communication on the natural language code. The theory builds on the
realisation that natural language expressions characteristically severely
underdetermine the content of the information communicated by the
sentence (Chapter one, section 1.4). The underspecification of temporal
reference by the linguistic meaning of the verb form is ifiustrative in
this connection. S&W (1986:189) look at utterances with the present
perfect: I have had breakfast and I have been to Tibet.
The information concerning temporal specification recoverable from the
decoding of the linguistic meaning of these utterances is the same:
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roughly speaking, The speaker has had breakfast at some time in the
past, and The speaker has been to Tibet at some time in the past,
respectively. But both utterances are normally taken to have very
different temporal interpretations. The former is understood as locating
the event at some relatively proximate time in the past, the latter as
merely stating that the speaker did visit Tibet at some time in the past.
The difference in the meanings of the two utterances follows from the
principle of relevance. In every readily conceivable context the
utterance I have had breakfast has adequate contextual effects only if
understood as intended to convey the idea that the speaker has had
breskft comparatively recently. By contrast, the utterance I have
been to Tibet may be optimally relevant when construed without any
specific assumptions about the lapse between the time of
communication and the time of the speaker's visit to Tibet. It is the
assumption that the speaker is conforming to the principle of relevance
which leads the hearer pragmatically to enrich the logical form of the
first utterance, the output of linguistic decoding, to the level of a
proposition like: The speaker has had breakfast today, or The speaker
has had breakfast very recently. The hearer faces the task of
constructing hypotheses about the information that a rational
communicator conforming to the principle of relevance may have
intended to communicate by the utterance. Only some more specific
proposition will do in this case, because the inibrmation that the
speaker had breakfast at some time in his life or other will normally fail
to yield sufficient contextual effects to be optimally relevant. Rather
than fully determining the propositional content of the utterance, the
natural language code provides evidence on the basis of which the
hearer arrives at the speaker's intended interpretation. S&W argue
that a natural language expression may provide twofold evidence about
the speaker's communicative intention. On the one hand, it encodes
part of the information, part of the conceptual (ie. truth conditional)
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content of the proposition expressed by the utterance. On the other
hand, it may also encode procedural (i.e. computational) information,
instructions about the interpretation of the natural language expression
in context. For example, the personal pronoun I helps the bearer access
a conceptual representation of the intended referent by virtue of
encoding something like speaker. One might assume that speaker is
actually part of the proposition expressed by the utterance, that it is not
procedurally, but conceptually represented. Wilson and Sperber
(1990:107) argue against this view. They point out that an utterance
like I do not exist expresses a proposition which is necessarily false only
on the assumption that the personal pronoun I denotes the concept
speaker, but not on the view that the mesning of I merely encodes
procedural information about the relevant conceptual representation of
the speaker referent. Thus, on the first view, the utterance I do not
exzst expresses the proposition The speaker of the utterance does not
exist, which is necessarily false. On the procedural characterisation of
the meaning of I, the utterance I do not exist (when uttered by John
Brown, for example) expresses the proposition John Brown does not
exist, which is false at the time of communication, although it is not
necessarily false: one can conceive of possible worlds in which the
speaker referent of the utterance does not exist. On Wilson and
Sperber's account, this insight, originally due to Kaplan (1989), is a
strong argument in favour of characterising the meaning of the personal
pronoun I as procedural. In relevance theory terms, entities which
encode procedural information, which constrains the conceptual (i.e.
truth conditional) content of the proposition expressed by the utterance,
are called constraints on explicit content.
Other words like so and after all, discussed in detail by
Blakemore (1987;1988), present constraints of a different sort. Consider
(10):
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(10) a. John's just bought a new car. So he hasn't lost all his
money.
b. John's just bought a new car. After all, he hasn't lost
all his money.
The utterances (lOa) and (lOb) are truth conditionally equivalent. The
difference in the relation between the utterances in (lOa) and those in
(lOb) is due to the processing instructions encoded by so and after all.
So introduces a conclusion, thereby instructing the hearer to access a
context which includes the relevant premise(s). After all introduces a
premise, thereby instructing the hearer to access a context which
includes the relevant conclusion(s). As a result, John's just bought a
new car is treated as evidence in (lOa) and as something like (partial)
consequence in (lOb). Discourse connectives such as so and after all do
not contribute to the conceptual (i.e. truth conditional) contents of the
utterances in which they appear, but reduce the processing effort
required for the contextualisation. In relevance theory terms, discourse
connectives are said to encode constraints on implicatures. It seems to
me that these relevance theoretic distinctions explain the intuitions
underlying the Saussurean notion of valeur.
The notion of valeur in connection with examples of lexical
choice, like cheap/inexpensive of English as opposed to jeftin of Serbo-
Croat, can be explained in terms of the way in which considerations of
processing effort are involved in determining the use of a given
linguistic entity. Also, relevance theory considers words (or phrases for
that matter) as labels for concepts, but does not stipulate that the
linguistically encoded meRning of a given entity fully determines the
conceptual content which that entity is intended to communicate on
every occasion.
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If Burger's idea about the actual/non-actual distinction (in what one
would standardly call the linguistic expression of tense in French) is
roughly correct, the category of tense should possibly be analysed in
terms of linguistically encoded constraints on explicit content This
would explain how the constant contribution of a category to the
interpretation of the utterance (valeur), is not part of the conceptual
(i.e. truth conditional) content of the mental representation which that
utterance purports to represent (signification).
The remarks on underdeterminacy with regard to the categories
of tense and aspect in Chapter one suggest two possible ways of
analysing these categories within the framework of relevance theory:
as constraints on explicit content or as conceptually encoded. The
evidence presented so far is sufficient strongly to suggest that the
categories of aspect and tense are not to be analysed in terms of
constraints on implicatures, because they do constrain the conceptual
content of the proposition expressed by the utterance. Whether
aspectual categories encode procedural constraints on explicit content
ultimately depends on arguments like the one given for the personal
pronoun L Thus, the perfect of English may seem to encode a contraint
on explicit content. Consider the utterances in (11) and (11'):
(11) a. John scored a goal.
b. John has scored a goal.
(Smith (1981:159))
(11') a. *John scored a goal, but be hasn't scored a goal.
b. *John has scored a goal, but he didn't score a goaL
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On the basis of examples like (11) and (11'), Smith (1981) argues that
the simple past and the present perfect forms are truth conditionally
equivalent Were this not so (11'a) and (11'b) would, presumably, not
(necessarily) be contradictory. So, the present perfect would appear to
encode a constraint on implicatures, rather than a constraint on explicit
content. But, once the consequences of the underdeterminacy thesis are
fully appreciated, once it has been demonstrated that pragmatics plays
a part in establishing the truth conditional content of the proposition
expressed by the utterance, this conclusion no longer seems to be
warranted. The most that tests like (11') can show is that there is no
difference between the conceptual mepnings of the simple past and the
present perfect. In other words, it would seem that (11') lends fairly
strong support for the conclusion that (ha) and (lib) are equivalent at
the level of logical form. On the assumption that this is actually the
case, one could easily explain the intuition that (ha) is more likely to
be taken as locating the event in the more distant past than (lib) in
terms of a constraint on explicit content encoded by the present perfect,
but not by the simple past. Hence, the possibility that the present
perfect actually encodes a constraint on explicit content would seem to
be quite plausible.
However, I have serious doubts about this argument, more
specifically, about the premise that the logical forms of(lla) and (lib)
are actually identical. Let's assume that the simple past tense encodes
a concept like past, without actually specifying relative to what moment
in time the event is located in the past. Then, an utterance like (ha)
will be interpreted as locating the event in the past relative to the time
of speech, because the time of speech is the most accessible time. The
present perfect would probably differ from the simple past tense in this
respect, because it makes explicit reference to the present.
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I believe that the present perfect indicates by virtiae of its
linguistic meaning that the state of nffirs described by the iatterance
obtains before the time indicated by morphological tense. Consider
again the examples with the present perfect given in Chapter one ((14b)
and (14c), repeated as (12a) and (12b)):
	
(12) a.
	
John has lived in London (but now he lives in New
York).
	
b.	 John has lived in London (for three years now).
The present tense in these examples indicates that present is the time
at which the truth conditions for the proposition are met. The perfect
indicates that the truth conditions for the state of affairs described by
the utterance are also satisfied at some time (or other) which precedes
the time indicated by tense. How does this work for (12a) and (12b)?
Well, (12a) describes a state of affairs which no longer obtains in the
present. That much is made clear by the context, as shown by the
continuation in brackets. So, the hearer pragmatically establishes that
the utterance is intended to express a past tense proposition, while the
linguistically encoded present tense indicates that the past tense
proposition is relevant when its truth is evaluated at speech time.
Were this not so, the speaker would have used the simple past tense
form as in: John lived in London. In (12a), the use of the present
perfect is pragmatically justified because it spares the hearer the
processing effort that he might otherwise invest in accessüg some
assumptions about a past time context against which he would process
the utterance for contextual effects. By explicitly indicating that the
truth conditions for the proposition are met at present, the speaker
invites the hearer to derive an interpretation on which explicit
reference to present time in thiking about a past time event is optiniilly
relevant. How could this be? One possibility is that the proposition
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about the past time state of affairs is not to be processed against a
context which includes many assumptions about the past. Other
plausible hypotheses could be that there are at present some relevant
consequences of the state of fThirs in the past, or that a rather recent
past event is talked about, and the like. The interpretation of (12b) is
somewhat different. In (12a) the hearer inferentially arrives at a past
tense proposition embedded under a present tense, so that the
proposition has complex tense, as it were. In contrast to (12a), (12b) is
enriched into a present tense proposition. The contribution of the
perfect construction in this case is that the proposition expressed by the
utterance entails that the truth conditions for the state of affairs
obtaining at present are also satisfied at some time in the past: I have
lived in London entails I lived in London, although the proposition
expressed by the utterance with the present perfect (on the intended
interpretation of (12b)) is not a past tense one. Let me now go back to
my main argument. If I am right in chiming that the contributions of
the present perfect and the simple past to utterance meaning are
different at the level of logical form, then the view that the present
perfect encodes a (procedural) constraint on explicit content is not
tenable, after all.
Generally speiking, positing a procedural constraint on
utterance interpretation will crucially depend on arguments like the
ones for the personal pronoun I and the (present) perfect construction.
It is not clear to me that there are any convincing arguments for the
view that the meanings of aspectual categories are procedurally rather
than conceptually represented. I therefore assume that the aspectual
distinctions of English and Serbo-Croat are conceptually represented.
The idea that problems pertaining to aspect (like those with tense) are
related to the discrepancy between the meaning encoded in the
language and the conceptual contents conveyed by the putative
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aspectual categories in use, is exemplified in the remainder of this
Chapter. In Chapter four an analysis of the progressive and the
perfective will be given; the invariant contribution of these aspectual
categories to utterance meaning will be spelled out in some detail.
2.3.2 The aspectual categories of English and Serbo-Croat
compared
In certain uses iniperfective verbs of Serbo-Croat correspond to
the simple form of achievement verbs of English. Consider the
following examples.
(13) a.
	
John blinks.
b. Jovan trepóe [impert].
c. (?)Jovan trepne [perf.].
	
(14) a.	 Mary coughs.
b. Men ka1je [imperf.].
c. (?)Meri kihne [pert].
The utterances (13a) and. (14a) are normally understood as saying
something about the kind of persons John and Mary are. (13b) and
(14b) are similar in this respect, but also have a progressive-like
interpretation readily available. They are not descriptions of
individual instances of blinking and coughing (cf Goldsmith and
Woisetschlaeger (1982)). By contrast, (13c) and (14c), the Serbo-Croat
translations of(13a) and (14a) with perfective verbs, are interpreted as
referring to individual occurrences of a blink and of a cough,
respectively. This is reflected in the utterances' being felt to be
elliptical. Both (13c) and (14c) direct, i.e. constrain, utterance
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interpretation in so far as they call for further contextiaal information
concerning the occasions on which the events took place. Questions like
When?, Why? and What happened next? immediately come to one's mind
upon hearing (13c) or (14c) out of (the appropriate) coatezt.
Process verbs of English in the simple past tense are sometimes
ambiguous between an activity reading and an accomplishment reading.
The same is true of iniperfective verbs of Slavonic languages. The
similarity between the meanings of accomplishment VPs and perfective
aspect, makes it reasonable to expect that, when the -accomplishment
reading is the intended one, the perfective verb will be used in the
Serbo-Croat translation of the sentence in English. Btt this prediction
is not fully borne out.7
	
(15) a.	 Did John read/Has John read War and Peace?
(from Comrie (1976:113)
b. Da li je Jovan itao [imperL] Rat i nur?
c. Da li je Jovan proitao Eperfj Rat I mir?
The sentence (15c) unsmbiguous1y translates the question (15a) as
asking about John's having read the whole book, and yet (15b), which
allows for both a completive (perfective-like) and a non-completive
(iniperfective-like) interpretation, will be the preferred translation if the
speaker is believed to be interested merely in the fact of John's having
read the novel, without any additional overtones (cf. Coanrie, 1976:113).
The translation (15c) with the perfective will not be appropriate in this
case, because it suggests the relevance of other information concerning
the event, such as the time by which the subject was supposed to finish
reading the book. It may also be taken to indicate that a specific copy
of War and Peace is being talked about, or that there are some reasons
why completing the reading of the novel is particularly important. In
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other words, the perfective places further constraints on the context
against which the utterance is interpreted.
The examples (13) to (15) show that the imperfective normally
occurs in some uses where most definitions of aspectual categories
suggest that perfective aspect should be appropriate. The reverse
situation arises as well.
(16) a.	 They ran when the tram stopped.
b. Tra1i su [imperfj kada se tramvaj zaustavio.
c. Potrali su (perf] kada se tramvaj zaustavio.
The sentence in (16b), the Serbo-Croat translation of (16a) with the
imperfective verb, has two possible interpretations:
(i) the tram stopped first, and then running began;
(ii) the tram stopped while running was in progress.
(16a) with a process verb and (16c), its translation with the perfective
aspect, allow only for the first interpretation. The translation with the
perfective inchoative in (16c) is the more appropriate of the two,
because the imperfective verb in (16b) may invite the undesirable
interpretation (ii). So, although both process verbs and iniperfective
aspect are characterised in terms of the lack of reference to endpoints,
only the former occur in linguistic contexts in which they necessarily
have an inceptive, perfective-like interpretation. As the above emple
shows, the inceptive interpretation is available for imperfective verbs,
but it is not the only possible one. In this respect imperfective verbs of
Serbo-Croat are like English state verbs.
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The similarity between the interpretations of imperfective verbs
of Serbo-Croat and state verbs of English is illustrated by examples like
(17):
(17) Macbeth believed in ghosts when he saw Banquo.
Unlike (16a), (17) has two interpretations: one on which Macbeth
already believed in ghosts when he saw Banquo, and another one,
according to which Macbeth began to believe in ghosts upon seeing
Banquo. This is not the only interesting siniiiarity between
imperfective verbs and state verbs. Consider (18), for example:
(18) a.	 Charles believed in ghosts when he was a child,
and he still believes in them.
b. Mary lived in London last year, and she may still
live there.
c. (*X?/Djohn ran for several hours this morning,
and he may still be running.
d. Jovan je jutros trao nekoliko sati, i moda jo
uvek tri.
Although (18c) is (possibly) unacceptable, there seems to be nothing
wrong with its translation into Serbo-Croat in (18d). Since (iSa) and
(18b) with stative verbs, are also acceptable, it seems cbvious that the
interpretation of imperfective verbs is very similar to the interpretation
of English state verbs. But why do process verbs of English in the
simple form receive a perfective-like interpretation in es'ni pies such as
(16a)? Why is (18c) understood as a contradiction? I now propose
briefly to consider one answer to these questions.
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2.3.3 Viewpoint aspect
C. S. Smith (1983; 1986) takes the view that situation types
(states, processes, accomplishments and achievements) are universal
conceptual generalisations about real world situations. They are
aspectual categories differently realised across languages, which focus
on their different properties. The aspectual distinctions of particular
languages are subsumed under the term viewpoint aspect, instantiated
by categories such as the perfective-imperfective distinction of Slavonic
languages and by the simple-progressive distinction of English. C. S.
Smith's explanation for the problem raised by sentences like (16a) and
(18c) is based on her characterisation of the simple and the progressive:
In the perspective of simple aspect, an event is presented
as a whole The focus includes both Initial and final
endpoints; Internal structure is ignor&L This
interpretation of the meaning of simple aspect is
essentially the traditional notion of perfectivity; but I do
not use that term here, because the account of simple
aspect that I will propose in §3 departs somewhat from
the traditionaL Progressive aspect presents an interior
perspective, from which the endpoints of an event are
ignored. Thus the progressive indicates a moment or
interval that is neither initial nor final.
(C. S. Smith, 1983:482)
Further on, in §3, it is claimed that 'the invariant contribution of (the
simple) viewpoint aspect is the perspective of a situation as a whole',
and that 'this perspective is understood differently according to
situation'. Thus, 'in stative sentences, a state is taken to obtain with
no indication or implication about endpoints' (p.492), as exemplified by
'Susan knew the answef. So, (the simple) viewpoint aspect is
malleable, as it were, while situation aspect remains fixed. Since
process verbs, arguably, imply endpoints and the simple aspect
represents the situation as a whole, (16a) and (18c) are easily
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explained. When the simple is used in talking about individual
occurrences of processes, the completive interpretation arises in the
interaction of the meaning of process and the meRning of the simple
aspect. The simple aspect does not impose a completive interpretation
on state verbs, presumably, because state verbs do not make explicit
reference to endpoints, and because the meaning of the situation type
takes precedence over the meaning of viewpoint aspect Viewpoint
aspect can be overridden by situation aspect. However, there is no
reasoned account of what determines the precedence of the latter over
the former.
It will have become apparent from what has been said so far
that, on this view, the simple aspect is actually significantly different
from the perfective aspect in the traditional sense of the term, since the
meaning of completion in the perfective cannot be overridden by
situation type meining. Perfective verbs derived from imperfective
state verbs really invariably describe situations as delimiteth znati
('know') is an imperfective stative, saznati ('learn', or more precisely, 'to
change from the state of not knowing into the state of knowing') is
perfective, and, like all perfective verbs, it describes the change in its
entirety, i.e. as a whole. The difference between the simple and the
perfective was exemplified by the sentences in (13) and (14), and many
more ifiustrations could be given to confirm the conclusion that
whatever the melning of the simple form may be, it is crucially
different from the mepning of the perfective, contrary to C. S. Smith's
assertion. Furthermore, there is very little evidence from English to
support her view of the meaning of the simple. In fact, the only
convincing examples of the completive meaning of process verbs in the
simple aspect involve utterances where more than one event is talked
about:
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(19) a.	 They ran for the shelter when they heard the
alarm.
b.	 In the afternoon, when he goes to school, John
will meet his friends.
In (19a) the completive meaning is reflected in the lack of the
interpretation on which runni ng is simultaneous with hearing the
alarm. In (19b) the situation in the when-clause also describes a
complete event. However, both the simple and the progressive in (20a)
and (20b) are appropriately translated by the imperfective, as in (20c).
(20) a.
	
John washed his car from four to six this
afternoon.
b. John was washing his car from four to six this
afternoon.
c. Jovan je prao [imperfl kola od etiri do est ovog
poslepodneva.
The translation with the perfective verb oprati would not be acceptable,
unless the sentence was taken to mean that the washing of the car took
place within a subpart of the interval: from four to six.
(21) (*X?)Jovan je oprao [perf] kola od (etiri do est ovog
poslepodneva.
That perfective verbs may be somewhat difficult to interpret with
from ... to adverbials in sentences such as (21) is not really surprising.
The adverbial of duration suggests an interpretation on which the event
of washing the car completely lasted throughout an interval of time.
But, a situation viewed as a whole can be spoken about as occurring
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between two extreme points of an interval of time only on the
assumption that it takes place (possibly more than once) within some
sub-interval(s) of the interval of time indicated by the adverbial. John
could have started washing the car at four, and finished at six, but
what he was doing between four and six was wash the car, not wash the
car completely. Of course, John may have been washing the car again
and again. In this case, a continuation of (21) such as pet puta 'ave
times' would make the intended interpretation clear, and the utterance
would be perfectly acceptable.
(22) Od etiri do 'est Jovan je popravio kola, oprao ii i vratio
se kuéi.
From four to six, John repaired the car, washed it, and
returned home.
Sentence (22) is perfectly acceptable, as the linguistic context provides
enough clues to make it clear that the intended interpretation is the
one on which all the events described by perfective verbs are understood
as taking place within the time span indicated by the adverbiaL But,
if (21) is difficult to interpret because the immediately accessible
context would normally suggest an interpretation which amounts to a
logically impossible assertion (that a situation represented as a whole
is true throughout an interval of time, while its endpoints coincide with
the endpoints of the interval indicated by the adverbial), then the view
that the simple aspect describes the situation as a whole cannot be
correct. If this were a tenable position, (20a) would be just as odd as
(21).
An alternative to explaining the mepning of completion
associated with (certain uses of) the simple viewpoint aspect is to
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propose a pragmatic analysis, i.e. to claim that the perfective character
of the simple is due to contextual factors, that it stems from
interpretation, not from the meining of the simple form per se. As my
treatment of the simple is crucially based on this assumption, a few
remarks are made here, in order to dispel some initial doubts as to the
feasibility of the pragmatic approach, raised by an obvious potential
difficulty, illustrated in (18c) above, and repeated in (23):
(23) (*X?/!)John ran for several hours this morning, and he
may still be running.
The sentence in (23)is arguably unacceptable because it expresses a
contradiction. The proposition in the first clause refers to the situation
of running as completed, and the proposition in the second is the
downright denial of the first. It would appear that, if the pragmatic
treatment of the mesming of completion were correct, (23) ought to be
acceptable in some suitably convoluted context (given the criterion of
cancellability of pragmatically derived meaning.) If it were not possible
to devise a context in which the utterance would not be taken to
express a contradiction, it would seem that any attempt to deal with the
meaning of completion in exRmples like (23) in pragmatic terms must
be doomed. However, such contexts exist, as illustrated in (24), and
both the unacceptability of(23) and the problem it poses for an analysis
of the simple which does not invoke completion (i.e. endpoints) are only
apparent. The objection based on the putative unacceptability of
sentences such as (23) loses its force.
(24) a.	 John ran for several hours this morning, and, for
all I know, he may still be running.
	
b.	 Lily strolled along the beach,, and she may still be
strolling there.
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Whether the simple past tense form of process verbs like run is taken
to denote a complete (delimited) event or an incomplete one is clearly
a matter of interpretation, not of linguistically encoded meaning. I
return to the issue in more detail later. The main points made here
are: (a) that the meaning of the simple aspect cannot be characterised
in terms of completion and that the equation of the meaning of the
simple with the meaning of the perfective is, consequently, not justified;
(b) that a pragmatic explanation for the meRning of completion found
in certain utterances with the simple aspect i possible, at least in
principle.
I hope that this brief consideration of verbal aspect has shown
two things. First, that the characterisations of aspectual categories
within the two approaches exsimined are based on much the same
intuitions about the mernings definitional of the members of aspectual
distinctions. Second, and more important, there seems to be a good
case for claiming that the semantics and pragmatics of the binary
aspectual distinctions, like the perfective-imperfective contrast in
Slavonic languages and the simple-progressive opposition of English,
cannot be exhaustively defined in terms of the features of meaning
usually invoked in the 'definitions'. The examples examined reveal the
presence of residuary meanings which escape existing definitions and
are reflected in the interaction of the verbs, belonging to one or another
aspectual category, with the context in the process of utterance
interpretation. Let me condude this section by giving an outline of the
general picture of aspectual distinctions as presented so far.
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Putting it in the most general terms, the problems of verbal
aspect, as outlined above concern the characterisation of (a) certain
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universal conceptual contrasts (situation type aspect), (b) the language
specific devices for expressing (some of) these contrasts (perfective-
iniperfective, simple-progressive), and (c) the relation between the two.
The picture of aspectual categories sketched out so far, crucially draws
on several key words: change, time (more specifically, duration), and
delinutedness. Following are featural specifications of verbs (including
phrasal VP predicates), according to the situation type they denote
(Table 2), as well as of the perfective-imperfective and the simple-
progressive distinctions of Serbo-Croat and English (Table 3).
state	 procoss	 accomplishment	 achievement
verbs	 verbs	 VP.	 verb.
change	 0	 +
(i) complex	 + (I)
(II) single	 + (ii)
duration	 +	 +	 +
delimited	
-	 (-)	 (+)	 +
Table 2
perfedive	 imperfective	 simple	 progressive
change	 +	 0	 0
(i)complex	 + (I)
(ii)single
	
duration	 0	 +	 0	 +
	
delimited	 +	 0	 0	 -
Table 3
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What is the significance of the five '0' slots in the figures above? Why
are two marks in (Table 2) enclosed in brackets? The '0' slots are to
indicate that some aspectual categories may be indeterminate with
respect to the presence of a particular feature. Thus, neither the
iinperfective nor the simple encode presence or lack of delimitedness.
Similarly, both the iniperfective and the simple are readily used to
denote stative situations as well as dynRmic ones, and are, therefore,
unspecified with respect to the feature change. The bracketed sign
is to indicate that process verbs may be used to denote complete, i.e.
delimited, changes of state, contrary to what is usually assumed, while
the '+' marking accomplishment predicates as denoting delimited events
is enclosed in brackets, because quite a few accomplishment VPs may
be used in tilking about non-delimited events, a fact the significance of
which is sometimes overlooked. What about state verbs? ShouIci they
be defined as those which never denote dynamic situations (own,
contain)? If so, how is the aspectual character of those verbs which
may be used both as state verbs and as process verbs to be definect (live,
stand, etc.)? These and other related questions are addressed in the
following chapters.
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SUBJECTIVITY, ASPECT AND RELEVANCE
Aspectual categories are, it is often argued, indicative of the
speaker's perspective, or point of view, on the state of affairs described
by the utterance and this meaning is not part of the truth conditional
content of the utterance. There are at least two potentially interesting
versions of this position. On the first one, the expression of the
speaker's point of view is determined by the interaction of the linguistic
meaning of a given aspectual category with the context, and the point
of view expressed is to be pragmatically explained. On the second
approach, the point of view conveyed by a particular aspectual category
is part of its linguistic meaning and subjectivity is to be regarded as
pertaining to linguistic competence. This second position I will refer to
as the subjectivity thesis. In Chapter four I will pursue the first of these
approaches. This chapter considers subjectivity as a category in general
and as a facet of aspect semantics in particular.
Subjectivity is a term used in connection with the linguistic
expression of the way the speaker (or other subject of consciousness) is
involved in or looking at the situation in the world described by the
utterance. There are a number of reasons for considering subjectivity
in connection with aspect. First, it has been claimed that various
aspectual categories are expressive of subjectivity, so that these
categories do not merely denote the conceptual distinctions which make
a contribution to the truth conditional contents of the utterances in
which they are used. Second, a number of authors have emphasised the
significance of the expression of subjectivity in language. My
examination of the notion is based on the works of Lyons (1982) and
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Banfield (1982). The first account epitomisee a tradition which Lyons
traces back to Benveniste (1958) and which lays emphasis on the
linguistic expression of subjectivity. Lyons (1982) discusses a number
of phenomena relating to aspectual choice in the spirit of this tradition.
The second analysis is the most formalised, and probably the most
explicit, account of subjectivity in relation to aspect. Third, many
treatments of aspect endorse some version of the subjectivity thesis.
This is evidenced by C.S. Smith's (1983; 1986) notion of viewpoint aspect
(expressive of the the speaker's perspective on the situation), Whitaker's
(1983) account of the progressive in terms of experientiality, Kuno and
Kaburáki's (1977) notion of empathy, the widespread characterisations
of certain aspectual categories (cf Comrie (1976)) in terms of fbcusing
on a particular stage of the event, etc. Consequently, my assessment
of Borne explicit proposals concerning subjectivity and its linguistic
expression will have much bearing on those analyses of aspect which
more or less implicitly rely on some version of the subjectivity thesis.
The condusion that subjectivity is not a well defined term will carry
over to viewpoint, experientiality, empathy, /bcus and the like. The
reanalysis of the arguably subjective elements of language should also
make these other terms redundant.
My emination of the consequences of the treatment of aspect
in terms of subjectivity will show that even if there were a good case for
cbiming that subjectivity is grammaticalised in language, the notion
fails to provide a plausible account of the uses of the arguably
subjective aspectual categories. I argue that Banfield's and Lyons
analyses do not stand up to scrutiny, and that much of the evidence
they put forward in support of subjectivity receives a natural
explanation within the framework of relevance theory.
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3.1 EVIDENCE FOR SUBJECTWITY
Sections 3.1.1 and 3.12 are summary reviews of Banfield's and
Lyons' analyses. I look at Banfield's evidence and arguments first.
3.1.1. Overview of Banfleld's analysis
3.1.1.1	 Syntactic evidence for subjectivity
The distribution and interpretation of (w) exclamatory
expressions (Yes...., Oh,.... etc.), (b) parentheticals (...., he thought,
John realised), (c) forms of direct address (Sir,...), (d) addressee
oriented adverbials (between you and me), (e) quoted clauses, and some
other phenomena as well, provide the basis for Banfield's view that
subjectivity is grammaticalised in language. Syntaciically, all the
elements listed in (a) to (e), characteristically occur i independent
clauses, and cannot appear in embedded ones. Semantically, they are
interpreted with reference to the speaker or to some third person
subject of consciousness, depending on whether they are used in
discourse or narration.
So, the expression of subjectivity is evidenced and explained
syntactically in so far as there is a class of non-embeddáble elements in
the language. The existence of these elements provides the justification
for the introduction of the E (EXPRESSION) node which arguably
explains the ungrammaticality of (1) and the possible difficulty in
interpreting (2).
(1) *John said that yes he would be late.
(2) John said that he would arrive at five, yes.
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Banfield's syntactic evidence is important here primarily in that
it identifies a class of non-embeddable elements. Since aspectual
categories do not fall into this class, the syntactic arguments for
subjectivity, however good or bad they may be, do not properly apply to
them either. Aspectual categories fall into the class of, as Banfield calls
them, embeddable subjective elements, to be considered presently.
3.1.1.2	 Embeddable subjective expressions
The list of enibeddable subjective expressions includes: (a)
expressive lexical items 'whose full interpretation entails a reference to
the speaker...' (that idiot of a doctor, a devil of an organi3er, poor,
damn); (b) deictics (deictic adverbs, tense, first and second person
pronouns, which are arguably referred for interpretation to the main E,
rather than to S, when they are used in indirect speech: *Bjll said to
me, that 1 was stupid). All the items listed in (a) and (b) are considered
to be instances of the grammaticalisation of subjectivity on the grounds
that they non-truth conditionally encode reference to the speaker's
attitude towards the proposition expressed by the utterance (Banfield
(1982:57)). Their interpretation is explained in terms of two principles:
1E/lI: For every expression (E), there is a unique referent of I
(the SPEAKER), to whom all expressive elements are attributed,
and a unique referent of you (the ADDRESSEE/HEARER)
1E/1 PRESENT: For every expression (E), there is a unique
referent of the present tense, which is cotemporal with NOW4
The second principle ensures that present time deictica in
discourse are interpreted as cotemporal with the present tense, and
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that all instances of the present tense are also cotemporal. Taken
together, the two principles account for the assignment of the E'a single
point of view to the E's single speaker and moment of utterance.
Banfield also characterisea the sentence of represented speech
and thought in terms of subjectivity. She points out that there are two
competing views regarding the expression of point of view in narrative
fiction:
We have in fuel two radically different conceptions of the
presentation of point of view in language and literature.
In one, all language is seen as paradigmatically spoken,
and all other uses are derivative from the spoken
language. Hence, in all these derivative uses of language,
a speaker appears whose presence gives language its
characteristic structure. In the other, point of view
becomes a concept which can be independent of the
speaker's role in communication. Subjectivity is not
dependent on the communicative act, even if U is shown
through language. And if it is not subordinated to the
communicative function, then language can contain
speakerless sentences.
(Banfield (1982:69-70))
Banfleld then points out a number of characteristics shared by
the subjective expressions of discourse and the sentence of represented
speech and thought: non-embeddability and free use of parentheticals.
I will briefly illustrate these points here.
The sentence of represented speech and thought is never
introduced by a complementiser, (3a), exchimctives occur freely, (3b), as
well as topicalised constituents, (3c):
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(3)	 a.	 *That he was unhappy, John said.
b. Oh how extraordinarily nice workmen were, she
thought.
(Mansfield, The Garden Party')
c. Absurd, she was - very absurd.
(Woolt Mrs Dalloway)
(Banfield (1982:71-73))
Parentheticals are freely used in the sentence of represented
speech and thought.9 The main difference between subjectivity in
direct and indirect speech, on the one hand, and represented speech and
thought, on the other, arguably, lies with the fact that in represented
speech and thought, expressivity may be attributed to the referent of a
third person pronoun. There are, however, a number of other
differences between the sentence of discourse and the sentence of
represented speech and thought, because of which, the analysis of the
sentence of represented speech and thought requires a reformulation of
the principles which, arguably, govern utterance interpretation. The
central reason for modi1ing the general principle 1E/1I is the
observation that in the sentence of represented speech and thought the
expression of subjectivity is not attributed to the speaker. Thus, the
principle 1EII SPEAKER is replaced by 1EI1 SELF, and two further
constraints:
a. 1E/1 SELF. For every node E there is at most one
referent, called the 'subject of consciousness' or
SELF, to whom all expressive elements are
attributed. That is, all realisations of SELF in an
E are coreferentiaL
b. Priority of SPEAKER If there is an I, I is
coreferential with the SELF. In the absence of an
I, a third person pronoun may be interpreted as
SELF.
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c. If E is related anaphorically to the complement of
a consciousness verb, its SELF is coreferential
with the subject or indirect object of this verb.
(Banfield (1982:93))
The above constraints are construed as 'interpretive principles which
formalise processes which speakers or readers apply' to the sentences
in question. Having completed this admittedlly sketchy summary of
Banfleld's formalisation of subjectivity in relation to embeddable
subjective elements, I turn to her account of subjectivity in relation to
(the progressive) aspect.
3.1.1.3	 The progressive: simultaneity and subjectivity
According to Banfleld, the distinction between two kinds or
levels of consciousness is grammaticalised in language:
in language is already contained - as part of what
language knows - the very distinction between reflection,
Descartes' Cogito, the I am thinking, where the subject
knows that he knows, and the other conscious states
which underlie it and may never be reflected upon but are
the minimal required to be conscious as opposed to
unconscious.
Banfield (1982:210)
Lyons (1982:104) takes the same view, when he observes that
Descartes' Cogito ergo sum should be translated, not as I think,
therefore I am, but as lam thinking, therefore I am, and that 'however
we judge the success or failure of Descartes' attempt to found all
knowledge on the indubitability of self-consciousness, we must realise
that his application of the Cogito rests upon the thinking subject's
awareness of himRelf in the act of thinking.' The temptation to use the
simple present is said to arise from the lack of continuous forms in
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Latin and French, and from a misinterpretation of the meaning of
Cogito as habitual or generic.
Banfield observes that the English past progressive, like the
unparfait of French, exhibits an affinity for use in the sentence of
represented thought. This is illustrated by the examples (4) and (5)
(4) a.	 Emma looked out the window.
b.	 A few drops of rain fell
were f11ing.
(5) a.	 When Emma looked out the window, a few drops
of rain fell
b.	 When Emma looked out the window, a few drops
of rain were falling.
The sequence in (4a) and (4b) is adequately paraphrased by (5b) with
the progressive, not by (5a) with the simple. Banfleld exphinR this in
terms of a semantic feature which Bhe calls simultaneity and which is
associated with the -ing participle. This feature is obviously assumed
to be linked with subjectivity in some way. Simultaneity is a two place
relation. Something is simultaneous with somethhg else. The idea is
that the progressive is subjective because it encodes simultaneity with
the moment of consciousness (NOW). The deictic now which, in
Baneld's terms, indicates the time of consciousness, is compatible only
with the progressive, and not with the simple past, because, arguably,
only the former has the feature sunultaneity.
(6) a.	 A few drops of rain were now f11ing.
b.	 ?A few drops of rain now fell.
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Banfleld assumes that the presence of the feature simultaneity requires
a temporal antecedent. The only appropriate referent which is
automatically associated with an expression (E), and which does not
need to be lexically inserted, is NOW Therefore, the possibility of
using the present progressive in isolation, (i.e. without explicit adverbial
temporal specifiers) in discourse and the relative ditliculty of using the
past progressive in the same way are explained. In discourse, the
antecedent NOW is automatically assigned in the present, but not in
the past tense. Banfleki then argues that the progressive and the
imparfait of'represented speech and thought will differ from the same
tenses when used in discourse, because they refer to the NOW of the E
node and hence may appear without any explicit time adverb' (Banfleld
(1982:107)). I will examine the consequences of Banfleld's approach for
an account of the uses of tense and aspect in some detail shortly, and
will propose an alternative to her analysis of the progressive in Chapter
four. The point I hope to have made here is that on Banfleld's view the
progressive (and the impaifait) is (are) related to subjectivity via
simultaneity. I now turn to Lyons' analysis.
3.1.2 Lyons' account of subjectivity
Lyons (1982) takes the view that the role of subjectivity in
natural language must be recognised in linguistics, even if it cannot be
fully explained. He points out that 'the speaker's expression of himself
in his utterance' cannot be 'reduced to the assertion of a set of
propositions, without loss or distortion in terms of a neutral
metalanguage with an objective, or transcendent, point of reference.'
According to Lyons, the role of subjectivity has been ignored in modern
linguistics and philosophy of language due to the fallacy that language
is essentially, if not solely, an instrument for the expression of
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propositional thought' (Lyons (1982:103-4)). He points out that
utterances are standardly assumed to convey descriptive, i.e. truth
conditional, representations of states of affairs in the world, and
proceeds to argue against this position.10
Lyons' (1982:105) view (he refers to it as locutwna,y
subjectivism) rests on two claims:
(1) The self-expression of the speaker in his utterance
cannot be reduced to the assertion of a set of
propositions.
(ii) In both semantics and pragmatics of natural
language two components should be distinguished:
(a) a subjective component (the self-expression of
the locutionary agent), and (b) an objective
component (a set of communicable propositions)
(Lyons (1982:105))
3.1.2.1	 Non-paraphrasability u.s evidence for subjectivity
The notion of subjectivity, arguably, makes it possible to account
for the semantic contrasts between sentences like those in (7), for the
quotative in French, in (8), and the choice of aspectual categories in
discourse and narration in general.
	
(7) a.	 I remembered locking the door
b. I remembered myself locking the door
c. I remembered that I had locked the door
In what sense are (7a) and (7b) expressive of subjectivity? (7a) is
readily taken to convey something beyond the proposition expressed by
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(7c). Moreover, this extra element of me pning cannot be paraphrased
by a set of propositions, such as: The speaker remembers taking out his
key and inserting it into the lock, The speaker rernenthers putting his
hand on the door handle and checking whether the door is locked, The
speaker has a mental representation of himself in the act of locking the
door, etc. None of these propositions are either necessary or sufficient
to capture the meaning that the speaker may rationally have intended
to communicate by the utterance. The last one (The speaker has a
mental representation of himself in the act of locking the door) is, I
assume, necessarily part of the interpretation of (7b), but it could still
be argued on purely intuitive grounds that it does not exhaustively
paraphrase the speaker's intended interpretation of the utterance.
Again, the extra element of meaning could not adequately be rendered
by a list of propositions about the speaker's past realisation of himself
in the act of locking the door. On Lyons' account, non-paraphrasability
is a prime indication of non-propositionality, i.e. subjectivity. Other
expressions are considered subjective on somewhat different grounds.
3.1.2.2	 The quotative of French and subjectivity
Lyons addresses the following questions: What is the literal
meaning of (8), with the so-called quotative use of the present
conditional form of the verb? What does the term literal meaning
mean with respect to utterances such as (8), which are not clearly
ambiguous between a metaphorical and a non-metaphorical
interpretation?
(8)	 Le premier niinistre serait malade.
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Two points are made in this connection. First, (8) is truth conditionally
equivalent to (9):
(9)	 Le premier ministre eat malade.
Second, the English translations of (8) which seem roughly adequate
(given in (10)), actually differ truth conditionally from both (8) and (9):
(10) a.	 The Prime Minister is thought/believed to be ill.
b. The Prime Minister is reported to be ilL
c. We are given to understand that the Prime
Minister is ill.
Basically, (8) illustrates the same problem as (7), but the issue of
literalness seems to be involved in addition. Subjectivity in connection
with aspect is again somewhat different.
Lyons (1982) observes that the past progressive does not
preclude future time adverbials and that the progressive in general
allows double temporal specification:
(11) John was coming tomorrow.
(12) Yesterday John was coming tomorrow.
He argues that utterances like (11) can have two quite different
interpretations with respect to the reference time indicated by
adverbials such as tomorrow, and that one of them does not necessarily
involve the experiential mode of description (though it may be held to
do so in particular contexts), whereas the other interpretation does.
Lyons further observes that in utterances like (12) 'we do not need to
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invoke any notion of experientiality or of subjective projection into the
consciousness of another (though there might be other reasons in the
context, for so doing)' (Lyons (1982:120)). I will come back to these
examples later. Suffice it to point out here that the simple aspect also
allows for double temporal specification, as shown in (13) and (14):
(13) a.	 *pJohn arrived tomorrow.
b.	 ?Yesterday John arrived tomorrow.
(14) According to the original plan John arrived tomorrow.
The acceptability of the utterances in (13) and (14) is determined by the
accessibility of the interpretation on which they are construed, as
representations of plans made in the past, rather than being
descriptions of states of ff5lir5 in the past (see Smith (1990:105) for a
consideration of examples like (13) and (14)). The progressive, for
reasons to be discussed later (section 3.3.3.5), makes the relevant
interpretation more accessible and is, therefore, more appropriate for
this use.
3.1.2.3	 Aspectual choice, modes of discourse and
subjectivity
Aspectual categories seem to differ from subjective modality in
that they play a part at the level of the propositional content of the
utterance, by virtue of encoding information about the temporal contour
of the situation (I used the terms completion and delimitedness; cf.
Chapters one and two) described by the utterance. Lyons further points
out that there are restrictions on the combination of tense and aspect
categories:
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restrictions in the language system itself arid restrictions,
statistical if not absolute, upon the use that is made oft/is
system by speakers. It is my contention that these
restrictions are far from random or accidental: they can
be explained by invoking the distinction between a more
or less subjective mode of description, or point of view,
and associating the choice of one or the other with what
is normal for different kinds of discourse.(Lyons (1982115))
Lyons then proposes an explanation for the interaction between
tense and aspect by postulating a distinction between what he calls the
experiential and the historical modes of discourse:
The term [used here], 7istorical is intended to suggest
the narration of events, ordered in terms of successivity
and presented dispassionately with the minimum of
subjective involvement; and this mode of description
clearly relates to the static, non-deictic, objective
conception of time. The term 'experiential on the other
hand, is suggestive of the kind of description that might
be given by someone who is personally involved in what
he is describing; and this mode is no less clearly related
to the dynamic, deictic, subjective conception of time.
(Lyons (1977:688))
Furthermore, Lyons assumes that 'the historical mode is the norm from
which the experiential mode constitutes a deviation' (Lyons (1977 S89)).
In his view the distinction between the descriptive and the historical
modes of discourse provides a straightforward explanation for the
following regularities regarding the use of aspectual categories:
(i) The preference of the progressive for talking about
processes taking place at the time of
communication.
(ii) The preference of the simple for describing states.
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(iii) The observation that in narration, where events
are listed in order of occurrence, the aspect
appropriate for the historical mode of description
is the preferred choice.
Essentially, the explanation goes along the following lines. Processes
taking place at the thne of communication are readily and
characteristically represented on the basis of experience. Hence, the
progressive is the natural choice for describing situations of this type
when they are simultaneous with speech time. States are not
characteristically thought of as represented on the basis of experience.
In addition to this, they do not involve change. Hence, the simple is the
appropriate form for talking about states, regardless of whether they
obtain in the past or in the present. The third point merely states the
fact that in narration the speaker or writer characteristically relates the
events factually, rather than in terms of his own, or someone else's,
experiential involvement in these events. This is a rough summary, but
it is, I hope, sufficiently representative of Lyons' position to allow for a
consideration of the accounts of tense and aspect choice in terms of
subjectivity. The following section looks at the implications of Banfield's
and Lyons' ideas for an analysis of aspectual choice in English and
Serbo-Croat.
3.2 TUE USES OF TENSE-ASPECT FORMS
Four notions play a central role in Banfield's (1982:112-67)
analysis of the uses of tense and aspect categones:
(i) SELF (the subject of consciousness, and the
source of subjectivity);
(ii) NOW (the moment of the act of consciousness);
(iii) SPEAKER;
(iv) PRESENT (the time of communication).
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All four notions are asewned to be part of UG, and the relations
between them are constrained by four requirements:
(a) any appearance of the SPEAKER is at once an
appearance of the SELF;
(b) for every expression there is one SELF;
(c) if reference is made to the SPEAKER (the
personal pronoun I), the SPEAKER is
coreferential with the SELF;
(d) if there is a NOW and if there is a PRESENT they
coincide.
The uses of tense forms in discourse and narration, exemplified
in (15) below, are characterised in terms of the framework sketched out
above.
	
(15) a.	 rm reading a paper.
Citain lanak.
b. Black passes the ball to Fernandez, ... Fernandez
shoots!
Black dodaje [imperf] loptu Fernandezu,
Fernandez utira [imperfi
c. Elle vit la lune [aorist].
She saw the moon.
Ona vide mesec.
d. How my heart was beating now as he came
toward me!
Kako mi je sada lupalo [impart] srce, dok ml se
pribliavao!
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The progressive in (15a) is the present tense of discourse, where the
time of communication overlaps with the moment of the act of
consciousness (NOW), so that it is defined as 'PRESENT=NOW'. The
sentence in (15b) is an example of the historical present. In this case,
there is a time of communication, but it is not associated with an act of
consciousness, as stated in the definition PRESENT without NOW'. In
narrative fiction, there is no time of communication (since, arguably,
there is no communicator at all) and with some tenses, like the aorist
of French (but not the aorist of Serbo-Croat, which may be used
subjectively), there is no SELF and no act of consciousness. Therefore,
the aorist of French (passé sinzple), the simple past of narrative in
English, and the aorist of Serbo-Croat, when used in narration, as in
(15c), fall under the formula 'no Present or NOW. In expressions of
represented thought, the so-called free indirect style, there is no time
of communication, but there is an act of consciousness, explicitly
referred to in (15d) by the adverbial now. (If the time of communication
may be involved at all in examples like (15d), it is only in case the
speaker is retelling the events as if reading aloud from a book, in
utterances like Suddenly, it was getting dark, which are understood as
recollections of the speaker's past experience of the situation, and the
act of specking is unrelated to the time of communication.) The epic
preterite imparfait, the past simple and the past progressive in
expressions of represented thought are defined as 'NOW without
PRESENT'.
If subjectivity is really grammaticalised in the progressive, then
it seems reasonable to expect that Banfield's framework could explain
(or could at least provide the basis for an explanation of) the more
pronounced overtones of the experiential meining of past and future
time progressives. It should also provide an explanation for what is
known as semantic markedness (cL Lyons 1977:688-9) in connection
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with aspect. It is usually considered that in Slavonic languages
perfective verbs are (not only morphologically, but also semantically)
marked. One problem with Lyons' explanations in terms of the
historical and the experiential modes of discourse is that the notions of
experiential and historical modes are left rather too vague. Banfleld's
framework apparently provides for a more specific characterisation of
the two modes. The historical mode would correspond to the historical
present (PRESENT without NOW) and narrative (no PRESENT or
NOW) uses of tense forms, whereas the experiential mode would
include the present tense of discourse (PRESENT=NOW) and the
expressions of represented thought (NOW without PRESENT).
Markedness would, then, be explained in terms of the appropriateness
of a category in a particular mode of discourse. The relation between
Lyons' historical and experiential modes of discourse and Banfleld's
formalism are summarily represented below.
historical	 PRESENT without NOW the historical present of sports
mode	 commentaries, directions and stage
directions
no PRESENT or NOW narrative
expenential	 PRESENT - NOW	 the present tense of discourse
mode
NOW without PRESENT past tense of represented thought
That the progressive and the imperfective of Slavonic languages should
be unmarked in the present tense of discourse, would, then, follow from
the definition PRESENT = NOW. In discourse, there is a SPEAKER,
there is a PRESENT and there is a NOW. Since PRESENT and NOW
must coincide, and SELF is tied to the SPEAKER, the imperfective and
the progressive in the present tense are felt to be appropriate in the
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present tense of discourse. Both describe situations as simultaneous
with NOW, but the progressive, in which subjectivity arguably appears
granimaticalised, necessarily represents the situation as simultaneous
with the moment of the act of consciousness (NOW), while the
iniperfective may, but needn't be expressive of subjectivity. This is
apparently also reflected in the ambiguity of the imperfective aspect in
Serbo-Croat, in utterances like: Jovan ide u ko1u ('John goes/is going
to school'). On the one hand, this utterance can be interpreted as a
description of an instance of the subject's going to school simultaneous
with the time of communication and the moment of the act of
consciousness, as the translation with the progressive shows. On the
other hand, the utterance may be taken as habitual, i.e. as not making
reference to an individual occurrence of the situation or NOW, as in the
translation with the simple (see the discussion of the examples (1) and
(2) in Chapter two). The progressive would be marked in past and
future tense expressions, because it describes the situation as
associated with a NOW in the past or in the future and, therefore,
violates the requirements that SPEAKER and SELF, and PRESENT
and NOW must coincide. The simple form, arguably, makes reference
to the event, the progressive to an experience of the event by the SELF.
It should be noted, however, that the violation of a presumably
grammaticalised relation between Banfleld's universals would result
here in more or less pronounced stylistic overtones, rather than
unacceptability. Lyons avoids this problem by looking at markedness
as being both semantically and pragmatically determined, but he does
not propose an explicit account of the relation between the semantics
(i.e. linguistic meaning of a given category) and interpretation in
context. Clearly, if the subjectivity thesis is to be maintained, more
evidence and more detailed argumentation are badly needed. Let me
look at some seemingly corroborative evidence first.
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(16) a.	 He sat there for hours doing nothing.
b.	 He was sitting there for hours doing nothing.
An important difference between (16a) and (16b) would be that the
latter represents the situation as observed by a SELF (perhaps the
author or narrator), whereas the former utterance would not necessarily
at least) be so interpreted. That the second requirement (i.e. the
1SPEAKER/1SELF requirement) would be violated seems rather
obvious. It is claimed that (16b) makes reference to a moment of the
act of consciousness in the past, which cannot possibly be construed as
simultaneous with the time of communication, i.e. with PRESENT.
Then, the first requirement is violated in so far as the SPEARER, the
subject of consciousness by definition, must be located at PRESENT,
while the past progressive locates both SELF and NOW in the past. As
has already been said, the SPEAKER may be understood as relating his
own past experience. One would have to assume that, in this case, the
SELF is coreferential with the SPEAKER purely accidentally, as it
were. This is apparent in sentences of represented thought, as in:
Sud4enly, it was getting dark. She would be late for the six o'clock
train, where the third person subject of the second utterance is most
likely to be understood as the subject of consciousness for the
progressive in the first.
The marked character of perfective verbs in the present tense
could also be accounted for in terms of Banfleld's approach. I assume
that the perfective would be defined as lacking PRESENT (cf the
examples (13c) and (14c), Chapter two), Since the present tense of
discourse and the historical present require the PRESENT by
definition, perfective verbs would either be excluded from, or marked in,
these two uses. The perfective present would be ruled out as the
present tense of discourse. A state of affairs (I take it that events are
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states of affairs characterised by change) which is conceived as
completed cannot be at the same time construed as extending over the
PRESENT. However, the perfective present may be used with
adverbials of frequency, in the habitual, when the state of affairs is
represented as obtaining at a number of sub-intervals within the
PRESENT.
(17) a.	 Dodju [perf] nam u posetu.
They come to us on a visit.
b.	 Ponekad n.am dodju [perfj u posetu.
They sometimes come to us on a visit.
c. Dolaze (imperf.] nani u posetu.
They come/are coming to us on a visit.
d. Redovno nam dolaze [imperf] u posetu.
They regularly come to us on a visit.
The perfective present in (17a) is marked in so far as the sentence
would be felt to be somewhat incomplete on the interpretation in the
most likely immediately accessible contexts, although the most salient
reading is the one explicitly indicated by the adverbial ponekad
('sonietinies') in (iTh). (17c) with the imperfective present is readily
interpreted as habitual, in the sense unambiguously expressed by (17d),
or as conveying a futurate me pning. The latter interpretation may be
slightly more prominent, due to the singular noun poseta ('visit'), which
may suggest that a single visit is being talked about. The other sense
in which (17a) is marked concerns the implicature that, on a habitual
reading, the utterance is normally, though not necessarily, taken to
indicate the comparatively low frequency of events. On the
interpretation of an utterance like (17a) in the most likely immediately
accessible context, the adverbial ponekad ('sometimes') is felt to be more
appropriate than redovno ('regularly') with the perfective present.
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In the past tense, the perfective is standardly assumed to be the
unmarked, and the iniperfective the marked member of the distinction
(cf. Lyons (1982)). However, unlike the past progressive, the
imperfective in the past tense is not always felt to be marked. The
subjective character of the imperfective is context dependent. The
lexical meaning of the verb seems to play a particularly important role
here.
(18) a.
	
Iao [imperf] je na potu I slao [imperf,l pismo.
He went to the post office and posted/was posting
a letter.
b.	 Thao [imperf] je na potu I poslao [pert] pismo.
He went to the post office and sent a letter.
Only the iniperfective slao ('was sending') in (iSa) is felt to be marked.
The verb In the main clause, L4ao ('went', 'was going') is also
imperfective, but it is unmarked and is understood as merely stating
the fact that the event occurred. Perhaps a better translation would be
He has been to the post office."
The above observations on markedness bring to light certain
similarities and differences between the simple and the progressive
aspects of English on the one hand, and the perfective-imperfective
distinction of Slavonic languages, on the other. The progressive would
seem to be subjective regardless of the context, i.e. to be an instance of
the granunaticalisation of subjectivity. The imperfective, apparently,
may, but needn't, be subjective, depending on the context. The
perfective and the simple would have in common the lack of reference
to SELF and NOW as part of their semantics, but would differ in that
the perfective represents the situation as a whole, while the simple does
not. These condusions seeming to receive some support from the use
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of the simple of English and the iniperfective of Serbo-Croat in sports
commentaries, as in (15b), repeated here in (19):
(19) Black passes the ball to Fernandez, ... Fernandez shoots.
Black dodaje loptu Fernandezu, ... Fernandez utira.
The progressive would be excluded from this use, because it involves
SELF and NOW, while the historical present of sports commentaries
makes no reference to the subject of consciousness. The perfective in
the Serbo-Croat translation would be ruled out, because the historical
present is defined as PRESENT without NOW, and the perfective lacks
both. By contrast, the imperfective includes PRESENT, but does not
necessarily involve NOW, and would, therefore, be the appropriate
form. But why would this treatment of semantic markedness be taken
to confirm the view of subjectivity as grainmaticalised in language?
Only the progressive seems to be consistently associated with the
expression of subjectivity. The iniperfective would seem to be subjective
in some uses. The perfective present, apparently adequately defined as
'no PRESENT or NOW', may appear to be a strictly non-subjective form,
used as a narrative tense. But this is actually not the case. This form,
somewhat unusual in narrative prose (cf Stevanovió, (1969:563)), is
now found in the spoken language, when past events are felt to be
evoked and not merely reported.
(20) Idem ja pre neki dan ulicom prema Kalemegdanu I ba
onde na uglu kod Narodne biblioteke sretnem jednog svog
druga sa studija, pozdravim se sa njim,
The other day, Fm walking in the street toward
Kalemegdan and right there at the corner near the
National Library I meet a friend from my student days,
we say hello to each other,
(Stevanovi (1969:564))
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The italicised perfective verbs in (20) may be interpreted as subjective,
although, of course, the vividness of the perfective in narration would
not be conclusive evidence for assuming that the perfective aspect Ia
subjective. The aorist of French (passé simple) is also associated with
vividness, but, it is, arguably, not subjective, since it does not take
deictics relating the event to the situation of communication or to the
time of consciousness (llspartirent hier ('They left yesterday')A Jules
Verne, trop pondéré, je preferat maintenant lea extravagances de Paul
d'Ivoi	 ('To Jules Verne, too sensible, I preferred now the
extravangances of Paul d'Ivoi') (Banfield (1982:149))). However,
judging purely intuitively, the speaker in (20)18 not merely recalling
that the events took place, but also his realisation of the events as they
occurred. So, it would seem that both aspects of Serbo-Croat may be
used subjectively, but that neither is consistently associated with the
expression of subjectivity or lack of it. Hence, the conclusion that they
do not grammaticalise reference to the SELF seems inescapable.
Moreover, the evidence against the view that the progressive could be
an instance of the grnimaticalisation of subjectivity is also compelling,
as I shall now show.
While the subjective character of the progressive may seem
intuitively plausible in expressions with animate subjects, the presence
of a subject of consciousness remains unclear in those cases where the
subject is inanimate. Consider (21):
	
(21) a.
	 Is the phone working?
b. Does the phone work?
c. I think the phone isn't working. At least, that's
what they told me. I haven't tried to use it
myself:
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Of course, (21a) cannot be plausibly understood as asking about the
phone's awareness of itself in the act of working. It would, perhaps,
make sense to assume that (21a) does indeed make reference to the
subject of consciousness, but that the referent is to be sought outside
the expression itself. Who would be the subject of consciousness
referent in (21)? Probably, the speaker. What would be the role of the
reference to the subject of consciousness in the interpretation of this
utterance? Well, it could be argued that (21a) contrasts with (21b), in
that only the former would normally be understood as asking about the
addressee's personal experience about the phone's working, while the
latter would be concerned only with the addressee's factual knowledge.
But, this will not do since the progressive may be used even if the
speaker's personal (i.e. experiential) involvement in the situation is
explicitly denied, as in (21c). Moreover, the progressive is readily used
in linguistic contexts which apparently predude the presence of the
subject of consciousness, in the complement of raising verbs and in
impersonal passives.
(22) a.	 John seems to be working.
	
b.	 It is believed that John is working.
Not only are these progressives acceptable, but the progressives of verbs
which are normally used exclusively in the simple aspect, become more
acceptable in the complement of seem, as Sag (1973:88) observes:
(23) a.	 *Irn's knowing a lot about contraception.
	
b.	 ?Irina seems to be knowing a lot about
contraception.
One might still want to maintain that reference to the subject of
consciousness is (weakly) conveyed by the verb seem (cf. 'John seems to
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me to be working very hard these days'), but this would indicate at
most that the progressive has a certain affinity for use in talking about
events as being witnessed.
Obviously, the cost of mainthining Banfield's view of the
progressive as a subjective expression is extremely high. The treatment
of other aspectual categories, namely the perfective and the
imperfective, clearly indicates that the overtones pertaining to the
grammatical expression of subjectivity may be determined by the
interaction of the linguistic mepnings of aspectual categories with the
context, and that the categories in question do not grammaticalise
reference to the subject of consciousness. I hope to have shown that
Banfield's approach fails in a number of respects. It does not provide
an explanation for the difference between the grammaticalisation of
subjectivity and cases of pragmatically determined subjective
interpretation. Once the notion of grammaticalisation of subjectivity is
extended to include embeddable subjective elements, the criteria for
assigning particular items to the range of subjective constructions
remain mainly notional (cL the observations about the perfective and
the aorist of Serbo-Croat in section 3.2) and the account of subjectivity
becomes open to objections standardly raised against traditional
grammars. Virtually any category can be considered expressive of
subjectivity in some contexts. Intuitions about the interpretation of
sentences in use seems inevitably to lead to grouping together as
subjective possibly disparate phenomena.
Furthermore, even if the formalism made it possible
systematically to relate verb forms with particular uses it would still
have to explain how the non-standard choices are exploited in literary
style, for example. Lyons' distinction between two modes of discourse
seems at least equally problematic in this respect. It may seem
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plausible to assume that part of the process of interpretation involves
assigning the utterance to one of the two modes of discourse, but any
attempt to make sense of this view meets with great difficulties. How
would the hearer know which of the modes is in operation, as it were,
in any given utterance? Assuming that tense-aspect selection provides
the vital clues in this respect, how are the non-standard choices
identified and interpreted? It seems that the hearer needs to establish
independently of the text of the utterance which mode is being used,
and then interpret the tense and aspect choices, accordingly, as
standard, or as deviating from the standard. It seems to me that the
account proposed by Lyons cannot deal with the contrasts as commonly
encountered as those between: It was raining where the progressive is
normally marked, and It was raining when John arrived, where the
same form is normally unmarked. I cannot think of a plausible
explanation of ezRmples like these in terms of (the graxnmaticalisation
of) the experiential or historical modes, which would be remotely
convincing. I now look at Banfleld's and Lyons' arguments for
subjectivity in the context of relevance theory.
3.3 SUBJECTWITY AND RELEVANCE
In section 3.2 I started by taking Banfleld's framework for
granted and showed that it does not make it possible to explain the
choice of tense and aspect categories and the related phenomenon of
semantic markedness in terms of the grammaticalisation ofsubjectivity.
In this section I will suggest that a plausible analysis of a number of
subjective expressions needn't invoke either the distinction between the
two modes of discourse or the notion of subjectivity. In Chapter four,
I will propose an alternative and more explanatory account In the
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remainder of this chapter 1 look at a number of fallacies underlying
Banfield's and Lyons' analyses in the light of relevance theory.
3.3.1 Absence of SPEAKER
Banfield's account of the sentences of represented speech and
thought crucially relies on the assumption that they grammaticalise
absence of reference to the speaker. As a result, the sentences of
represented speech and thought are interpreted as expressing the
consciousness of persons other than the speaker. It is the
grammaticalisation of the Absence of SPEAKER that prevents such
sentences from being used in spoken communication. Two rather
obvious objections to Banfield's position impose themselves. First, it is
simply not true that the sentences in question are actually unspeakable.
Not only are these sentences speakable, but they are quite ordinarily
spoken. Second, it is not clear which element or elements in the
sentence of represented speech and thought grammaticalise Absence of
SPEAKER. Consider (24):
(24) It was getting dark. Now they would be late for the last
train.
The second utterance in (24) is most likely to be interpreted as
representing a thought entertained by some third person subject of
consciousness, and not by the speaker. If this is due to Absence of
SPEAKER being granimaticalised in this utterance one would want to
be able to identify the elements which grammaticalise this principle.
The most plausible such elements are the deictic now and the past
tense form would. But neither of these taken in isolation can be said to
indicate that the utterance represents a thought entertained by a
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subject of consciousness other than the speaker. And, taken together,
these two elements are more plausibly seen as providing evidence about
the speaker's intended interpretation of his utterance, than as
grammaticalising Absence of SPEAKER. On the one hand, the deictic
now points to the present. On the other hand, the past tense form
would indicates that the state of affairs of their being late for the last
train is to be understood as a prediction in the past. The most manifest
interpretation of the deictic now in this case will be the one on which
it is not the speaker's present which is referred to, but the time of some
third person subject's past anticipation of the event of being late for the
last train. It is unnecessary to assume that either of the elements in
question grammaticalises Absence of SPEAKER Moreover, the very
assumption that neither now nor would grammaticalise this principle
provides the basis for a natural pragmatic explanation of the speaker's
intended interpretation of the utterance in question. These elements
provide evidence for the interpretation of the utterance. Thus, the
expression of represented speech and thought is more difficult in those
languages which do not allow for the clues available in English.
Examples like (24) are somewhat difficult to translate into Serbo-Croat,
which, unlike English, does not have a future in the past expression
equivalent to would + in/. Possibly the best solution would be to
translate the first sentence in (24) by using the past tense, and to use
the periphrastic future (corresponding to will + inf.) in the second:
Smrkavalo se. Soda e zakasniti na poslednji uoz ('It was getting dark.
Now they will be late for the last train'). By virtue of being confined to
the use of the deictic periphrastic futurate construction in Serbo-Croat,
the speaker/author does not have a valuable means of indicating as
clearly as it would be possible in English that he does not (personally)
subscribe to the truth of the thought expressed by his utterance. The
intended interpretation on which the utterance is to be taken as
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representing a thought entertained by some third person subject is
therefore more difficult to arrive at.
I hope to have indicated the way in which a pragmatic account
makes it possible to dispense with stipulatory principles like Absence
of SPEAKER In order to show in gore detail what such an account
would be like, it will be necessary to introduce to distinction made in
relevance theory between descriptive and interpretive uses of utterances.
Let me look first at Lyons' criticism of what he calls the descriptive
fallacy.
3.3.2 'The descriptive fallacy'
In his criticism of what he calls the descriptive fallacy Lyons
(1982) refers to a number of approaches to the study of language which
'pay no attention to the non-propositional and non-assertive components
of language or play down their importance'. I will argue that Lyons is
right in dismissing the strictly descriptivist view of language, but that
his criticism is not radical enough. Rather than dismissing the position
which he criticises, Lyons takes the view that it is merely not
comprehensive enough. His requirement for distinguishing between an
objective (truth conditional) and a subjective (non-truth conditional)
component in language assumes (some version of) the Gricean maxim
of truthfulness (with the concomitant view of literalness as the norm in
utterance interpretation). Along with most theoretically minded
approaches to the study of language, Lyons assumes that language is
principally used descriptively, that (as a rule) natural language
utterances faithfully (i.e. literally) represent 8peakers' thoughts which
are descriptive (i.e. truth conditional) representations of situations in
the world. In other words, as rule, the speaker is assumed to subscribe
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to the truth of the proposition expressed by his utterance. Lyons
observes that the descriptivist view is not warranted. On the one hand,
many utterances cannot adequately be paraphrased in terms of a set of
propositions. On the other hand, it is difficult to establish (the import
of) the literal meaning of utterances which are not clearly ambiguous
between a literal and a metaphorical (i.e. non-truth conditional)
interpretation (see section 3.1.2, this chapter). The non-paraphraseable
(more or less) literally used expressions as well as those to which the
term literalness arguably does not apply are then to be explained in
terms of the linguistically encoded or pragmatically induced subjective
meaning, which combines in some way with the objective (in other
words, descriptive or truth conditional) meaning. Lyons and Banfleld
are, I think, in agreement about the inadequacy of the descriptivist
approach, but have diverging views on the interaction between the
descriptive and the subjective facets of utterance meaning. While Lyons
looks at this relation as a continuum with strictly descriptive meaning
at one end (e.g. I remembered that I had switched off the light) and
entirely subjective meaning at the other (e.g. I remembered switching
off the light), Banfield distinguishes three relatively discrete situations:
descriptive utterances, subjective utterances expressing reflective
consciousness, and subjective utterances expressing non-reflective
consciousness. Let me briefly look at Banfleld's distinction between
these two levels of consciousness.
Banfield takes over the notions of reflective and non-reflective
consciousness from Kuroda (1976), and proposes an epistemological
justification for this dichotomy based on Russell's and Sartre's ideas.
Roughly speaking, non-reflective consciousness implies mere awareness
of the subject of consciousness sufficient to influence behaviour,
whereas reflective consciousness involves the subject's knowledge that
he knows. Of course, every sentence expressive of the speaker's
108
SU8JCT1VITT MPW? AND RELgVAN
consciousness is an expression of reflective consciousness on this view,
because it is necessarily an instance of knowing that one knows. The
positive distinguishing features of the expression of reflective
consciousness are exciamatives (as the contrast between: He would be
late and Yes, he would be late illustrates), questions in free indirect
style (How could 1 do such a stupid thing?), and parentheticals (How
could I do such a stupid thing, John thought). The only positive
linguistic feature of the expression of non-reflective consciousness is,
arguably, the possibility of using a proper noun in referring to a non-
reflectively conscious se1f Thus, in a sentence like John would be late,
and all his friends would have left before he arrived the subject referent
John can be construed only as a non-reflective subject of consciousness.
The corresponding sentence (on my account, utterance) of reflective
consciousness would have to have the pronoun he as subject. How is
this to be explained?
In the expression of reflective consciousness the linguistic form
of the utterance is taken closely to resemble the thought entertained by
the reflecting selL It so happens that people do not normally form
individuating representations of themselves which include information
about their name, unless some form of sell'-address, i.e. self-
communication, is taking place. In the expression of non-reflective
consciousness, the linguistic form of the utterance can only be taken
vaguely to resemble the mental representation entertained by the
subject of consciousness. So there is no reason why the name of the
subject of consciousness should not be mentioned in the utterance.
Also, the propositional form of the utterance of non-reflective
consciousness is easily interpreted as representing a thought which the
speaker believes to be true, not only a thought attributed to the third
person self. If there are sufficiently relevant contextual effects to be
obtained from interpreting the utterance as expressing a thought of the
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speaker, as well as a thought of some third person seli the hearer is
free to access both interpretations and derive these effects. Some
contextual effects may follow from entertsining both interpretations.
Thus, a sentence like: John was late and would arrive after his friends
have left, may easily (and plausibly) be interpreted both as representing
a thought that the speaker endorses as a true description of a state of
affairs, but it may also be interpreted as a representation of a thought
that went through John's mind. And there may be relevant effects to
be accessed from each interpretation. On the first one, the speaker is
taken to assume that (probably) John will be or was late. The second
interpretation gives rise to expectations about other related thoughts
that may have occurred to John, and may also be taken as an
explanation of these other thoughts (depending on some continuation
of the text, such as: He knew he'd better hurry, where the realisation
that he would be late is taken as the reason for John's hurrying). I now
turn to the relevance theoretic distinction between descriptive and
interpretive uses of utterances.
3.3.3 Descriptive and interpretive use
In relevance theory terms, an utterance is used descriptively in
case its propositional form (roughly, the equivalent of Lyons' literal
meaning) is an interpretation of a thought of the speaker's which is a
truth-conditional (i.e. descriptive) representation of a (desirable or
actual) state of RiThirs. S&W (1986; 1988) point out that some version
of descriptive use is standardly assumed to be the most important in
natural language, and that all departures from it are in some sense
taken to be marginal. Along with the proponents of the subjectivity
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thesis, S&W reject the descriptivist stance, but unlike the advocates of
subjectivity, they develop a theoretically motivated account of those
utterances which clearly defy a treatment in terms of descriptive use.
They capitalise on the observation that utterances may be used to
represent thoughts which are representations of other (relevant or
attributed) thoughts, in which case they are said to be used
interpretively. The notion of interpretive use makes it possible for
S&W to give a unified explanation for a number of phenomena
induding free indirect style, echoic utterances (exclamatives and irony),
evidentials, and others as well.
3.3.3.1	 Free indirect style
In free indirect style the speaker does not regard the thought
represented by the propositional form of the utterance as true, but as
attributed to some other individual who does.
(25) John was getting nervous. (By now,) The train
was an hour late. (Surely,) Mary would not wait. She
would have left before he arrived.
In (25), only the fIrst sentence may yield an adequate range of
contextual effects when understood as used descriptively, i.e. as
representing a thought which the speaker entertains as a true
description of a state of ffirs. In the immediately accessible context
the second utterance is relevant in so far as it can be taken as an
explanation for John's nervousness, in which case it needs to be
construed as representing a thought attributed to John, not as a
thought which the speaker regards as a description of a state of Rffiir8.
Similarly, the last two utterances are relevant if construed as
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consequences of the train's being late. They too may be optimally
relevant when understood as representing thoughts attributed to John,
since they are manifestly the kinds of thoughts that are normally
assumed to be going through the mind of a nervous passenger. The
aclverbials now and surely in brackets make the intended interpretive
reading more manifest.
The accounts of free indirect style in terms of subjectivity build
on the observation that it constitutes a departure from truth-
conditionality, in the sense that in the expression of represented speech
and thought the speaker/author does not subscribe to the truth of the
proposition (i.e. thought) which the utterance purports to represent.
Banfleld apparently takes this as a justification for assuming that the
sentences in question are speakerless or unspeakable. The notion of
subjectivity is then introduced as a non-truth conditional kind of
rnerning in addition to the standard truth-conditional one.
Both Lyons and Bin field reject the strong descriptivist view, but
they take some version of the mim of truthfulness for granted, and
posit subjectivity as a reasonable alternative. By contrast, relevance
theory rejects the m%xim of truthfulness and recognises the importance
of interpretive use. This makes it possible to account in a
straightforward way for a number of subjective expressions without
assuming that these expressions are incompatible with the attribution
of the utterance to the speaker/author. In free indirect style the
speaker merely attributes the thought to some third person subject,
while in echoic utterances the speaker expresses his attitude towards
the attributed thought. Ironical utterances echo thoughts from which
the speaker distances himself with ridicule or scorn. Exdamatives are
utterances which express surprise or another related attitude on the
part of the speaker towards some relevant thought (cf S&W (1986),
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Wilson and Sperber (W&S hereafter) (1988), Clark (1991)). This may
be indicated by non-linguistic devices such as intonation, (26a), or by
the use of exclaniative intezjections such as Oh!, Ahi and Aluil, (26b),
for example.
(26) a.	 It's (absolutely) wonderful!
	
b.	 Oh! It's (absolutely) wonderful!
Exclaniative inteiections, assumed to be subjective elements, are
plausibly analysed as indicating interpretive use, more specifically as
determining higher level explicatures (cf W&S (1990)).
3.3.3.2	 Exclamative interjections and higher-level
explicatures
The exciamative inteijections like oh in (27), ah in (28) and aha in (29)
are, according to Banfleld, prime examples of subjective expressions.
They do not make a contribution to the propositional content of the
utterance, but are indicative of the speaker's attitude towards the
proposition expressed.
(27) Oh! You're cheating.
(28) AhI You're cheating.
(29) Aha! You're cheating.
Like a whole class of other subjective items exclamative inteijection8
are syntactically identified as not occurring in indirect speech:
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(30) John said that *ohlah/aha you were cheating.
The semantic motivation for treating exciamative inteijections
as subjective expressions can be summarily stated in three points
(according to Banfleld (1982)):
(i) Exciamative inteijecions are markers of the speakefs
attitude but they fall short of being specific with respect
to the attitude that they express; hence they are non-
propositional, in that their meaning is not fully truth
conditional;
(ii) The attitude conveyed by exciamative inteijections is not
part of the propositional content of the utterance (when
they are part of a larger sentence); hence, excianiative
interjections do not contribute to the truth conditions of
the proposition expressed by the utterance;
(iii) Point (ii) rests on the presumption that every utterance
of a sentence communicates one and only one proposition
(i.e. that it has only one explicature).
I will take these points in turn, starting from the last one first. In
recent work W&S (1990) challenge the view in (iii). They look at
examples like (31):
(31) Peter: Can you help?
Mary (sadly): I can't.
(W&S (1990:98))
Obviously, the logical form of Mary's utterance in (31) does not express
a fully fledged proposition. However, it provides sufficient evidence for
Peter to be able inferentially to enrich this logical form to the level of
a proposition which Mary may rationally have intended to
conununicate. Which proposition would this be?
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(32) a.	 Mary can't help Peter to find a job.
b. Mary says she can't help Peter to find a job.
c. Mary believes she can't help Peter to find a job.
d. Mary regrets she can't help Peter to find a job.
(W&S (1990:98))
The proposition (32a) can plausibly be derived by enriching the logical
form of Mary's utterance in (31). In relevance theory terms it would be
called an explicature (a development of the logical form of the
utterance). W&S (1990) make the following two points which are
particularly important. First, an utterance characteristically has more
than one explicature. Secondly, once the hearer has enriched and
completed the logical form of the utterance to the level of a determinate
proposition, he may embed it under a higher level description: a speech
act description (32b), or a propositional attitude description (32c) and
(32d). The propositions (32b) to (32d) are called higher-level
explicatures. They are also developments of the logical form of the
utterance and are also plausibly regarded as intended to be
communicated by the utterance. Hence, higher level explicatures are
to be regarded as linguistically communicated. Certain adverbials are
characteristically used to determine higher level explicatures. Consider
(33):
	
(33) a.	 Frankly, I can't help you.
	
b.	 Mary said frankly to Peter that she couldn't help
(W&S (1990: 105))
W&S point out that the adverbial frankly in (33a) and (33b)
encodes exactly the same conceptual information. However, in (33a) the
conceptual information encoded by the adverbial is incorporated into a
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higher-level explicature, some elements of which are not encoded but
inferred. In (33b), the adverbial contributes directly to the truth-
conditions of the proposition expressed by the utterance. But, although
the information conveyed by the frankly in (33a) is not part of the truth
conditional content of the proposition expressed by the utterance, the
speaker who utters (33a) can be accused of insincerity, or
untruthfulness:
(34) Mary: Frankly, I can't help you.
John: You know very well that you can.
So far, I have shown that the assumption (iii) 10 not justified,
because an utterance may plausibly be taken to linguistically
communicate more than one proposition. I have also given some
evidence for clarifying the import of the assumption (ii).
Let me assume that exciamative interjections determine higher
level explicatures, like the adverbial frankly in (33a). Moreover, I take
it that, when they are part of more complex expressions, exciamative
interjections always determine higher-level explicatures. Just as in (34)
Mary can be accused of insincerity, so can the speaker A of (35):
(35) A:	 Oh! He is cheating again.
	
B:	 Come on, you are not really surprised. You knew
all the time that he was cheating.
Exciamative inteijections do not contribute to the propositional content
of the utterance. What could possib1 .y be the conceptual content of oh
or a/i? Although these words seem devoid of conceptual content, it
seems plausible to assume that they in some way help the hearer to
establish the propositional content of higher-level explicatures. So, the
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assumption (ii) cannot be taken as evidence that these interjections are
to be regarded as subjective expressions on the grounds that they do not
contribute to truth conditions. What about assumption (i)?
Exciamative inteijectiona differ from other hedging expressions
like I suppose or certainly, because, by virtue of their linguistic meaning
they make extremely vague reference to the propositional attitude of
the speaker. It may be the case that oh, ah, a/ia and simibir words
encode vei little conceptual information or that they do not encode
conceptual information at all, but very vague guidelines, in other words,
they encode instructions for the hearer inferentially to arrive at the
attitude under which the proposition is embedded at the level of higher-
level explicature (see Blakemore (1987)). They provide clues for the
hearer to construct fully propositional higher level explicatures. It
seems quite plausible to assume that one and the same exdamative
interjection, say ah, may determine two higher-level explicatures: The
speaker i.e surprised that... and The speaker is resigned because... etc.
So, exclamative interjections do not provide evidence for positing a class
of subjective elements (where subjective is to be taken to mean
expressive of the speaker's direct, i.e. non-propositional, involvement in
the situation described by the utterance). The subjectivity view of
exclaniative inteijections amounts to the point that the linguistically
encoded meRning of natural language expressions severely
underdetermines their propositional content, plus a little extra (which
has just been shown to be unnecessary): that some natural language
entities grmmaticalise, in addition to conceptual or procedural
meaning, a kind of non-truth conditional mepning which one could call
subjective (or, perhaps, affective or expressive).
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3.3.3.3	 Subjectivity, evidentiality and literalness
The adverbial suddenly, and the adjectives damned and poor,
arguably, also grammaticalise subjectivity. Unlike exciamative
inteijections they are embeddable.
(36) Mary said that John had suddenly dropped the glass.
(37) John said [that] that poor devil of a worker interested
(38) Mary said [that] that damned John was a real nuisance.
(Banfield (1982))
The adverbial suddenly, and the adjectives poor and damned contribute
to the truth conditional content of the propositions expressed by the
utterances in which they appear, since they occur freely in indirect
speech, where the propositional content of the utterance (and not the
actual words of the speaker) is reported. So why are these words
considered to be subjective? Consider suddenly first.
There is a dear sense that in addition to representing a situation
in the world truth-conditionally, (39a) also strongly suggests that
somebody, possibly the speaker (author), witnessed the event and is
relating his personal experience. In this respect (39a) contrasts with
(39b), which is readily understood as non-experiential.
(39) a.	 He was laughing. Suddenly, he burst into tears.
	
b.	 He was laughing. A few seconds later he burst
into tears.
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The intuition that suddenly is subjective in so far as the utterance
conveys somebody's realisation that it was getting dark, rather than a
description of a state of affairs, seems particularly strong in utterances
like (40).
(40) Suddenly, it was getting dark.
However, the progressive in (40) is also claimed to grammaticalise
subjectivity, so that it is not obvious whether experiential overtones are
here due to the use of the adverbial, the progressive, or whether they
are jointly determined by both. Let me look at (39) first. Roughly
speiking, the second utterance in (39a) expresses a proposition like:
Unexpectedly John started crying, or Contrary to what one would
normally expect, John started crying. The experiential subjective
overtone, i.e. the intuition that the thought is attributed to someone,
could then be explained on the assumption that suddenly encodes the
information that the utterance is used interpretively, not descriptively.
In other words, utterances with the adverbial suddenly are necessarily
interpreted as msiking reference to the event as being talked about on
the basis of perception. But why and in exactly which way is (40) more
subjective than (39a)? Consider (41) as a paraphrase of (40):
(41) Someone/The speaker suddenly realised: 'it is getting
dark'.
By virtue of its lexical meRning suddenly makes reference to an event
of mental perception. Hence the feeling of contradiction in *John
suddenly came in unobserved. The intended interpretation of (40)
involving the mental event of realising at the level of the higher level
explicature is inferentially derived. On the one hand, suddenly encodes
reference to the event of observation. On the other hand, suddenly is
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semantically incompatible with the event denoted by the progressive.
Also, by virtue of its lexicalised mssning suddenly modifies momentary
events (i.e. achievements). Hence the incompatibility between suddenly
and the progressive which involves non-deliinitedness. The hearer
looks for an interpretation on which the conflict between the meanings
of the adverbial and the progressive is resolved, and derives (41) (in
which suddenly modifies 'event of mental perception) as a plausible
understanding of (40).
In both (39a) and (40) the adverbial suddenly indicates that the
propositions in question (He burst into tears and It was getting dark in
(39a) and (40) respectively) are embedded under higher level
representations such as suddenly _____ and the subject suddenly
realised _____ as representations of thoughts attributed either to the
speaker (on some past occasion) or to someone else. The imin
difference between (39a) and (40) would then be that in the former the
adverbial modifies the event of the proposition X burst into tears,
whereas in the latter it modifies the event of the realisation of It's
getting dark. (39a) is about someone's quwk and unexpected awareness
of X's crying, while (40) is about someone's quick and unexpected
awareness of that person's realisation of its getting dark. Hence the idea
of self-consciousness in (40). It is rather interesting that the clause
containing the adverbial suddenly nnot be embedded under a verb of
mental perception. Thus (Wohn realised/saw/perceived that U
suddenly got dark is not plausible on the reading that the adverbial
modifies the proposition of the embedded clause (except, perhaps, in
case of a habitual or iterative interpretation on which John realised
that on a number of occasions the event of getting dark is perceived as
sudden - as a continuation like these days would 8uggest . or in case
there are appropriate contextual clues indicating that the subject of
realising is not the observer who witnesses the event as sudden.) Verbs
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like realise, see, and perceive involve the consciousness of the subject,
while suddenness indicates change from not being conscious to being
conscious. So, an utterance like *J0/j realised that it suddenly got
dark is contradictory because it seems to involve John's being conscious
of his becoming conscious of its having got dark. In ether words, the
utterance suggests that at the time of his reaiisation that it has got
dark, John is already aware that it has got dark. In (40), there is no
contradiction precisely because the utterance is interpreted as meaning
something like (41), where John became conscious of his realisation that
it was getting dark. I now turn to the quotative of French, as a marker
of interpretive use.
Lyons (1982) claims that the French quotative iilhistrated by (42)
is not clearly ambiguous between a literal and a metaphorical
interpretation, and questions the significance of the term literal
meaning in relation to euch utterances, without suggesting a conclusive
answer.
(42) Le président serait malade.
Essentially, Lyons points out that the French quotative is subjective
and that this is why its meining cannot be exhaustiveIy and adequately
paraphrased in English. I would like to propose a different explanation.
Lyons makes two assumptions, only one of which is true. Let me
tentatively assume that the propositional form of the utterance is
actually adequately stated as: Le président est maladie (The president
is ill). On the literal interpretation of(42), its propositional form would
be taken as identical to a thought of the speake?s, namely: Le
président est malade. Now, the observation which seems correct is that
the literal understanding of(42) is in some sense irrelevant. Had the
speaker intended the utterance to be relevant by virtue of being a
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descriptive (i.e. truth-conditional) representation of a state of affairs, he
should have used the indicative present rather than the quotative. By
using the quotative, which is formally the conditional present, the
speaker is talking about a state of cffiairs in the actual world as being
merely possible. Questions: Why would the speaker have used the
quotative expression in preference to the Indicative one? In particular,
why would the speaker have done so in a context which includes the
assumption that information about the present (i.e. actual) state of the
president's health is highly relevant? Answer. Because he intends his
utterance to be interpreted as expressing, not a thought of his own, but
a thought entertained as a belief by others (journalists, people in high
circles etc.), ie. as an attributed thought. Once the hearer forms this
hypothesis, further assumptions about the lack of the speaker's
commitment to the truth of the proposition, such as The president is
probably ill, and the like, are derived as implicatures.
In relevance theory terms, the French quotative would be
characterised as indicating (attributive) interpretive use: the
propositional form of the utterance is an interpretation of a thought of
the speaker's which is itself an interpretation of a thought attributed
to other people (and not descriptively: the speaker's thought is not a
description, i.e. a truth conditional representation, of a state of affairs).
It seems unclear that, as Lyons claims, (42) should be ambiguous
between a literal and a metaphorical interpretation. In relevance
theory, literalness is defined in terms of identity between the
propositional form of the utterance and the speaker's thought which
that utterance purports to represent An utterance is said to be used
loosely or metaphorically when its propositional form merely resembles
to a greater or lesser degree (Le. shares a greater or lesser number of
contextual implications with) the thought or thoughts of the speaker
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which it is intended to represent (For a detailed relevance theoretic
analysis of loose use and metaphor see S&W (1986; 198511986)).
Although the utterance (42) really seems to be similar to metaphor in
being non-paraphraseable by a set of propositions while intuitively
communicating the propositions in that set it does not seem to be
metaphorically used, because the truth of the propositional form of the
utterance: Le président est inalade (The president is ill) is not in
contention when the corresponding utterance with the quotative is used.
Thus, compare: * président serait malade mais peut-être 11 n'est pas
,p. jgfr (*Thepfrjent is/would be £14 but perhaps he is not ill), with
the clearly metaphorical Peter is a pig, although he is not an animal.
The former is felt to be somewhat contradictory on the quotative
interpretation, while the latter is not. The point is that the quotative
interpretation is crucially dependent on the contextual assumption that
information about the actual state of the president's health is relevant.
Were it not for this contextual assumption, the utterance would
probably be interpreted as the consequent of an elliptical conditional.
Hence, the contradiction. By contrast, the metaphorical interpretation
crucially depends on the realisation that the speaker could not
rationally have intended to communicate the proposition expressed by
the utterance. Hence, the contradiction does not arise in metaphorically
used utterances whose propositional form is manifestly false.
I hope to have shown in the preceding sections that relevance
theory, which does not rely on some version of the mim of
truthfulness in its account of commmunication, and provides an
explanation for both truth conditional and non-truth conditional aspects
of utterance interpretation, makes it possible successfully to explain a
number of phenomena without invoking the notion of BubjectMty.0
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3.3.3.4	 Loose Use
The interpretation of embeddable evaluative adjectives and
phrases like a devil of a... is to be explained not only in terms of
interpretive use, but also in terms of loose use. Consider an example.
(43) Ce pauvre diable d'ouvrier, perdu sur lee routes,
l'intéressait.
This poor devil of a worker, wandering and on the road,
interested him.
(Zola, Germinal)
(Banfield (1982 :202)
In relevance theory terms the propositional form of the utterance
represents a thought which it resembles to some degree (i.e. with which
it shares certain logical properties). In utterances like (43) the
propositional form of the utterance is not to be construed as being
identical with a thought which the speaker could have intended to
communicate. The worker, obviously, is not a devil (as indicated by the
expression a devil of a...), and needn't actually be poor to be referred to
as such. Upon accessing the propositional form of the utterance all the
hearer or reader needs to do is to construct hypotheses about which
thought(s) the speaker may plausibly have intended to communicate by
his utterance and arrives at a range of implicatures. (This) lonely
ghastly-looking worker wandering on the road..., (This) shabby-looking
wretched man walking aimlessly,... etc. The literal interpretation will
not even be considered. But, why is (43) easily understood as
representing a thought attributed to some fictional third person subject?
The deictic this points to the time of communication. However,
neither the communicator's nor the addressee's present is plausibly
124
susJcTmTT ASPCI AND RELEVANcE
taken as the situation pointed at by the deictic. The deictic this is
interpreted as referring to a relevant spatio-temporal context other than
the situation of communication - some occasion on which a third person
subject of consciousness entertains some thought like: This poor devil
of a worker interests me. Therefore, the absence of the deictic makes
the attributive understanding less manifest
(44) Un pauvre diable d'ouvrier,...
A poor devil of a worker,...
The utterance (44) is readily understood as being used loosely, as a less
thpn literal interpretation of the communicator's thoughts. Also, once
the expression poor devil is taken to be used loosely, rather than
literally, the assumptions about who regards the worker as a poor devil
become more relevant. In many easily conceivable contexts the reading
on which the utterance expresses a metaphorical attributed thought will
be more relevant t1in one on which the thought is attributed to the
communicator.
So what is the import of the treatment of these examples in
relevance theory terms? Relevance theory does not stipulate the
primacy of descriptive use over interpretive use, nor of literalness over
loose use. In other words, the theory does not rely on any version of the
maxim of truthfulness. As a consequence of this the subjective
phenomena explained in terms of interpretive use and loose use are not
to be seen as exceptional either. I now turn to some examples of the
progressive as a subjective construction.
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3.3.3.5 The progressive - loose use and interpretive use
When is the progressive used descriptively and when
interpretively? Why does the choice of the progressive in preference to
the simple sometimes invite a reading on which the utterance is used
interpretively, rather than descriptively? Let me address these
questions in turn. Consider the following examples:
(45) a.
	
The London train arrives at five.
b.	 The London train is arriving at five.
Both (45a) and (45b) are apparently contradictory. An event (the
arrival of the London train) is simultaneously located in the present
and in the future. The hearer may try to make sense of utterances like
these in two ways. (a) the hearer may assume that they are used
descriptively and loosely. The logical form of the utterance locates one
and the same event of the train's arrival simultaneously in the present
and in the future. Question: What could the speaker have intended to
communicate by this somewhat contradictory utterance? Answer(s):
There are present Indications that the train will actually arrive at five,
and the like. Also, the hearer may further enrich the logical form of the
utterance and derive a non-contradictory propositional form: The
London train usually/characte/ristically/often arrives at five.
Alternatively, (b) the hearer may assume that the utterances are used
interpretively, that they are not intended as (loose or literal)
descriptions of individual instances of the event of the train's arrival,
but interpretively, as representations of plans or schedules. So how is
the hearer to arrive at the optimally relevant interpretation? Consider
(46):
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	(46) a.
	
The tram arrives.
	
b.	 The train is arriving.
The simple present in utterances like (46a) is not normally used in
talking about individual instances of events at the time of
communication. The utterance (46a) would normally be felt to be
incomplete, and its completion would involve making some hypothesis
about a specific time other than the present at which the train's arrival
is due, according to some plan or schedule. In this case, the utterance
is taken to be used interpretively, as a representation of a plan or
schedule. Alternatively, the interpretation on which the
usual/characteristic time of the train's arrival is talked about may be
more relevant, in which case the utterance is taken to be used
descriptively. In both cases, the hearer choses the first interpretation
tested and found to be consistent with the principle of relevance. The
most manifest interpretation of (46b) would be quite different in most
readily conceivable immediately accessible contexts. The most manifest
interpretation of(46b) is normally the one on which the utterance is a
description of an ongoing event of the train's arriving at the station. It
is, therefore, normally the first to be tested, and, if found to be
consistent with the principle of relevance, it is accepted by the hearer
as the speaker's intended interpretation. However, when an adverbial
such as five o'clock is used, as in (45b) an interpretation like the one
given for (46b) is not highly manifest. In mpking hypotheses about
what the speaker could have intended to communicate by the utterance
(45b) the hearer will, therefore, first make hypotheses about there being
present indications that on this particular occasion the train will arrive
at five: The speaker has evidence that the train will arrive at five. There
are present indications that the train will arrive at five. In the normal
course of events the train will arrive at five, and the like. Utterances
like (46b) are readily used in describing ongoing events. it is therefore
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reasonable to assume that in interpreting (45b), the descriptive
interpretation is normally the most manifest one, and the first to be
tried out for relevance. There is a difference between the characteristic
interpretations of (45b) and (46b). In readily conceivable immediately
accessible contexts the first interpretation for (45b) likely to be tested
and found to be consistent with the principle of relevance is a loose one,
whereas (46b) receives a more or less literal interpretation. What about
(45a) and (46a)?
In utterances like (46a) the simple present is not used in
describing individual occurrences of events tiking place at the time of
communication, but in the so-called habitual meaning. Thus, the
somewhat incomplete utterance (46a) is easier to contextualise when a
continuation which makes the habitual understanding more manifest
is added:
(47) The Londjcon train arrives on time.
The utterance (47) would normally be taken to mean something like:
The London train characteristically/usually/often arrives on time.
This enriched propositional form is construed as an interpretation of a
thought of the speaker's which may be either (a) a description of a
state of affairs or (b) an interpretation of other relevant thoughts. On
the understanding in (b) the speaker's thought is a generalisation based
on past time occurrences of the train's arrival, or on the British Rail
advertisements, or on commuters' reports etc. Whether (47) is to be
understood as used descriptively, as in (a), or interpretively, as in (b),
is determined by considerations of relevance. Like all utterances which
may be used descriptively, (45a) also allows for an interpretive
understanding. Utterances like (45a) differ from many others inso far
as the most manifest reading is the one on which they are used
interpretively, and it is not difficult to see why. On the one hand, (45a)
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does not make reference to an ongoing event. On the other hand, it is
a matter of common knowledge that times of trains' arivals are given
in schedules and time-tables. So, it seems quite obvious why (45a) is
readily understood as an interpretation of a schedule, rather than being
a description of what actually goes on in the world. My point here is
that utterances like (45a) should not be regarded as grammaticalising
interpretive use. Rather, their interpretive understanding is determined
through the interpretation of utterance in context Consider the
following situation Mary is not at home. Peter wants to know when
she will be back. Jane gives the answer in (48):
(48) Mary comes back at eleven. She'll be here by three in the
morning.
If the utterance Mary comes back at eleven were to be understood as
used descriptively, the continuation She'll be here by three in. the
morning would contradict the speaker's belief in the first utterance
(that Mary normally comes back home at eleven, or that she will be back
at eleven), and the contradiction fails to yield any interesting contextual
effects. But when the first utterance is understood as an interpretation
of a plan made by Mary, her promise that she would be back by eleven
etc., the second utterance will be understood as contradicting, not a
belief of the speaker's, but a belief attributed to Mary, i.e. Mary's
original plan or promise. Hence, the implicatures: Mary is the sort of
person who doesn't keep her word, it is impossible to tell when Mary will
be back, Mary often changes her plans, Mary is always late, etc. The
contrast between (49a) and (49b) is also of interest here:
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	(49) a.
	
The London train arrives at five, but it will
probably be here at ten past five.
	
b.	 ?The London train is arriving at five, but it will
probably be here at ten past five.
The utterances (49a) and (49b) contrast in two major respects. First,
(49a)is much easier to interpret than (49b). Second, (49b) is felt to be
somewhat ironical, whereas (49a) is not (or less manifestly so). Only in
(49a), but not in (49b), is the interpretive understanding of the first
conjunct highly manifest. As a result, in processing (49a) for relevance
the hearer will not be led to consider at all the utterance as expressing
a contradiction. But the first conjunct in (49b) is normally taken to be
used descriptively, and the continuation in the second conjunct
contradicts the proposition expressed by the first. So, how is the
contradiction to be resolved? The hearer will assume that the speaker
has used the first conjunct ironically, that he distances himself with
ridicule and scorn from all those who entertain the belief expressed by
the first conjunct of(49b). But why is the ironical reading less manifest
in (49a) than in (49b)? Well, the first conjunct in (49a) is taken to be
an interpretation of a schedule. A ten minutes' departure from a
schedule can hardly be said to be indicative of gross incompetence. The
first conjunct of (49b), however, is taken to be an interpretation about
the arrival time on the occasion of a particular journey while the train
is already on its way: By saying explicitly that the train will actually
arrive ten minutes after the announced time, the speaker is indicating
that he distances himself with ridicule and scorn from the officially
announced time of the train's arrival. For some speakers the ironical
interpretation is just too difficult to access, and they find the utterance
(49b)unacceptable.
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So far I have discussed examples in which the simple form is
more readily understood as being used interpretively. But there are
contexts in which the interpretive reading is more manifest for the
progressive than for the simple. These are the examples of the so-called
subjective use of the progressive (Lyons (1982)), ifiustrated by (11) and
(12) (repeated as (50a) and (50b)):
	
(50) a.	 John was coming tomorrow.
	
b.	 Yesterday John was coming tomorrow.
Both (50a) and (50b) would normally be understood as interpretations
of plans made in the past, in other words, as interpretations of
desirable (i.e. relevant) thoughts or attributed thoughts. This
distinction between desirable, i.e. relevant, and attributed thoughts
captures the difference between two readings of these utterances
pointed out by Lyons (1982:120). On one reading the speaker is
projecting himself, as it were, into the consciousness of some other
subject of consciousness, while on the other reading the speaker is not
felt to be doing so. When the utterances in (50) are taken to be
interpretations of plans, they are, I think 1 used interpretively, but not
attributively. They are interpretations of relevant thoughts, but not of
thoughts attributed either to particular individuals or people in general,
and the speaker is not felt to be projecting himself into the
consciousness of other people. But, when these utterances are taken to
represent the thoughts (or the words) attributed to other people the
speaker is felt to be projecting himself into the consciousness of these
other individuals. So, why is the progressive readily understood as
used interpretively in these examples? Why are the corresponding
utterances with the simple difficult to contextualise? Consider (51):
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(51) a.	 ?Mary lectured next Friday.
b.	 ?Yesterday Mary lectured next Friday.
I assume that by virtue of its linguistic meaning the progressive makes
reference to a non-complete event which instantiaties the property
denoted by the predicate. I also assume that the simple form is
semantically unmarked (i.e. unspecified) both with regard to completion
and instantiation. So, why are the utterances with the progressive in
(52) readily understood as used interpretively, while the ones in (51) are
difficult to process?
(52) a.	 Mary was lecturing next Friday.
b.	 Yesterday, Mary was lecturing next Friday.
On my characterisation of the semantics of the progressive, this form
explicitly points to an ongoing event in the past thereby mpking more
manifest the assumptions about the spatio-temporal context in which
that event took place. By using the progressive the speaker makes
more accessible the reading on which the future time proposition,
roughly Mary lecture on Friday, is entertained at some specific time in
the past as a plan. The simple is semantically vague by comparison
with the progressive. The interpretation of the utterances in (51)
requires a greater expenditure of processing effort than (52), because it
gives fewer explicit clues about the speaker's intended interpretation of
the utterance. Considerations of explicitness and processing effort also
provide the basis for an explanation of the examples in (7), repeated in
(53):
(53) a.	 I remembered locking the door.
b. I remembered myself locking the door.
c. I remembered that I had locked the door.
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In all the examples in (53) the complement of the verb remember s a
proposition. However, the three complement clauses (53a), (53b) and
(53c) do not give the same amount of explicit information about their
propositional content. Thus, in (53b), by using the reflexive accusative
myself, the speaker explicitly refers to himself as directly affected by the
event of the main verb, although reference assignment is the same
when the less explicit utterance (53a) is used. The extra amount of
processing effort required for decoding (53b) is offset because the use of
the reflexive is taken to indicate that the speaker has a recollection of
himself in the act of locking the door, as opposed to remembering
merely that the event of his locking the door took place. While the
temporal interpretation of the complement clauses in (53a) and (53b) is
entirely dependent on the verb of the matrix clause, the past perfect in
(53c) explicitly indicates that the remembering subject represents the
remembered event as located in the past relative to the moment of
remembering. Hence, the intuition that in (53c) the remembering
subject does not (necessarily) represent to himself his direct, perceptual,
experience of the situation of locking the door.
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Chapter Four
PRAGMATIC S AND VIEWPOINT ASPECT
Two approaches to aspect were introduced in Chapter two: one
which is mainly concerned with language particular aspectual
categories, and another one, which focuses on the universal conceptual
contrasts pertaining to aspect. Following C.S. Smith (1983) 1 refer to
the first of these as viewpoint aspect. This term applies to aspectual
categories like the progressive and the simple of English and the
perfective and the imperfective of Serbo-Croat (and Slavonic languages
in general). Some issues relating to situation type aspect are discussed
in Chapter five. This chapter considers a number of problems
pertaining to aspectual choice and the interpretation of the progressive-
simple contrast of English and the perfective-imperfective distinction of
Serbo-Croat. The characterisation of the contribution that the
progressive and the simple make by virtue of their linguistic mernings
to utterance interpretation is mined. I argue that the linguistic
meaning of the progressive is adequately characterised in terms of the
feature [- completej as well as in terms of reference to an event
instantiating the property denoted by the verbal predicate. The analysis
of some overtones typically associated with a number of uses of the
progressive is given, and a solution to the problem of markedness of the
pastJfuture progressive is proposed. The linguistic m&ining of the
simple (in relation to the progressive) is emined, and an account of
the interpretation of the simple aspect is put rward. I argue that my
treatment of the progressive naturally extends to the be going to + inf
construction and that it is preferable to Haegeman's (1989) analysis
which does not look at this periphrastic future form as an instance of
the progressive. An account of the overtones associated with the
be going to + inf construction are given as further evidence in support
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of my characterisation of the meaning of the progressive. I then
proceed to consider the perfective aspect of Serbo-Croat and argue that
it differs from the progressive of English with respect to the feature of
completion but shares with the semantics of the progressive reference
to an instantiation of the property. I take the view that the imperfective
aspect has the feature [- complete] in common with the progressive, but
does not make reference to an event instantiating the property. Both
aspectual categories of Serbo-Croat differ from the simple aspect of
English which is semantically unmarked, i.e. unspecified, with regard
to completion and reference to instantiation. The consequences of the
analysis for an explanation of aspectual choice in English and Serbo-
Croat are also examined.
4.1 TuE PROGRESSWE
The issues to be considered in this section are summed up in the
following questions: How is the linguistic meaning of the English
progressive to be characterised? How are the overtones of meaning
such as reproof in (1), insincerity in(2), and temporariness in (3), related
to the linguistic meaning?13
(1) Old Lily is always feeding the pigeons.
(2) John is being polite.
(3) John is living in Muawell HilL
it is shown that an answer to these questions also makes it possible
successfully to address a number of issues considered in the sections to
follow: Why is the progressive often felt to be more appropriate than
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the simple in the present, and less appropriate in the past tense? How
exactly do the meinings of the progressive and of the simple contrast?
4.1.1 The meaning of the progressive
According to Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982) (G&W
hereafter) the meaning of the progressive construction falls in two
semantic domains. The first is aspectuaL It deals with the ideas of
incompletion, or non-delimitedness, usually associated with the
progressive, and has no direct bearing on the problems to be considered
in this section. The second domain arguably concerns the metcuphysicol
status of the property denoted by the progressive predicate and is
defined as phenomenal (because it makes reference to events
instantiating a property), and as related to the basic evklential meRning
(because it refers to the evidence of the manifestations of the property
denoted by the predicate). G&W draw a contrast between wihat they
call the phenomenal/structural distinction and the evidence/ksiow ledge
distinction. The first they call the core semantic contrast, the second,
the basic semantic distinction. As far as my understanding of their idea
goes, the core phenomenal mepning is encoded in the progressive
construction, while evidence as a member of the basic semantic
distinction, is brought to bear on the interpretation in context of some
utterances with the progressive. Admittedly, it is not clear in what
sense both distinctions would be semantic if only one pertains to the
linguistic meaning of the progressive. Since G&W's account is not at
all sufficiently explicit in this respect it is not possible to say what
exactly they have in mind. I assume that the aspectual meirning of the
progressive is plausibly defined as [- completel and that this feature is
associated with the -ing sufiix. This aspectual meaning, as G&W call
it, is, in my opinion, independent of the metaphysical meaniing of the
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progressive construction. The -trig form of the verb retains its aspectual
feature in those utterances in which it does not occur as part of the
progressive. Thus, in an utterance like AU the candidates speaking two
foreign languages are requested to fill in another jtbrm the participle
speaking has the value [- complete], but not, to use G&Ws term, the
phenomenal mepning expressed by the progressive. G&W argue that
the progressive in (4a) describes the situation as a phenomenon, an
ongoing event, as opposed to the simple in (4b), which describes it
structurally, as it were, as a property applying to the subject
irrespective of any actual events.
(4) a.	 John is w1kirig to school.
b.	 John walks to schooL
The evidential merning of the construction is ifiustrated by the contrast
between (5a) and (5b). While (5a) can be used felicitously to describe
the functioning of the engine on the basis of the speaker's knowledge,
(5b) suggests that the account is based on evidence of the engine's
actual functioning at the time of communication. More precisely, the
progressive in (5b) highlights the relevance of perceptible evidence for
the interpretation of the utterance. So, it would seem plausible to
assume that the progressive, by its linguistic meining, points to
perceptible evidence of the situation described by the utterance.
(5) a.	 The engine doesn't smoke anymore.
b.	 The engine isn't smoking anymore.
Although the progressive in (5b) and &mihr examples may seem
strongly to support the intuitions behind the idea ofperceptible evidence
as part of the linguistic meining of the be + V-mg predicate, I argue
that this characterisation is not tenable (section 4.2). The analysis of
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the examples in section 4.3 shows that G&Ws opposition between the
phenomenal and the evidential meming is neither tenable nor
necessary and that the evidential meaning needs to be pragmatically
explained.
4.1.2. Properties and Instantiations of properties
The account of the progressive to be proposed here crucially rests
on the view that the linguistic meining of the progressive is correctly
defined in terms of reference to a particular event instantiating the
property denoted by the predicate. I assume that all predicates describe
properties: feed the pigeons, be polite, live in Muswell Hill, and walk
to school are all properties. Some of these properties are more readily
thought of and talked about as instantiated, i.e. as being actualised as
events. The contribution of the progressive to the meaning of the
predicate is that it points to an event in the world instantiating the
property, and contrasts with the simple, which is unspecified in this
respect.
The strong intuitions about perceptible evidence as being
somehow intrinsically related to the meaning of the progressive stem
from people's encyclopaedic knowledge about instantiations of
properties, in other words, happenings or events: they take time to
take place, they involve change and have endings and beginnings, and
are characteristically represented on the basis of perception. Which of
these features of mepning pertaining to encyclopaedic knowledge about
events will be more salient (i.e. more manifest), will vary from
utterance to utterance and from context to context. This accounts for
the idea of perceptible evidence as being sometimes more and
sometimes less prominent. But, can as vague a characterisation of the
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linguistic meaning of the progressive as the one proposed here provide
the basis for a plausible analysis of the, presumably pragmaticaliy
induced, overtones illustrated in (1), (2) and (3)? I propose to argue
that it can. Moreover, it is the only characterisation of the linguistic
meaning of the progressive which is both sufficiently general to account
for the range of uses and overtones of the construction, and at the same
time constrained enough to preclude those which do not actually occur.
Let me consider some possible proposals concerning the meaning of the
progressive.
4.2 SOME C}LRACTERISATIONS OF THE MEANING OF THE
PROGRESSWE
In Chapter three I looked at the treatments of the progressive
in terms of subjectivity, and concluded that they had to be rejected. Not
only is subjectivity too vague a term to be useful, but (more
importantly in the context of this chapter) it also predicts too narrow
a range of uses for the progressive (cL Chapter three). In this chapter
I argue that the notion ofpoint of view is pragmatically explained. But,
first, let me briefly look at some other proposals.
It may seem plausible to take the view that the progressive, by
virtue of its meaning, indicates that the situation is talked about on the
basis of perceptible evidence. But, however easy it may be to find
emples which seemingly lend support to this proposal, it is equally
easy to find compelling ones which disconfirm it. One can certainly use
the progressive in talking about a situation and deny that one has
perceptible evidence of its occurrence, while asserting one's belief that
the situation being described is actually tiking place, e.g. I think my
kettle is boiling in the kitchen (although we can't hear anything in the
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living room). I switched it on five minutes ago. In this example my
knowledge that my kettle takes about five minutes to boil is sufficient
evidence for my belief that the kettle is actually boiling. The
progressive is the appropriate form, although the context manifestly
precludes the availability of perceptible evidence of the event (see also
the examples (22) and (23) in Chapter three).
Another apparently plausible proposal is that the progressive
indicates limited extension of the situation in time (cL Leech (1970)).
Leech also claims that the progressive indicates by virtue of its meaning
the overtone of persistence of the process in utterances such as The
Earth E.g revolving on its axis, and in statements of eternal truths in
generaL The apparent contradiction between the meRnings of lirn.ited
extension in time and persistence of the process could possibly be
explained on the assumption that the hearer pragmatically decides
what is the intended interpretation on a particular occasion, without
assuming that the overtones are part of the linguistic meaning of the
progressive. G&W point out that Leech's view poses a serious
learnability problem since the language learner needs to assign two
contradictory mepnings to a single grammatical form along a single
semantic dimension. In order to assess the import of G&W's criticism
it is necessary to look at Leech's analysis more dosely.
Leech (1970:149) introduces a semantic feature which he calls
situation and which, arguably, captures the common distinctive
meaning of the progressive in contrast to the simple aspect. The
progressive form has the value (+ situ], the simple [- situ]. Leech
further observes that the corollary overtones of the value [+ situ] are
(a) duration, (b) limited extension, (c) happening not necessarily
complete, and (d) continuousness (i.e. ceaseless persistence of the
process). The plausibility of G&W's objection crucially depends on the
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status of the overtones in question. Leech (1970:149) claims that the
overtones (a), (b) and (c) taken together, distinguish the meaning
1+ situ] from [- situ] (although they may but needn't be contrastive in
every utterance in use). So, if the overtone (d) were to be characterised
as not being properly part of the meaning 1+ situl, it would be possible
to explain this overtone pragmatically. One could assume that the
progressive actually encodes limited extension of the situation in time,
because this overtone is more or less systematically associated with the
progressive (although it is more salient in some verbs than others and
in some utterances than in others). But it is patently impossible to
isolate a class of examples which would be expressive of the overtone
of persistence of the process over time. Leech illustrates this overtone
by the following examples: The earth is turning on its axis, Death is
getting nearer and nearer evely day, and He is always making fun of
me. It seems to me that terms like continuousness and persistence of
the situation/event over time are not accurate. The stylistic quality of
these examples is, I think, closer to something like the vividness of the
speaker's personal (experiential) involvement in the situation described
by the utterance. Moreover, some utterances, such as The earth is
turning on its axis, seem somewhat odd. This stylistic oddity could be
explained as arising from the conflict between the meRning of limited
extension of the situation in time associated with the progressive and
the hearer's encyclopaedic knowledge about the state of sffirg
described by the utterance as being of virtually unlimited duration.
The overtone of dynamicness inherent in all uses of the progressive
would also be readily explained as derived from the basic memling of
limited extension in time, as would the comparative incompatibility of
the progressive with state verbs. States are situations
characteristically thought of as not involving beginnings and ends (cf.
Chapter two, p. 38). Therefore, they would be incompatible with the
progressive to a greater or lesser extent depending on the accessibility
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of encyclopaedic assumptiOns about the compatibility of the 8itUatiOfl
described by a given verb with the idea of temporariness. Leech
(1970:151) considers the overtone of persistence over time to be a
separate meaning of the progressive sometimes 'strong enough to cancel
out' the meaning of limited extension, and his account remains wide
open to G&W's objection about learnability. Also, it is unclear how the
feature [+ situationi can be defined in terms of the three overtones
mentioned above. On Leech's view the meaning of the progressive is
actually a generalisation from the overtones which are determined by
the construction in use. Clearly, an account on which the overtones are
either part of the semantics or are derived from some basic meaning,
defined independent from the overtones themselves, is needed. Now,
the memng of incompletion which is associated with the -ing sux
accounts for Leech's overtone (c), and the overtone (a), duration, is in
some sense contained in the overtone (b), limited extension (i.e. limited
duration). So, why not take the view that the me pning of the
progressive, in addition to lack of completion, involves limited duration
of the state of affairs described by the utterance? Well, there are
contexts in which one can readily use the progressive while explicitly
denying that the state of fliThirs is being described as involving limited
duration. Thus, both utterances, Nelson's column now stands on
Trafalgar Square and it is likely to stay there forever, and Nelson's
column is now standing on Trafalgar Square and it is likely to stay
there forever, are acceptable. They convey slightly different overtones
and one utterance may be preferred to the other, depending on the
context. The utterance with the progressive seems to indicate that the
speaker has actually seen the column. It would be particularly
appropriate in a context which includes the assumption that the column
had been removed for repair and has now been put back in its old place.
The utterance with the simple would possibly be taken to mean that the
monument has been moved to Trafalgar Square as its new properly
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designated location (Cf. G&W (1982:84-5), examples (13) to (15)).
Whatever the difference between these two utterances may be, the one
with the progressive is not felt to be contradictory, as it should, if
limited extension in time were the linguistic meaning of the progressive.
According to some other proposals, the progressive focuses, as it
were, on the middle of the event, i.e. on a stage of the event which is
neither initial nor final (cf. Conirie (1976), King (1983)). These
characterisations of the semantics of the progressive would leave a
number of uses of the form unexplained. The idea of focus on the
middle of the event would make it possible to account for the overtone
of temporariness as an implicature, but a number of interpretations of
the progressive would be impossible to explain. Thus, in some
utterances the progressive may be readily understood as indicating the
time of the onset of the event. For example, an utterance like I am
feeding the cats at five, may be interpreted as saying that the speaker
will be in the process of feeding the cats at five o'clock (and would have
begun feeding them before that time), or, alternatively, that five o'clock
is the time at which the speaker starts feeding the cats. The latter
interpretation would, I believe, be precluded by any definition according
to which the progressive, by virtue of its linguistic meaning, focuses on
some non-initial and non-final stage of the event. So, it seems that
both the overtones of temporariness and focus on the middle of the
situation are to be explained as pragmatically derived from the
linguistic meaning of the progressive which still needs to be given. In
the following sections I take the view that the contribution of the -ing
participle to the meaning of the progressive is to be characterised by the
feature [- complete], and I argue that the meaning of the progressive
construction as a whole is to be characterised in terms of reference to a
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particular event which instantiates the property denoted by the pred icate.
I begin by looking at the examples (1) to (3).
4.3 RELEVANCE THEORY AND THE OVERTONES OF MILD REPROOF,
INSiNCERITY AND TEMPORARINESS
In sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 an analysis of a number of overtones is
given, and it is argued that they arise as implicatures, which are
determined by the interpretation of the progressive in context.
4.3.1 The overtone of mild reproof
Two elements seem to combine to give rise to the shade of
meaning of mild reproof. The first one is the impression that the event
is being talked about as experienced, the second is that utterances like
(6a) and (7a) are examples of hyperbole.
(6) a.	 Old Lily is always feeding the pigeons.
b.	 Old Lily always feeds the pigeons.
(7) a.	 The baby is always crying.
b.	 The baby always cries.
By virtue of pointing indexically, as it were, to instantiations of
properties, the progressive refers to something observable, possible to
be represented on the basis of perception. Therefore, the speaker who
uses (6a) or (7a) may be understood as tz1king about his personal
experience, and this may be exploited by the hearer in niRking
inferences about the speaker's intended meaning of the utterance. The
contrast between (7a) and (7b) is of particular interest in this
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connection. The propositional form of both utterances is something like:
An instance of the baby's crying extends over all times, including the
time of communication, but only the utterance in (7a) is really strongly
felt as expressing the speaker's attitude towards the situation described
by the utterance. The shades of meining such as annance,
nervousness, dissatisfaction, and the like, are more prominent in (7a)
than in (7b). If the speaker intended merely to describe the
characteristic behaviour of Old Lily and the baby, the utterances with
the simple would be more relevant, since reference to individual
instances of these activities would not have adequate contextuai effects
in the initial context. It is the assumption that the speaker of(6a) and
(7a) is conforming to the presumption of optimal relevance whidh leads
the addressee to include in the context some assumptions about the
speaker's being related to the situations via experience. How does this
experiential quality in the melning of the progressive give rise to more
specific impressions of reproof, disapproval and the like? The answer
largely follows from the fact that (6a) and (7a) are examples of
hyperbole.
In the light of his general knowledge about people and eding
animals or crying babies, the hearer needn't even consider these
utterances as being used literally in order to realise that the speaker
could not have intended them to be so used. In terms of relevance
theory, these utterances are illustrations of loose use. The idea behind
this term is that the proposition expressed by an utterance, while being
an interpretation of a speaker's thought, is not necessarily a literal
interpretation of that thought (see Chapter three, sections 3.3.14 and
3.3.3.5). Relevance theory does not regard loose use as a departure
from the norm, but takes literalness and metaphor to be on the extreme
opposite ends of a continuum. Hyperbole is a case in point. Neithei4he)
(6a) nor (7a), is adequately interpreted as expressing a literal
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interpretation of the thought which it purports to represent, and each
receives a loose interpretation, as it were, without the literal
interpretation being even considered. The hearer accesses the
propositional form of the utterance and makes hypotheses about the
thoughts which a rational communicator conforming to the principle of
relevance could have intended to communicate. This is how (6a) and
(7a) come to convey the impressions of mild reproof, or disapprovaL
They arise as a result of the effort on the part of the hearer to
mximise the relevance of contextual assumptions about the speaker's
personal experience in the context of hyperbole. The impression of
reproof consists of a number of weak implicatures that the hearer
makes about the speaker's intended meaning of(6a) and (7a): Old Lily
spends more tune feeding the pigeons than a sensible person would do,
Pigeons are not nice birds, Pigeons know how to find food and needn't
be fed by people, ... , and: The baby cries so much that the speaker can
hardly bear it, The speaker disapproves of the baby's crying, The
speaker is feeling apologetic about the noise made by the baby.....The
feeling that terms such as reproof or disapproval fail fully to capture
the overtones associated with the progressives in (6a) and (7a) comes
from the fact that these overtones are impressions, that they are made
up of a range of assumptions which have simultaneously become more
manifest, and, therefore, cannot be completely described in one single
word. Which assumptions will be part of the impression crucially
depends on the context against which the utterance is interpreted for
relevance. For example, if no unpleasant noise is heard at the time of
communication, (7a) is not likely to be interpreted as an apology. If the
hearer is confident that the speaker is very fond of Lily, the overtone
of reproof will, possibly, not arise at all. The crux of the matter is that
by using a comparatively simple utterance the speaker invites the
hearer to form a great number of hypotheses, and thus significantly
alters their mutual cognitive environment in an economical way. The
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overtones are entirely a function of the context brought to bear on the
interpretation of the proposition expressed by the utterance. The
account of the implication of insincerity in (2) illustrates the same
point.
4.3.2 The overtone of insincerity
The predicates be polite and love the fruit salad denote properties
which cannot be talked about in terms of their instances, because they
are conceptualised as non-instantiable. The property be polite pertains
to character, and love to emotional disposition. Hence, one would
expect it to be somewhat difficult to talk about these properties in
terms of their instantiations.
(8) John is being polite.
(9) Mary is loving the fruit salad.
The literal mepning of (8) and (9) is roughly paraphrased as: John is
instantiating the property be polite, and Mary is instantiating the
property love fruit salad. As these properties cannot be instantiated,
the hearer can hardly fail to realise that (8) and (9) are not intended to
be interpreted literally, and starts looking for assumptions about what
the speaker might have intended to convey. This is how both sentences
come to be interpreted as tslking about behaviour. The resemblance
between the ideas of instance of a trait of character in (8), and instance
of an emotion in (9), and the concept of behaviour is very striking. Both
(8) and (9) strongly suggest that by using the progressive the speaker
is actually talking about behaviour. It may not be dear how either of
the two utterances can ever be optimally relevant. On the one hand, if
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the speaker is really ti1king about behaviour, it would seem more
relevant to do so explicitly. On the other hand, if he is not, why use the
progressive at all? The following examples show that the utterances (8)
and (9) are not necessarily incompatible with the guarantee of optimal
relevance. Consider the fàllowing scenario:
Three people A, B and C are present at the same time in the
same place. A says something to B, and B takes offence at what
Ahasjustsaid. Crealises thatAhadintendedtobekindtoB,
and that A's utterance can be interpreted as expressing genuine
politeness. Therefore, C says to B:
(10) A is being polite.
By using the progressive, C invites the hearer to form two hypotheses:
(a) A meant to say something polite and (b) A is a polite person. This
makes it possible for B to draw the relevant conclusion that A's
utterance was an act of genuine politeness, a conclusion which could
probably have been derived from A is polite or A is behaving politely
alone, as well as from a conjunction of the two, but only at the expense
of considerable processing effort.
Utterances like (8) are sometimes understood as implying
insincerity on the part of the subject. This implicature will arise in
case only the assumption that John is polite has contextual effects in
some context accessible to the hearer, while the assumption that John
is behaving politely does not give access to any contextual effects in the
already existing context, or a context readily accessible to the hearer.
The assumption that the speaker who uses (10) is conforniing to the
principle of relevance, leads to some contextual assumption, roughly,
like (11):
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(11) By using the progressive and talking about A's behaviour
as polite, in an immediate context in which the statement
about A as a polite person would be more relevant, the
speaker indicates that he is not committed to the truth of
the statement A is a polite person.
This assumption, when included in the context, gives access to a
number of more or less vague implicatures. A hearer who entertains
the assumption in (11) may easily form various plausible hypotheses
about the thoughts the speaker intended to convey: John is insincere,
John is desperate to make a good impression, John is making a great
effort to conceal his real feelings..... Some other, more straightforward
formulation, would fail to give rise to so wide a range of implicatures,
and would, consequently, be less relevant. The speaker could use any
or all of these implicatures as his actual utterance, and thereby
explicitly convey what he means, but that would either involve the loss
of other implicatures (and of the crucial element of indeterminacy and
so shared responsibility for their derivation), or a great amount of
processing effort necessary for the interpretation of an extremely long
utterance. The example in (9), repeated here as (12), illustrates the
same point.
(12) Mary is loving the fruit salad.
Why is (12) so suggestive of Mary's behaviour as expressing the great
and genuine pleasure she finds in eating a particular fruit salad?
Because the first assumptions that come to mind about the situation in
which (12) would be used are: It Is mutually manifest to both the
speaker and to the hearer that Mary does love fruit salad, or, at least:
it is mutually manifest to the speaker and to the hearer that there is no
reason to believe that Mary doesn't like fruit salad. By phrasing the
utterance in such a way that it draws attention to the subject's
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behaviour, while directly predicating the property love the fruit salad
the speaker strengthens the hearer's existing assumptions about Mary's
love for fruit salad and alec) instructs him to maximise the relevance of
the manifestations of Mary's actual behaviour, her loving the particular
fruit salad which she happens to be eating. This is how implicatures
like the following are derived: Mazy is completely absorbed En eating
the fruit salad, Mazy finds the speaker's salad particularly good, One
should make fruit salad when one invites Mary, My fruit salad is
particularly good this time,....
Given a different setting, the import of(12) will also be different
For example, if it is mutually manifest to the speaker and to the hearer
that Mary didn't like fruit salad on some previous occasion, (12) may
again be more relevant than the corresponding utterance with the
simple. it is the contrast between Mary's past and present behaviour
that is relevant here. The simple present would, possibly misleadingly,
suggest that the speaker has conclusive evidence that Mary loves fruit
salad. By using the progressive he distances himself from that claim.
The examples examined so far involve implicatures deriving from loose
use. The overtone of teinporanness differs in this respect from the first
two.
4.3.3 The overtone of temporariness
The meaning of temporariness is particularly salient in
examples like (3), repeated as (13a):
	
(13) a.	 John is living in Muswell Hill
	
b.	 John lives in Muawell HIlL
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Whether the speaker uses (13a) or (13b), the idea civeyed is that John
is a resident of MusweU Hill at the time of communication. Other
things being equal, the utterance with the simple form makes a
stronger claim and should be more relevant. The meaning of the
utterance with the progressive is roughly: An event instantiating the
property 'live in Muswell Hill' applies to John at the time of speech. It
contrasts with the masning of the simple in (13b), which is something
like: The property 'live in Muswell Hill' applies to John at the time of
speech. Generally speaking, if there is no evidence to the contrary, the
property live in Xis taken as relatively stable, nearly synonymous with
be an inhabitant ofX. The use of the progressive Ia talking about such
properties highlights the memnng of transience, available to the hearer
as part of his encyclopaedic knowledge about events. The hearer forms
hypotheses about why the speaker has chosen the progressive and stops
at the conclusion which seems the most relevant to him, namely: John
is temporarily residing In Muswell Hill. In other utterances, the
temporariness associated with instantiations properties is not
exploited at all. Consider (14):
	
(14) a.
	
The Earth is turning on its axis.
	
b.	 The Earth turns on its axis.
In the light of common knowledge that it is an event normally conceived
as everlasting (in this case the revolution of the Earth on its axis) which
is talked about, it would not make sense even to consider the
iniplicature of limited duration as part of the intended meaning. If the
speaker had the intention to convey the idea of temporariness, he would
have had to do so explicitly, as the hearer cannot be expected to think
about the event in (14a) as transient. Having o doubts as to the
omnitemporal nature of the process, and assuming that the speaker
shares his belief, the hearer will exploit the pragmatically derived
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meaning of perceptible evidence in (14a). While (14b) with the simple
is taken as a statement of fact, (14a) comes with some implications of
the speaker's personal involvement in the situation, his perceptual
experience of an everlasting situation. If Leech's intuition is to be
trusted at all, we are dealing here with one pragmatic implication
(experientiality) leading up to another (the ceaseless persistence of the
process).
Another issue related to the experiential quality of the
progressive, known as the problem of semantic markedness in the
progressive (cf. Lyons (1977:688-9)), also receives a natural explanation
within the framework of relevance theory.
4A MARKEDNESS
It is often observed that the progressive is semantically marked
in the past tense and in the futurate will + be V-ing construction, and
unmarked in the present tense (see Chapter three, sections 3.1.2.3 and
3.2). The following example is taken from Whitaker (1983):
(15) She'll be coming round the mountain,
When she comes,
She'll be wearing silk pyjamas,
When she comes,
Shell be riding six white horses,
When she comes,
This song of marching troops is intuitively felt to convey something of
eye-witness testimony of an event in the future. Some uses of the
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progressive in the past tense illustrate the point equally well. Compare
(16a) and (16b) with (16c) and (16d), respectively:
	
(16) a.
	
It rained.
	
b.	 It was raining.
	
C.	 It rains.
	d.	 It is raining.
Both (16a) and (16b) are about one or several instances of rain in the
past, whereas only (16d), but not (16c), is normally taken to describe an
occurrence of rain at the time of communication. Two questions should
be considered in this connection. Why is the utterance (16b)
stylistically marked, while (16a) with the simple, is unmarked? Why
does the past simple in (16a) readily receive the interpretation on which
an instance of rain is talked about, while (16c) with the present simple
form is normally understood as habitual? The term habitual was
briefly discussed in Chapter three (pp. 126-130). I have suggested an
account on which habitual statements fall into two groups: descriptively
used habitual utterances, and interpretively used ones. In the first
group of utterances the process of pragmatic enrichment of the logical
form yields a propositional form which includeø a concept like
often/usually/regularly; in other words, the utterance is interpreted as
a descriptive (i.e. truth conditional) representation which quantifies
over individual occurrences of events. On this construal an utterance
like John walks to school is talken to mean something like John
usually /often/regularly walks o school. In contrast to this
interpretation, utterances with the simple present of event verbs are
often understood as being used interpretively, i.e. as generalisations
based on whatever is taken to be adequate evidence for the speaker to
make these generalisations. Generic utterances are a prime eriniple
of this kind of use. Thus, an utterance like Dogs bark would be
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explained as an instance of interpretive use. This utterance is normally
understood as a generalisation about the way the world is; in other
words, it is an interpretation of other desirable (i.e. relevant) thoughts
about the world. On an account along these lines many of the well-
known problems relating to truth conditions of generic statements
would not arise, precisely because generic utterances are not used
descriptively: they are not interpretations of states of sffir in the
world, but of other desirable (i.e. relevant) thoughts. I will not propose
an analysis of generic utterances here. These few guidelines along
which such an analysis could be developed are given in order to indicate
how generics would relate to habitual utterances on such an account.
it is my contention that just as John walks to school may be construed
as being used descriptively, as in John usually walks to school, it may
also be understood as a generalisation based on other relevant thoughts
about John. It goes without saying that these other thoughts need not
be thoughts about the individual occurrences of John's walking to
school. They may be thoughts about John's having had hi bike stolen,
about John's claim that he would not buy a new bike, the speaker's
knowledge that John is a schoolboy, etc. Of course, generic statements
with properties which denote events will normally be taken as
generalisations based on individual occurrences of events, but there is
nothing in the explanation in terms of interpretive use which would
stipulate what must be the basis for generalisation.
In this section I will show that explicit reference to the feature
- complete] is often more relevant in statements about the past than
in those about the present. I will also try to demonstrate that the
habitual interpretation is often more manifest, and, therefore, more
relevant in simple sentences with the present tense than in those with
the past tense. My main claim is that these two points takegether
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provide the basis for a reasoned explanation for the problems raised in
connection with the examples (15) and (16)
On the account of the meaning of the progressive suggested here,
the difference between (16a) and (16b) is that (16a) is readily and
characteristically understood as merely stating the fact that there was
an instance of rain at some time in the past without making reference
to an individual occurrence of rain by virtue of its linguistic meining.
(16b) is more explicit in this respect, because the progressive indicates
by virtue of its linguistic meRning that a particular event instantiating
the property denoted by the predicate is talked about. Now, the
following assumptions central to relevance theory play a crucial role in
explaining the markedness of the past progressive: (a) relevance is a
positive function of contextual effects and a negative function of
processing effort; (b) other things being equal, the more explicit an
expression is, the more processing effort will be required for its
interpretation (cf S&W (1986:182)). By 'other things being equal' I
mean, in this case, the accessibility of information in the already
existing context of the hearer (i.e. information independent from the
aspect of the verb) that a particular occurrence of rain is talked about.
Let me illustrate this observation about explicitness by giving an
example.
(17) a.
	
It is r2ining.
b.	 It is riining now.
in the immediately accessible context (17a) will usually be understood
as describing an event ongoing at the time of communication. Hence,
the information conveyed by the deictic now, in (17b), would be
redundant here. Therefore, the speaker who uses (17b) in preference
to (17a) puts the hearer to the expense of more processing effort than
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necessary for arriving at the proposition expressed by the utterance.
The hearer maximising the relevance of the utterance locks for
contextual effects which will offset the extra amount of effort required
for processing (17b). This is how assumptions about a state of affairs
in the past and/or the future characterised by absence of rain ibecome
more manifest in (17b). These implicatures may interact with the
explicature(s) to give access to other implicatures, i.e. contextual effects,
not derivable from the explicitly communicated information r from
assumptions in the immediately accessible context alone. The contrast
between (16a) and (16b) is explained in much the same way as the one
between (17a) and (17b).
Characteristically, both (16a) and (16b) will be understood as
mpking reference to an event of raining in the past (when interpreted
in the most likely immediately accessible context). The progressive in
(16b) indicates by its linguistic merning (1) that a particular occiarrence
of rain is talked about, and (ii) that the state of fThirs is described as
non-complete (due to the aspectual me pning of the -ing participle). The
simple form is, I assume, semantically unmarked both with respect to
individuation and with respect to completion. Since the past tense of
both forms is readily understood as being used with reference to an
instance of rain in the past, the hearer mimi sing the relevance of the
utterance with the progressive will seek to derive contextual effects
which will offset the processing effort involved in interpreting the
utterance with the more explicit progressive construction. The
implicatures about the event in (16b) (It was raining), as being
represented on the basis of perception arise as hypotheses the hearer
makes in processing the utterance for relevance. These implicatures
may be more or less difficult to construct, depending on the available
clues. In terms of relevance theory, semantic markedness would be a
function of the processing effort required for the derivation of
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implicatures in the process of utterance interpretation. The greater the
processing effort and the wider the range of implicatures, the more
marked the utterance will be. Obviously, pragmatic markedness would
be the appropriate term, instead of the more widely used term semantic
markedness (see Chapter three, section 3.2). This account makes the
following prediction. If there are contexts in which explicit reference to
an individual occurrence of the event and/or incompletion is highly
relevant, the overtones of markedness brought about by the use of the
progressive in examples like (16b) should also be absent. This
prediction is, I think, fully borne out. Consider the progressive in the
main clause followed by a 'when-clause'.
(18) a.	 John didn't remember to take his camera, when
he went on holiday.
b. John was watching television when Mary was at
the party.
c. John opened the door when the bell rang.
d. John was watching television, when Mary came
in.
I take it that when indicates that the time of the state of affairs
described by the clause it introduces is the evahiation time for the state
offf'Rirs described by the main clause. By evaluation time I mean the
time at which the proposition expressed by the miin clause is
guaranteed to be true. There are four relevant temporal relations
between the evaluation time and the event described by the sentence:
(a) the event of the main clause immediately precedes the event of the
'when-clause', as in (18a); (b) the events of the two clauses are
simultaneous, as in (18b); (c) the event of the 'when-clause'
immediately precedes the event of the main clause, (18c); (d) the
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events of the two clauses stand in a relation of temporal containment
of some sort, (18d).
The use of the progressive in (18c) and (18d) saves the amount
of processing effort which would be required for arriving at the intended
interpretation of the temporal relation between the events in the two
clauses if the simple were used. The overtones of the vividness of eye-
witness testimony do not arise in this case precisely because the
progressive is relevant enough by virtue of it aspectual meaning I-
complete]. In (18b) and perhaps more strikingly in (18d) the hearer
cannot derive the speaker's intended interpretation of the temporal
relation between the two events, unless the progressive is used.
Consequently, the hearer needn't go beyond recovering the temporal
interpretation of the conjoined clauses in arriving at what can plausibly
be taken as the speaker's intended interpretation of his utterance, and,
by the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance, going
beyond the first such interpretation would necessarily run against this
principle. I now turn to the contrast between (16c) and (16d).
On the interpretation in the most likely immediately accessible
context, both utterances (16c), (It rains a lot) and (16d) (It i raining a
lot) are readily taken to express present tense propositions, i.e. they are
taken to be descriptions of states offThirs simultaneous with the time
of communication, and, therefore, as (- complete] by definition. So, the
most relevant semantic difference between the simple and the
progressive in utterances like (16c) and (16d) is that the latter makes
explicit reference to a particular ongoing event instantiating the
property denoted by the predicate, whereas the former does not. The
speaker may well be tiUdng about rain without referring to a particular
instance of it, as in habitual utterances such as (16c). Therefore,
explicit reference to an individual instance of rain expressed by (16d)
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is highly relevant for arriving at the interpretation intended by the
speaker. By using the progressive the hearer makes it sure that the
first interpretation considered by the hearer should be the one on which
a particular instance of rRining is talked about. Thus, the first
hypothesis about which proposition the speaker could have intended to
communicate by his utterance can easily be the right one. If the
speaker used (16c) with the simple, intending to communicate the idea
that a specific occasion of rain is described by the utterance, he would
fail to make his intended interpretation sufficiently manifest In other
words, a speaker who would use (16c) intending it to have the import
of (16d) would inevitably fail to conform to the principle of relevance.
But why is the habitual interpretation more manifest for the simple
form in the present than in the past tense?
First, the habitual reading of an utterance about the present is
characteristically highly relevant, regardless of whether an occurrence
of the event denoted by the predicate is actually taking place. Let me
make this point clearer by considering the following situation:
Susan and Peter are on holiday in Spain. It has been raining
non-stop for several days. Susan may use either (16'c) or (16'd)
in tplking about the weather
(16')	 c.	 ItrainsalotinSpain.
d.	 It is raining a lot in Spain.
In the situation sketched out above the assumption that it is actually
rpining heavily is mutually highly manifest to Peter and Susan. What
could Susan have intended to communicate by using (16'c)? She would
probably be taken to mean that the manifest climatic condition
warrants a generalisation about the weather in Spain. This
interpretation is relevant, because it gives access to implicatures like:
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There has been enough rain to contradict the more widely held
assumptions about the climate of Spain, We should go on holiday to
some other place next year, One should not trust the advertisements fiw
holidays, and a range of others. Of course, Susan may choose to make
a statement about its raining heavily at the time of communication and
use the utterance (16'd), thereby communicating a partly different set
of assumptions. My point is that in this context the habitual
interpretation is highly relevant and readily accessible. Since the use
of the simple aspect, as in (16'c), will not give any clues to the hearer
about the speaker's intended interpretation with regard to the habitual-
particular contrast, the habitual interpretation will then be the only one
consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance: had the speaker
not intended the utterance to be interpreted as habitual (or generic) she
could have used the progressive and saved the hearer some processing
effort.
Consider another situation:
Susan and Peter are back in London and are tilking with Mary
and John. Mary asks: Did you have a good time in Spain?
Susan gives the answer:
(16')	 a.	 It rained a lot.
b.	 It was raining a lot.
By asking the question Mary makes it mutually manifest to her
audience and to herself that information about the whole period of
Susan and Peter's stay in Spain is relevant to her. In general, both
(16'a) and(16'b) may be used to refer to one or more occurrences of rain
in the past, but in this particular situation (16'a) is a more relevant
answer than (16'b): only (16'a), but not (16'b), is readily interpreted as
a generalisation about the past, and the speaker's question indicates
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that a general answer would be relevant to her. The use of a 'when-
clause' (in an utterance like It was raining a lot when we were in
Spain) would probably not make the answer with the past progressive
more acceptable in this case. On the one hand, the -ing form would
explicitly indicate that the event is being described as non-complete. It
may be difficult to derive contextual effects which would offset the extra
processing effort involved in interpreting the explicitly [- complete] form
of the verb. On the other hand, it may also be difficult to derive any
relevant effects which would follow from using the progressive as a
construction referring to a particular occurrence of rain, precisely
because the speaker has already indicated that information about the
holiday as a whole would be relevant to her. Some native speakers feel
that the progressive would be taken to lay emphasis on the duration
and intensity of the rain. In other words, they feel that the utterance
(16'b) is somewhat hyperbolical: by using the progressive the speaker
characterises the whole stay on holiday as a continuing instance of rain.
But, in some contexts in which the habitual interpretation is less
manifest the past progressive would be perfectly appropriate. For
example if when asked to describe their holiday in some detail, Susan
starts talking about what she and Peter did on particular occasions. In
this situation, Susan may say: It was raining the day we went to
Madrid.... By using the progressive which points indexically, as it
were, to a particular ongoing event of riining in the past, Susan makes
more manifest to her audience a range of asssumptions about rain. In
this way she invites the listeners to interpret the events she proceeds
to describe in the context of these implicated assumptions. This, I
think, explains the so-called backgrounding effect of the past
progressive. Also, the use of the past progressive in those utterances
in which particular occurrences of ongoing events in the past are talked
about and in which the time of the event is relevant, receives a
straightforward explanation.
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(19) a.	 I was walking in the street iwhen I met Arthur.
	
b.	 (?)I walked in the street when I met Arthur.
By using the progressive in (19a) the speaker makes more mRnifest the
spatio-temporal context of the situation, and then elaborates on it by
spelling out, as it were, one of the relevant assumptions about the
occasion. The less explicit simple form in (1gb) gives a sense of
detachment between the two events, and is somewhat difficult to
contextualise. The conjunction when explicitly temporally relates the
two events; on the most salient interpretation of the utterance the event
of the subordinate clause falls within the time span of the event of the
main clause. By using the progressive in the mann dause the speaker
makes it easier for the hearer to anticipate the unilerstanding on which
an ongoing event in the past is described, and also to anticipate the
continuation of the utterance. Consequently, in mterpreting (19b) the
hearer finds it more difficult to establish the relevant temporal relation
between the events than he does in interpreting (19a), and expects the
extra amount of processing effort to be offset by same effects. As these
effects would be difficult to derive (in most readily conceivable contexts),
the utterance is normally found to be somewhat odd. The the lack of
explicit guidelines for interpretation in (19b) may m pke it too difficult
for the hearer to decide what is the interpretation intended by the
speaker. The use of when is crucial here. if events are merely
mentioned in a sequence without explicit indilcations about their
temporal connection, the utterance is perfectly sy to interpret:
(20) I walked along the street, I met Arthur,
Instead of laying emphasis on the temporal relation between the two
events (like (19b) with when), (20) is readily interpreted as relating the
events in the order in which they occurred, and creates expectations on
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the part of the hearer about other events which took place. The
question What happened next? immediately comes to mind upon hearing
(20).
The key to an explanation of the simple aspect of event verbs in
the present and in the past tense is the higher manifestness of the
habitual reading in the present tense. Habitual utterances are
adequately characterised as statements of general truths, i.e.
statements which hold over considerable periods of time and are not
easily likely to change. When the past tense form of the verb is used,
the state of affairs which the utterance is about is more likely to be
understood as terminated. Since individual events are more readily
thought of as transient, the use of the past tense will make more
accessible the understanding on which the utterance describes an
individual event in the past. The present tense form does not suggest
termination at all. Consequently, the habitual interpretation remains
highly accessible. That the possibifity of a habitual understanding of
the simple past of event verbs is not precluded seems to be an
advantage of, not a difficulty for, this account. The examples (16'a) and
(16'b) clearly illustrate the point. As Boon as there are some contextual
indications to the effect that the habitual interpretation is relevant, the
simple past receives the habitual understanding, and is more felicitous
than the progressive.
I hope to have shown how, given a fairly simple characterisation
of the linguistic mepning of the progressive and of the simple aspects,
relevance theory provides a natural explanation for some facets of the
meinings which these categories receive in use. I have given some
evidence in support of the view that the progressive, by virtue of its
linguistic meaning makes reference to a particular event instantiating
the property denoted by the verbal predicate. In the light of the
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distinction made in relevance theory between conceptual and procedural
meaning, introduced in Chapter two ( pp. 58-61, e question of
whether the linguistic mesning of the progressive is conceptually or
procedurally repres'ted.
4.5 TaE PROGRESSiVE AND CONSTRAINTS ON RFLEVANCE
The progressive, I have argued, constrains the explicit content
of the utterance by virtue of its meining. In other wards, the use of the
progressive is reflected in the truth conditional content of the
proposition expressed by the utterance. Bearing in miind the distinction
between representational (i.e. conceptual) meaning and procedural
meaning, the question arises as to whether reference to instantiation
of the property is represented at the level of the ligical form of the
utterance (i.e. whether it is conceptual) or whether it is encoded as a
constraint on explicit content, and, therefore, non-conceptual. In this
section I will show that my characterisation of the progressive as a form
which constrains the explicit content of the utterance is supported by
an analysis of the be going to + in! construction. The issue of whether
this constraining effect is to be explained in terms of a semantic
constraint on explicit content will remain open. I argue against
Haegeman's (1989) view that the be going to + in! construction
encodes a constraint on context selection. However, pending evidence
to the contrary, I take the position that the meaning of instantiation is
conceptually represented, and that the process of interpretation which
leads to a more or less specific representation of the individual event
being talked about in determined by considerations *1 relevance.
By way of introduction, let me consider yet another zimple
which shows how the progressive constrains utterance inthrpretation
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(21) The same sentence [I am hot] would be being used to
make a different statement, if uttered by someone else.
What is the contribution of the progressive would be being used to the
interpretation of(21) (adapted from Kempson (1975:36))? By virtue of
its meaning, the progressive acts as an indication to the hearer that
some relevant information about the event instantiating the property
is easily accessible from the context(& niL rLm In reasoning about
possible states of affairs, the hearer may not be in a position to access
direct evidence of the event taking place. Nor will the progressive in
(21) give rise to the overtones standardly associated with some uses of
the construction. However, there is some information about an instance
of using the same sentence which may be highly relevant; namely, that
one and the same event which instantiates someone else's uttering the
sentence also instantiates that person's using the sentence to make a
different statement. Of course, this piece of relevant information is
inferable from the context independentiy from the progressive. The
author could have used the simple: The same sentence would be used
to make a different statement, if uttered by someone else. But the
progressive makes the intended interpretation more accessible, thus
reducing the amount of effort necessary for the interpretation. The
effort involved in processing the progressive is offset by the contextual
effects achieved, because the construction makes the derivation of the
co-referential relation, as it were, between using and uttering easier. In
this example, the use of the progressive is relevant, because it reduces
the processing effort required for arriving at the intended
interpretation. The construction with be going to + inf. dearly encodes
future time and is also associated with a number of readily identifiable
overtones. I argue that these overtones are best explained on the
assumption that the be going to + inf. construction is an instance of the
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progressive. An alternative analysis put fbrward by Haegeman (1989),
which does not take this into account, is shown to be untenable.
The much discussed overtones associated with the use of be
going to + inf. (see Haegeman (1989) for references) seem to be
consistently linked to the linguistic meRning of the construction, but the
charactensation of the linguistic mecining itself has proved an obdurate
problem. 14
 Consider the following examples:
(22) I am going to leave next week.
(23) a.	 They are going to get married.
	
b.	 She's going to have another baby.
Sometimes the more general impression of future fulfilment of the
present, illustrated by most examples with be going to + inf. is narrowed
down, as it were, to the overtones of present intention, as in (22) and
(23a), and present cause (23b). In other uses, there is no apparent
overtone at all. These overtones vary not only in strength, but also in
the darity with which they are expressed. Thus, it is not clear that the
overtone ofpresent cause in (23b) either accurately captures the hearer's
intuitions about the meclning conveyed by the utterance, or that the
idea of present intention, arguably associated with (23a), is preduded
in (23b).
According to Haegeman's (1989) analysis, couched in relevance
theory terms, the overtones are implicatures deriving from the
interaction of the linguistic meRning of be going to + inf. with the
context, in the process of utterance interpretation. Arguably, the
construction indicates, by virtue of a linguistically encoded non-truth
conditional semantic constraint, that the proposition expressed by the
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utterance is to be processed against a context which includes some
present tense propositions. The overtones arise as implicatures, i.e. as
hypotheses about the state of affairs in the present which the speaker
(conforming to the principle of relevance) may have intended to
communicate by using the construction with be going to + inf.
This analysis allegedly receives support from the observation
that be going to + inf. is readily used with expressions pointing to (the
relevance of) present time, in contrast to the corresponding utterances
with will/shall, which seem somewhat difficult to interpret.
(24) a.	 We are already going to have the kitchen
redecorated.
b.	 ?We already will have the kitchen redecorated.
(25) a.	 I didn't realise that you are going to travel by
boat.
b.	 ?I didn't realise that you will travel by boat.
(26) a.	 Did you know that Ann is going to get married?
	
b.	 ?Did you know that Ann will get married?
The appropriateness of the be going to + inf construction in the
examples above, is explained by the semantic compatibility between be
going to + inf. and the contextual clues provided by the adverbial
already, in (26), and the verbs realise and know in (25) and (26),
respectively. The comparative difficulty in interpreting the (b)
sentences in (24), (25) and (26) is, arguably, due to the meaning of
will/shall, also characterised in terms of a semantic constraint on
interpretation, in this case, one which indicates that future tense
assumptions should be included in the context.
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Conversely, in conditionals in which the protasis describes a
state of ffRir5 in the future (to the exclusion of the present), the use of
be going to + inf in the apodosis causes processing difficulties due to
conflicting processing instructions in the two conjuncte.
(27) a.	 (*X?)lf you accept that job, you're never going to
regret it.
	
b.	 We're going to find ourselves in difficulty if we
cariy on like this.
(28) a.	 (?)You're going to be fired if you ever go near his
computer.
b. You'li be fired if you ever go near his computer.
c. You're going to be fired if you go on like this.
The sentences (2Th) and (28c) are easier to interpret t,€han (27a) and
(28a), because in both examples the 'if-clause' describes a state of affairs
in the present, so that both the protasis and the apodosis are
contextualised against a present time context. (28b) is also easily
contextualised, as both clauses describe states of affairs in the future,
without pointing to the relevance of present tense contextual
assumptions. But (27a) and (28a) are difficult to contextualise: be going
to + inf. in the apodosis, instructs the hearer to process the proposition
against a present time context, although it describes a state of affairs
contingent upon, and subsequent to, the future state of affairs described
in the protasis.
In coordinated clauses, the use of be going to + inf in both
conjuncts precludes the implication of causal link between the future
events, as the contrast between (29a) and (29b) illustrates.
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(29) a.	 He's not going to finish his Ph.D. and he's going to
lose his job.
	
b.	 He won't finish his Ph.D. and he'll lose his job.
Bearing in mind the point made by Blakemore (1987) that a conjoined
proposition is to be processed for contextual effects as a whole (in other
words, that the conjuncta are not to be contextualised independently),
Haegeman (1989) explains the lack of causal connection between the
future events in the two clauses in (29a) as resulting from the
instruction that both propositions should be processed against a present
time context, so that the future tense proposition in the first conjunct
does not serve as the background for the interpretation of the
proposition expressed by the second. Hence, the tendency to
understand the two propositions as merely listing events. By virtue of
pointing to the relevance of a present time context be going to + in!.
may be used to save the hearer processing effort that would be required
for the contextualisation of the corresponding utterance with will/shall.
(30) a.	 The rock is going to fall.
b.	 The rock will fall.
(31) Finally, tonight, on the weather forecast for the South.
The night is going to be rather cloudy, but most places
will remain dry. The temperature will fall around forty
near the coast, ... and the winds, they'll be south-east...
(from Nationwide, BBC, 20.02.1975)
The effect of the processing constraint in (30a) is to indicate that all the
necessary conditions for the future occurrence of the event are met. By
contrast, (30b) is felt to be incomplete: will points to the relevance of a
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future time context, and the appropriate context is not, or, at least, may
not be, easily accessible. At the beginning of the weather forecast in
(31), be going to + inf sets the context by embedding the account of the
events in the remainder of the forecast in a set of assumptions about
present indications.
On the basis of what has been said so far, the overtones of
present fulfilment of the future, present intention, present cause and the
like, could be explained as implicatures arising from the interaction of
the linguistic mepning of be going to + inf. with the context in use.
However, these implicatures are better explained on the assumption
that the be going to + inf. construction is an instance of the progressive,
than on Haegeman's view according to which it encodes a constraint on
context selection. Consider (32a) and (32b):
(32) a.
	 Mary's going to have another baby.
b. Mary will have another baby.
In both (32a) and (32b) the speaker is asserting his commitment to the
truth of the proposition [futurel Mary have another baby, but only in
(32a) is he indicating that the future tense proposition is relevant in the
context of some present tense assumptions: Mary intends to have
another baby, Mary is pregnant again, etc. However, it is to be noted
that neither of these is plausibly construed as part of the explicature.
An explicature like There are present indications that Mary will have
another baby gives access to a number of implicatures which could be
explicitly expressed only by some complex utterance that would be very
difficult to process. But, in principle, either Mary (probably) intends
to have another baby or Mary is (probably) pregnant could be part of
the speaker's intended explicature. Suppose that the hearer interprets
(32a) as: Mary is pregnant again and she will have another baby. The
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possible implicature of(32a), Mary intends to have another baby,, would
be weakened or lost, because the speaker would be explicitly
highlighting the relevance of Mary's pregnancy. If the explicature was:
Mary intends to have another baby, and she will have another baby, the
implicature that Mary may be pregnant may be weakened, because
emphasis would be on Mary's intention. But there is nothing in the
theory that stipulates the point at which the hearer muet atop
enriching. So, how is the explicature There are present Indications that
Mary will have another baby arrived at, in the first place? The qiaestion
iseasilyansweredonceitisreaiisedthatbegoingto+inf isan
instance of the progressive, and that the progressive points to some
event in the world which instantiates (i.e. semantically interprets) the
property denoted by the predicate. But, what would be the property
denoted by be going to? I assume that be going to encodes a Largely
emptied concept, some loose idea of going. The use of the construction
indicates that some event in the world which is the 8eUiafltiC
interpretation of a loose concept ofgoing is relevant. The exact ccontent
of the concept is determined by considerations of relevance. Once the
hearer arrives at a representation which is specific enough to be
optimally relevant (i.e. sufficiently specific to yield enough cortextual
effects for the processing effort required), he will stop enriching the
logical form of the utterance. In (32a) some propositional form like
There are present indications that Mary will have another baby will be
specific enough to give rise to a range of thoughts whireh the
communicator may have intended to communicate by using the egoing
to + inf construction. Haegeman's (1989) account in terms of a
constraint on context selection is far more problematic.
The view that be going to does not constrain the explicit cLontent
of the utterance makes it difficult to account for the examples in (24)
(We are already going to have the kitchen redecorated; ?We already will
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have the kitchen redecorated). Haegeman (1989:296) assumes that
'already is a pragmatic adverb, that it relates the event to other events
in the immediate context'. In other words, it is 'used as a means of
orgamsing the proposition with respect to its context, it can be argued
that it has a discourse function: it imposes pragmatic constraints on
processing'. But it should be noted in this connection that the
construction with will/shall is not incompatible with the present time
adverb now.
	(33) a.	 John will give the talk now.
	
b.	 Jobnisgoingtogivethetalknow.
As (24a) is perfectly acceptable, while (24b) is really odd, the view that
already has a purely pragmatic function seems unwarranted. If only
pragmatic considerations were involved, (24b) should, in fact, be
acceptable (though, possibly, difficult to interpret). Let me tentatively
assume that the adverbial already is better characterised as relating
states of affairs to a time at which they can be evaluated as true, and
that it does not have a purely pragmatic function. If (24a), as I have
argued, may express a proposition such as: There are indications in the
present that their kitchen will be redecorated, the adverb already may
be used to modify the state of 1Thir8 in the present by indicating that
it still is true, and has been true for some time. By contrast, (24b) is
unacceptable precisely because there is no state of ffiir anchored to
a time at which it could be evaluated. So, it seems that the examples
in (24) lend support to the view that be going to does, in fact, constrain
the explicit content of the proposition expressed by the utterance, and
is not a constraint on implicatures. As it is widely recognised that both
will/shall and be going to in the eirninples considered so far have
present tense, it seems reasonable to ask why only the latter
construction constrains utterance interpretation in the way in which it
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does? Let me look at the use of be going to in the past tense, which as
Haegeman herself observes, presents difficulties for her analysis.
Utterances like (34a) and (34b) have different entailments, since
only the latter requires that the anticipated event did take place.
(34) a.	 The Queen was going to arrive three hours later.
	
b.	 The Queen would arrive three hours later.
The utterance (35a) is acceptable, while (35b) is contradictory.
(35) a.	 The Queen was going to arrive three hours later,
but the plan was changed and she did not turn
up.
b.	 *The Queen would arrive three hours later, but
the plan was chrniged and she did not turn up.
On the view that utterances with be going to express future tense
propositions and that, in addition, this construction encodes a
constraint on context selection, utterances in which be going to is used
in the past tense should have the same logical implications as those
with the past tense equivalent of will, which is clearly not the case.
However, on the assuption that be going to encodes a largely emptied
concept, which is semantically interpreted by an event in the world, it
seems obvious that (35a) should not be contradictory. The logical form
of the utterance (34a) is readily enriched to the level of some
proposition like The Queen intended to/had planned to arrive, which,
of course, does not entail that the Queen actually did arrive.
I have suggested that be going to encodes a concept which is
largely devoid of lexical meining, and I have argued that this loose
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concept is pragmatically enriched in use. What ren1iin to be shown is
that reference to an event in the world is aiso part of the meaning of be
going to. What I have said so far could be true whether the
construction has the semantics of the progressive, or not. One way of
finding out would be to compare the be going to + in/ construction of
English with the equivalent construction in a language which lacks the
simple- progressive contrast. One such language is French. The
semantic correspondence between the be going to + inf construction of
English and the periphrastic future of French with the verb oiler ('go')
is only partial.15 Both convey similar overtones, but the certainty that
the anticipated event will actually take place is greater in English than
in French. This difference between the two languages could easily be
explained on the assumption that the English construction explicitly
points to some event in the world which is the semantic interpretation
of the loose concept of going, whereas the corresponding periphraatic
form of French is not explicit in this respect. Putting it roughly, the
English expression explicitly says that there is some particular event
in the world which is related to another event in the future in a
relevant way. The French expression says merely that some event (or
other) in the world is related to a future event in a relevant way.
Assumptions about the strength of causal connections depend, amongst
other things, on the range of events which enter into causal
interactions. it is one thing to say that a future occurrence of an event
is contingent upon some particular event ongoing at the time of
communication, as in English, and it is an altogether different thing to
say that it is contingent upon some event or other, as in French. That
much is common encyclopaedic knowledge. The hearer who processes
the English expression for relevance will naturally be led to the
conclusion that there is a strong causal link between the two events,
because the semantics of the English progressive construction provides
good evidence for that conclusion. The hearer who processes the French
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expression has less reliable evidence, and his conclusion will, therefore,
also be entertained as less certain. Admittedly, this is a rather sketchy
account, but it doesn't seem implausible to me. But why is (35b) felt to
be somewhat contradictory?
It seems reasonably clear that the use of the would + in!
construction in utterances like (35b) is closely related to the so-called
narrative present. Consider (36)
(36) I couldn't believe it! Just as we arrived, up comes Ben
and slaps me on the back as if we're life-long friends.
'Come on, old pal,' he says, 'Let me buy you a drink!' rm
telling you, I nearly fainted on the spot.
(Quirk et at. (1985:181))
In relevance theory terms the use of the simple present in narration is
explained as an instance of interpretive use. Intuitively by using the
italicised present tense forms the speaker of (36) is representing past
events as if he were experiencing them at the time of communication.
Therefore, it seems quite plausible to assume that the utterances with
the present tense forms in this use are intended to be interpreted as
representing thoughts as they occurred to the narrator, rather than
describing the events themselves. Just as narration can involve the
representation of past events as they are actualised, it may also involve
the representation of thoughts about events (and states of Rffiirg in
general) which are anticipated in the past, as in (37):
(37) Two years later the war would break out. The streets
now swarming with people would be deserted. The threat
of air raids would be lurking all the time.
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Clearly the italicised forms in (37) indicate that the utterances
represent anticipatory thoughts in the past, though not thoughts
directly attributed to a specific subject of consciousness. The future in
the past understanding of would guides the hearer to process the
utterance for relevance in the context of assumptions about some time
in the past as well as assumptions about some later time, the time of
the relevant development of events. In (37) this gives rise to
implicatures like: Who would have thought that.... The most likely
iniplicatures of (34b) would involve assumptions about the contrast
between the time at which the Queen's arrival is expected in three
hours' time and some relevant later state of cffir - the general
atmosphere at the time at which the Queen actually arrived. The
utterance (35b) is odd precisely because the continuation (but the plan
was changed...) requires a revision of the most manifest interpretation
of the first conjunct (The Queen would arrive three hours later). Now,
if my account of be going to + inf as an instance of the progressive is
correct, the utterance (34a) (The Queen was going to arrive three hours
later) should have a propositional form roughly like: There were
indications at time t in the past that the Queen would arrive at time t'
three hours after t. The optimally relevant interpretation of (34a) does
not depend on the assumption that the event of the Queen's arnval
actually took place. Consequently, the utterance in (35a) (but the
plan was changed ... is not felt to be contradictory.
If the interpretation of utterances with be going to + inf really
involves the enrichment of the logical form in the way in which I have
argued it does, there is no need too assume that this construction also
encodes a constraint on context selection. Also, itseeins quite obvious
that my analysis accounts not only for all examples which can be
explained on Haegeman's approach, but also for those which present
difficulties for her analysis.
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4.6 TEE PROGRESSWE AND THE PERFECTIVE
The features of deliznitedness, change and duration circumscribe
a range of conceptual contrasts. In Chapter two I have argued that,
given the characterisation of the aspectual categories in terms of these
features, there emerges a lack of predictable correspondence between
the aspectual categories of English and Serbo-Croat in a number of
uses. I also suggested that this is to be accounted for in terms of the
interaction of the meanings of predicate expressions with the context.
I have argued that the progressive of English indicates by part of its
linguistic meaning that a particular event instantiating the property is
talked about. In this section an attempt is made to show that the
semantics of the perfective aspect of Serbo-Croat is to be characterised
in terms of the same feature, and that this makes it possible to explain
the apparent lack of systematic correspondence of the aspectual
categories of the two languages in a number of uses.
In Chapter two I looked at the use of the imperfective aspect in
habitual utterances in Serbo-Croat and I pointed out that the choice of
the perfective would be inappropriate for a number of reasons.
Crucially, the utterances with the perfective would be difficult to
contextualise. Intuitively, further information about the circumstances
concerning the events described would be required. This is why the
utterances in (c) in the examples below ((13) and (14) in Chapter two)
are marked with a bracketted question mark.
(38) a.	 John blinkg.
b. Jovan trepée [imperf.].
c. (?)Jovan trepne [perf.].
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	(39) a.	 Mary coughs.
b. Meri ka1je [imperf.l.
c. (?)Meri kihne [pert I.
The intuitions mentioned above are easily explained on the assumption
that by virtue of its linguistic meaning the perfective aspect makes
reference to a particular [+ complete] event instantiating the property
denoted by the predicate. On the one hand, habitual utterances are
often generalisations based on individual occurrences of events, so the
aspect which points to particular occurrences of events is obviously
inappropriate for use in these habituals. This may suggest that in
habitual utterances with an understood or explicit frequency adverbial
the perfective should be more appropriate. This is indeed the case. On
this interpretation the perfective would indicate that there are some
specific circumstances under which John blinks. On the other hand, by
virtue of explicitly referring to individual events, the perfective makes
more relevant the assumptions about the spatio-temporal context in
which the event takes place. Questions like 'When?', 'Why? and 'What
happened next?', which immediately come to one's mind upon hearing
(3&) and (39c), arise as a result of the hearer's attempt to offset the
effort involved in processing the utterances with the more explicit
perfective aspect in terms of the contextual effects achieved. The more
difficult such contextual assumptions are to access, the more
stylistically marked and incomplete the utterances with the perfective
will be felt to be.
The use of the imperfective in Serbo-Croat in mples for which
a characterisation of aspectual meining in terms of deliinitedness
predicts the use of the perfective was illustrated by example (12),
Chapter two, repeated in (40):
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(40) a.	 Did John read/Has John read War and Peace?
b. Da II je Jovan itao [imperf.J Rat I mir?
c. Da Ii je Jovan proitao [perL] Rat S mir?
(40c) with the perfective is felt to be inappropriate as a question asking
merely about John's having read the book, because it gives rise to some
presumably unintended overtones about the time by which the reading
of the book should have been completed, the implication that a specific
copy of War and Peace is being talked about, and the like. This is again
readily explained on the view that the perfective aspect of Slavonic is
similar to the progressive of English inso far as it makes reference to
individual events. Thus, the intuition that a specific copy of the book
is being talked about or that a deadline for finishing the book is
involved, arise as contextual assumptions in the process of utterance
interpretation in much the same way as those mentioned in connection
with (38c) and (39c). Consider now the use of the simple in English and
of the Serbo-Croat imperfective in sports commentaries.
(41) a.	 Black passes the ball to Fernandez... Fernandez
shoots!
b. Black dodaje [impert] loptu Fernandezu...
Fernandezu utira [iniperL]l
c. ?Black doda [perfj loptu Fernandezu... Fernandez
utne [perf.]!
The simple present in commentaries gives the impression of a
quick sequence of events. On the characterisation of the present simple
in sports commentaries given in Quirk et aL (1985:180) under the
heading instantaneous present, this use occurs 'where the verb refers
to a single action begun and completed approximately at the moment
of speech'. As this characterisation is very similar to a traditional
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definition of the perfective aspect, one would expect that the Serbo-
Croat counterpart of the instantaneous present in (41a) should be the
present of perfective verbs. But this is not the case. The appropriate
translation of (41a) is (41b) with the imperfective, and not (41c) with
the perfective. (41c) is somewhat unusual in that it gives rise to the
same kinds of questions as the perfective verbs in (38) and (39), i.e.
various questions about the circumstances in which the real world event
takes place, the sort of assumptions essentially irrelevant (and difficult
for the listener to construct) in sports commentaries. Thus, the
perfective aspect seems inappropriate for the same reason as the
progressive in (42):
(42) ?Black is passing the ball to Fernandez... Fernandez is
shooting.
Admittedly, there are contexts in which (42) would be
appropriate (commenting while watching the video recording of the
match, for example, where the progressive highlights the relevance of
the players' observable behaviour), but, in a live radio broadcast it is
the fact that the event occurs, rather than the representation of the
event itself, which is relevant, and the simple is the more appropriate
form. Also, the progressive explicitly indicates lack of completion,
while, in a sports commentary, the event is likely to be completed
before the hearer has finished processing the utterance. The aspectual
meRnirig of completion associated with the perfective also makes this
category unsuitable for use in sports commentaries. The use of the
perfective present would explicitly indicate that the event is completed
and the reporter could not assert without contradicting Ilim ReIf that the
pass has been successfully intercepted. Thus, the utterance (43) is a
contradiction.
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(43) (*)]	 doda [perf.] loptu Fernandezu... Watson izbacule
loptu u aut.
Black passes the ball to Fernandez... Watson kicks out.
The utterance in Serbo-Croat is acceptable only on the understanding
that Watson throws the ball out after it has been sUccessfully passed to
Fernandez. The reading on which Black's pass is intercepted by
Watson is preduded by the use of the perfective aspect. By contrast,
the corresponding utterance in English with the simple aspect allows
the reading on which Black's pass to Fernandez is intercepted. It should
be noted that only in the example in English a continuation like
Beautifully intercepted by Watson would be acceptable. But why
wouldn't the reporter choose the progressive here? After all, the
progressive would explicitly indicate that the pass has not been
completed and would make more manifest the possibility that the pass
may be intercepted. The answer is that the simple present of sports
commentaries does not relate the events truth-conditionally. The
reporter is relating as present the events which (he knows) have been
completed. The reporter's utterances echo his past thoughts which
represent events (which, at the time of communication, may, but need
not be completed) as present. In other words, the simple present of
sports commentaries, like the narrative present, is used interpretively,
and not descriptively. The main difference between these two uses is
that, in commentaries, the events being reported are almost
simultaneous with the moment of communication, or are actually still
in progress (and the reporter is anticipating the completion of the
events). In both the narrative present and the present of sports
commentaries, the speaker is not merely describing the events as they
occur, but his realisation of these events. In other words, the reporter's
and the narrator's utterances are interpretations of thoughts which are
representations of other thoughts.18
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The point made about the inappropriateness of the progressive
and the perfective in sports commentaries also carries over to the so-
called historical present used in narration.
(44) a.	 He opens the door, enters the room, looks out of
the window, and sits down at the table.
b. On otvara vrata [imperL], ulazi [iniperf] u sobu,
gleda Eimperf] kroz prozor, i seda Eimperfj za ste.
c. On otvori [perf] vrata, udje [perL] u sobu, pogleda
[perfj kroz prozor, I sedne [perfj za ste.
Both (44b) and (44c) are possible translations of(44a). However,
the imperfective, in (44b), is the more commonly used form in narration.
The perfective, in (44c), seems to focus on the context in which the
events occur. A number of facts about the use of the perfective and the
imperfective aspects in the so-called historical present are at least
consistent with, and therefore lend support to, the assumption that the
perfective partly constrains utterance interpretation by virtue of its
linguistic mepning in the same way as the progressive. It appears that
the perfective and the progressive differ with respect to completion but
have in common reference to particular events, as shown in Table 1.
Perfective	 Progreseive
change
(a) single	 +
(b)complex	 +
complete	 +	 -
referenc. to
particular event	 +	 +
Table 1
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4.7 THE IMPERFECTWE AND THE PROGRESSIVE- MORPHEME -P/A-
This section looks at some examples of verbs with the
iniperfectivising morpheme -Wa- (-ava-, -eva-) and argues that in
addition to the feature I- complete] this morpheme is (with some verbs
and verb forms at least) expressive of reference to particular events. It
is also shown that the interpretation of a number of verbs with the
morpheme -irati in the infinitive which are usually considered bi-
aspectual differs from the interpretation of imperfective verbs. This
lends support to the view I took in Chapter two, that the imperfective
aspect encodes the feature (- complete].
There is a small number of imperfective verbs in Serbo-Croat
most of which are characterized by the morpheme -Wa- in the infinitive
and present tense forms, and which tend to have a progressive-like
interpretation both with respect to lack of completion and reference to
individual events. These are illustrated in the (b) sentences in the
examples below.
(45) a.
b.
(46) a.
Mislim, dalde jesam.
I think therefore I am.
Razmiljam, dakle jesam.
I am thinking therefore I am.
Kad godje bio obuzet mranim niislima, odlazioje
is grada.
Whenever he was overwhelmed by sombre
thoughts, he would leave town.
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	b.	 Kad godje bivao obuzet mranim misliina, odlazio
je iz grada.
Whenever he was being overwhelmed by sombre
thoughtz he would leave town.
	
(47) a.	 Za vreme predavaxija, dobro su razumeli
predavaa.
During the lecture they understood the lecturer
well.
b.	 Za vreme predavanja, dobro su razumevali
predavaa.
During the lecture they were understanding the
lecturer well.
Sentence (45a) is the usual translation of Cogito ergo sum into Serbo-
Croat. Following the observations of Banfleld (1982) and Lyons (1982)
it is possible to see (45b) as the more appropriate translation (Chapter
three, section 3.L1.3). In (45b) it is himself in the act of thinking which
the subject is aware of, and, therefore, he knows that he knows.
Similarly, (46b) is understood as an utterance about the subject's
awareness of himself being €ivenvhelmed by sombre thoughts, while
(4Th) is felt to be appropriate only in case the people listening to the
lecture are showing perceptible signs of understanding. But the
contrast ifiustrated in the emples to (47) is rather exceptional,
because the pairs of verbs which differ only with regard to the presence
or absence of the imperfectivisuig affix -iva- (-ava-, -ova-) is the rather
restricted modern Serbo-Croat.
Imperfective verbs of Serbo-Croat normally allow for two
interpretations corresponding to the progressive or the simple aspect in
English. Thus, a sentence such as Radi can be translated as lie/She
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works' or as 'He/She is working'. Imperfective verbs differ from the
simple form of English and the aspectually unmarked verbs of Serbo-
Croat in that they retain the feature [- complete] in contexts like 'when-
clauses', where aspectually unmarked verbs could have either a
perfective or an imperfective interpretation, as the contrast between
(48a) and (48b) ifiustrates.
	
(48) a.	 Kad su nRlizirali [unspecified] problem,
raspravijali [imperfl su o mnogim pitanjima.
When they were analysing/had analysed the
problem they discussed [imperL] a lot of
questions.
	
b.	 Kad su govori]i [imperf.] o toni problemu,
odgovarali [imperL] su na mnoga pitanja.
When they were speaking [iniperfj about the
problem, they answered [imperfj a lot of
questions.
While (48a) is readily understood as conveying the idea that the
discussion took place after the analysing had finished, by far the most
manifest interpretation of (48b) is one on which the answering of
questions took place while problems were t1ked about. The
interpretation of (48b) and similar utterances strongly supports the
view that the imperfective aspect grammaticalises the feature
[- complete].
Some verbs with the -Wa- morpheme in the infinitive are not
used in the present tense, but only in the past tense and in the future
tense. The present tense is made with the corresponding verb without
the -wci- morpheme.
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(49) a.	 Kartoteka sadri mnogo podotaka [inf sadrati].
The file contains a lot of data.
b. *F.thteka sadrava mnogo podataka [ml.
sadravatiJ.
The file is containing a lot of data.
c. ?Kartoteka je sadra1a ninogo podataka [inL
sadrati].
The file contained a lot of data.
ci.	 Kartoteka je sadravala mnogo podataka [inL
sadravati]
The file contained/used to contain a lot of data.
e. ?Kartoteka ée sadrati mnogo podataka [inL
sadrati].
The file will contain a lot of data.
f. Kartoteka ée sadravati mnogo podataka [inL
sadravati].
The file will contain a lot of data.
The difference between the sentences (49c) and (49d) is one of aspect.
(49c) is interpreted as perfective, with the verb indicating change of
state, (49d) as imperfective, and indicating state. The same holds for
(49e) and (49f) respectively. But in the present tense only the 'simple'
form without the -iva- affix can be used. (49a) has an imperfective
stative interpretation. The examples in (49) are of some interest
because they illustrate the way in which the interaction of tense and
aspect constrains the use of verb forms. The unacceptability of(49b) is
due to the stative meaning of the verb, just as the English counterpart
with the progressive '*The file is containing a lot of data' is
unacceptable. The question marks in the examples (49c) and (49e) are
to indicate that the utterance would have a completive interpretation,
and would suggest that the file did or will contain a lot of data for some
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relevant period of time. In other words the utterances are difficult to
contextualise. It is not easy to determine the clear pattern of the
contribution of the -iva- morpheme. Certainly, it always conveys lack
of completion. In those cases in which there is a corresponding form
without this morpheme, -iva- also expresses reference to individual
events, like the progressive construction of English.
4.8 THE PERFECTWE AND THE SIMPLE
In Chapter two (section 2.3.3) I argued that process verbs of
English in the simple aspect are not to be characterised as [+ complete],
i.e. perfective. This was ifiustrated by the examples (21a) and (21b)
(repeated here as (50a) and (50b)):
(50) a.	 John ran for several hours this morning, and, for
all I know, he may still be running.
b.	 Lily strolled along the beach, and she may stifi be
strolling there.
Some native speakers find both of these examples slightly (or more than
slightly) difficult to interpret and even odd. So, let me give yet another
example which shows that the sense of completion with the past simple
form of process verbs is really not determined by their linguistic
meaning, but is pragmatically established.
(51) A:	 How did Susan spend the morning?
B:	 She worked on Peter's paper all morning and she
is still working on it.
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As far as I have been able to find out, native speakers of English find
B's reply perfectly appropriate. Since work is a process verb and is
used in the past simple tense fonn, without suggesting and, certainly,
without entailing completion or termination of the process, the
completive meaning of process 'verbs in the past simple tense form
should not be considered as due to the linguistic meaning of the
predicate but as pragmatically derived.
In this section I address the following questions. If process verbs
are to be characterised in terms of ongoing successive changes, i.e. as
[- complete], how do they receive a completive interpretation in certain
uses? Why do they differ from state verbs in this respect? Why are
imperfective verbs of Slavonic closer to state verbs of English than to
process verbs in these uses?
The verb run is normally said to denote a process, i.e. to involve
change, without involving endpoints. Therefore, one would expect that
it should be translated into Serbo-Croat by an iniperfective verb, not a
by a perfective one. And yet, as the discussion of the examples in (13),
repeated as (52), shows, this is not always the case.
	
(52) a.	 They ran when the tram stopped.
	
b.	 Trali su [imperL] kada se tranwaj zaustavio.
	
C.	 Potrali en [perfl kada se tramvaj zaustavio.
On the most easily accessible interpretation, (52a) is taken to be
about an instance of an event in the past. The 'when-clause' gives some
relevant contextual information, by explicitly indicating that an
individual event is talked about So, in Serbo-Croat there is no need to
avoid the implications associated with the use of the perfective. The
verb run, like all process verbs, may be used in describing both
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complete and non-complete events (see section 2), and thatta simple
past tense form in (52a) is correctly interpreted as describing the onset
of the process. The translation with the perfective, (52c), is more
economical than the one with the imperfective, (52b), because it saves
the hearer the processing effort necessary for arriving at the intended
interpretation. But why then do process verbs like run not allow for the
interpretation on which the process is in progress at the time of the
event of the when-clause'? It follows from the principle of relevance
that a rational communicator will formulate his utterance so that the
first assumption the hearer makes about the propositional form
expressed by the utterance is likely to be the correct one. The word
when indicates that the evaluation time for the proposition expressed
by the main clause is the same as the evaluation time of the proposition
expressed by the subordinate clause. The encyclopaedic assumptions
about causal connections between events are normally highly manifest
and are not contradicted by the lexical mepnings of the two
propositions. So, it is patently impossible to think of a context in which
the past simple form of a process verb would be intended to have other
than an inceptive interpretation and still be optimally relevant.
Examples like (50) show that this possibility exists at least in principle.
However, when the past simple form of the process verb is used in the
main clause followed by a 'when-clause' the hearer will, in almost all
conceivable contexts, consider the inceptive, completive interpretation
first. A rational communicator intending a non-inceptive, non-
completive reading would fail to conform to the principle of relevance.
By misguiding the hearer to consider first the interpretation which he
did not intend to communicate, the speaker would be putting the hearer
to the expense of greater processing effort than necessary for the
derivation of his intended interpretation. Also, on the assumption that
the meaning of when is to be defined as a moment rather than as an
interval of time longer than a moment, and that all process verbs
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readily allow for an achievement-like momentary understanding, it is
clear why the use of when should strengthen the completive
interpretation of the verb in utterances like (52a). For example, the
verb study in the utterance John studied hard on the day when Mazy
arrived, does not receive a completive understanding. The utterance is
readily taken to mean that Mazy's arrival took place at some time
within the interval during which John was studying. The so-called
state verbs like believe also allow for a completive reading in linguistic
contexts similar to (52), but this interpretation is less salient than the
non-completive reading. Consider the examples in (53) ((15a) in
Chapter two and its Serbo-Croat translations):
	
(53) a.	 Macbeth believed in ghosts when he saw Banquo.
b. Magbet je poverovao [perf.] u diuhove kada je
video Bankoa.
c. Magbet je verovao [imperf.] u duhove kada je
video Bankoa.
The semantic difference between state verbs and process verbs is
defined in terms of absence of change in the former and presence of
change in the latter. Bearing in mind that inception involves chpnge,
it should be reasonably clear why the inceptive interpretation is more
salient for verbs like run in (52a) than for those like believe in (53a).
The verb run denotes dimge, whereas believe does not Since the idea
of change is intrinsically associated with the ideas of transience or
temporariness, and completion, the use of a verb which denotes chsnge
(e.g. run) will make the completive interpretation more accessible than
the use of a verb which does not denote chinge (e.g. believe). The
processing effort involved in arriving at an interpretation which
involves both chsinge and completion is greater than the processing
effort required for arriving at a completive interpretation of a verb
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which already denotes change. Moreover, a speaker intending a non-
completive reading may readily use the progressive only with process
verbs, but not with state verbs. In other words, the speaker of (53a)
does not have the same choice as the speaker of (52a), if he wants to
indicate that the state of ffiir described by the main clause is
[-complete].
It seems reasonably clear that the choice between the perfective
and the imperfective aspect is explained in relevance theory terms. The
speaker who uses the perfective form guarantees that the optimally
relevant interpretation will be one on which the transition from the
state of not believing into the state of believing in ghosts is the
intended reading. The word when indicates that the time at which the
state of affairs of the main clause obtains is the time at which the truth
conditions for the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause are
guaranteed to be met. Therefore, the hypothesis that Macbeth's seeing
Banquo causes his believing in ghosts is highly manifest and highly
likely to be the first one to be considered by the hearer. The
understanding of (53a) on which Macbeth's seeing Banquo immediately
precedes and causes his believing in ghosts is more explicitly conveyed
by the perfective in (53b) (poverovati, roughly: 'begin to believe'), thrn
by the imperfective in (53c). The former is understood as laying
emphasis on the causal connection. The latter also allows for a reading
on which the event in the 'when-clause' (ininiediately) precedes and
causes Macbeth's believing in ghosts. But, in most readily conceivable
contexts, the speaker who uses (53c) would also be taken to
communicate the following assumptions: (i) Macbeth's seeing Banquo
is not the cause of his believing in ghosts, and (ii) it is not the
inception of believing in ghosts which is talked about. These
assumptions would arise in the search for an interpretation which
would offset the processing effort required for interpreting the utterance
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with the imperfective. Had the speaker not intended any extra effects
to be derived, be would have used the more economical utterance with
the perfective. I now turn to some issues concerning situation type
aspect
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The classification of verbs into situation types is based on the
view that verbal predicates denote conceptual contrasts which fall into
four neat classes (states,processes, achievements, and accomplishments)
defined by the features of change, duration, and delimitedness. Other
defining features, like dynamicness have occasionally been considered
as definitional (Lyons (1977); Morris (1984)). While it is rather obvious
that dynamicness is derivative upon change, the relation between
complexity of change and duration poses considerable problems (cf.
Bach (1981)). I take duration as a primitive.
Some version of the well known and fairly standard classification
of verbal predicates according to the situation types they denote seems
to me to be right (see Chapter two). But how the information about a
predicate's membership of a particular situation type is stored and
retrieved is far from dear. Most putative state verbs take the
progressive construction quite happily, while process verbs are readily
interpreted as achievements in the past simple tense, as well as in
'when-clauses', for example. Accomplishment predicates may allow for
a reading incompatible with their definitional mepning in some
linguistic contexts (John will write a letter, moreover he'll finish it), but
not in others (*John wrote a letter, moreover he finished it). This
chapter considers some consequences of relevance theory for an
explanation of these as well as some other related problems.
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5.1 VERBS OF STATE
By way of introduction, consider a standard textbook
characterisation of state verbs.
The choice between 'state' and 'event' is inherent in all
verbal usage In English. A state is undifferentiated and
lacking defined limits. An event, on the other hand, has
a beginning and an end; it can be viewed as a whole
entity, and can also make up one member of a sequence or
plurality of happenings... In fact;, to speak more plainly,
'state' and event' are semantic rather than grammatical
terms. Strictly, we should not talk of 'state verbs' and
'event verbs', but rather of 'state' and 'event' meanings or
uses of verbs.
(Leech (1975:4))
What exactly pertains to meaning and what to use, when it comes to
defining state verbs? I will look at the issue in relevance theory terms,
a framework which requires that the disjunction 'meRning or use' be
rephrased as 'meaning and use', since the distinction between
linguistically encoded and pragmatically determined aspects of
utterance meaning is central to this theory.
In Chapter four I have argued that the progressive aspect
granimaticalises reference to a particular event instantiating the
property denoted by the verb. Can this account of the merning of the
progressive shed some light on the semantics of state verbs? The usual
assumption is that it can, and in a straightforward way too. Since the
progressive makes reference to events by part of its mwining, state
verbs could be identified as those which cannot be used in this
construction. This is what Lyons (as well as many other authors) seems
to claim:
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Statute verbs constitute the most unportant subclass of
verbs that do not normally occur in the progressive aspect
in English. Stativity, then, is lexicalised, rather than
grammaticalised in English: it is part of the aspectual
character of some verbs... The incompatibility of statwily
and progresswity is explicable, however, in terms of the
language Independent ontological distinction ofstatic and
dynamic situations.
(Lyons (1977:706-7))
Provided that the putative ontological distinction is really warranted,
the explanation depends on the tacit assumption that every verb
expresses a concept and is fully specified with respect to the situation
type that it denotes. Not only does this position explain the
incompatibility of state verbs with the progressive, but it also predicts
it. The problem is that it predicts it wrongly since only a handful of
English verbs are ungrammatical in the progressive. Certainly most of
those which have the same temporal interpretation as know in the
utterance John knows/*is knowing maths take the progressive quite
happily, as illustrated by the examples in (1) ((2), (3), and (9) in
Chapter four):
(1)	 a.	 Peter is being polite.
b. John is living in Muswell Hill.
c. Mary is loving the fruit salad.
The lack of an explanation for the exceptions to this, presumably
defining, criterion, presents a problem for the classification, and one can
try to solve it in two ways: (a) by finding other criteria which would
hold more tightly, and (b) by characterising the meaning of the
majority of so-called state verbs in some other way which does not
absolutely preclude their use in the progressive. This second line I will
try to pursue, but I propose to give some arguments against the first
one first.
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Lakoff (1965) gives his well-known classificational criteria for
state verbs, based on their restrictions on their occurrence in the
following grammatical constructions: (a) the progressive, (b) the
imperative, (c) adverbials like deliberately, reluctantly, well,
enthusiastically etc., (d) the complements of the verbs persuade and
remind, (e) the do-something construction, (1) jbr-phrases, and (g) use
with instead of. Lakoff claims that state verbs are incompatible with
all of these, as illustrated below.
(2)	 a.	 *J0}iv is knowing that.
b. *(yçr that I am here.
c. *John knew the answer reluctantly.
d. *1 persuaded John to hear the music.
e. *He knew the answer though Bill told him not to
do so.
£	 *Jo]m knew that fact for his teacher's sake.
g.	 *1 heard the music instead of looking at the
painting.
Two objections to these tests are of interest here. First, even if
the tests in (2) have a diagnostic value, they do little in the way of
expiRining the differences in the behaviour of those verbs that satisfy
them. Second, not only are there verbs that one would want to call
state verbs and which are perfectly acceptable in the progressive and
the imperative constructions, but the criteria (c) to (g) do not correlate
only with lack of dynamicness.
These are the sorts of problems that a plausible and well
developed characterisation of state verbs (and situation aspect, more
generally), ought to be able successfully to address. Sag (1973:85)
eniined Lakoffs tests and sceptically conclude± 'So many factors are
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involved, in fact, that an accurate account of the facts is beyond the
scope of ... any ... theory hampered by its reliance on discrete
categorisation.' In what follows I will try to dispel Sag's scepticism by
arguing that relevance theory makes it possible (a) to show why and
how state verbs are to be distinguished as a class, and (b) to
accommodate the apparently problematic eTRm pies.
5.2 PROCESS VERBS AND ELIMINATION RULES
I would like to pursue the possibility (S&W (1986)) that with
verbs, like with other lexical elements, the information about mefining
is stored in the three types of entries, and that this is significant for the
classification of state verbs versus others. Consider (3):
(3) a.	 A killed B on Sunday.
b.	 B died on Sunday.
The lexical entries for the concepts killed and died contain the
information that they are verbs in the past tense. The encyclopaedic
entries include assumptions about instruments used for killing,
potential causes of death, etc. Iiiformation about these verbal
predicates is, arguably, represented in the logical entries for these
concepts, associated with the mepning postulate-like eliminsition rules
in (4) and (5):
(4) 'Kill' elimiirntion rule
Jnput:(X-kill-Y)
Output: (X - action of a certain type - Y)
(5) 'Die' elimination rule
Input:(X-die-Y)
Output: (X - event of a certain type - Y)
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Let me call the elimination rules in (4) and (5) action rule and event
rule, respectively. (Both kill and die satisfy the condition for eventhood,
in so far as they denote properties which involve c}mtige. It is to be
noted that the term event is often used more narrowly to include only
delimited change, and cover accomplishment and achievement
predicates to the exclusion of process ones. The term action is intended
to indicate agentivity.) It seems quite plausible to argue that the
difference in the defining linguistic meanings of state verbs as opposed
to event verbs can be expressed just in terms of the availability of
elimination rules like (4) and (5) (referred to as action/event rules
hereafter). Event verbs would be defined as those whose logical entries
contain action/event rules. Some of the so-called state verbs would be
defined as unspecified with respect to action/event rules (live, feel,
stand). The compatibility of these verbs with the prqgressive would
then appear to be pragmatically determined: the comparative
compatibility of a given verb with the progressive wc,uld depend on
whether that verb denotes a property which is readily thought of as
instantiable by an event. The dynamic meaning of verb, like feel in He
felt a sharp pain in his knee, would also be explained pragmatically, in
terms of a process of inferential enrichment driven by the principle of
relevance. Other state verbs like contain, own etc., which cannot
appear in the progressive, could plausibly be characterised by state
rules in their logical entries, of the same kind as the aczon/event rules
illustrated in (4) and (5). The account proposed would have the
advantage of maintaining the intuitively appealing binary distinction
between event verbs and state verbs, without the requirement that all
verbs be characterised positively, by the necessary presence or
necessary absence of features like stativity. This is precisely the sort
of account which I believe to be correct. On this approach, the non-
dynamic mecning of the great majority of the so-called state verbs could
be seen as pertRining solely to the encyclopaedic entry, and not the
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logical entry which contains information about the necessary content of
the concept. The assumptions about the lack of dynamism, etc.,
associated with verbs like live, wait, expect, feel and many others, are
stored as highly manifest in the encyclopaedic entries for these
concepts. They are part of the conceptualised me pning of the verb, but
not a necessary part of it. They are available as assumptions in the
context against which other facets of the mezning are interpreted.
Since their place is in the context, they can be, more or less easily,
cancelled out, as in the progressive, when the properties they denote
are talked about as instantiated in the form of events. However, if this
proposal is to deserve f'urther consideration, a number of problem
examples, pointed out by Sag (1973), need to be accounted for.
5.3 RELEVANCE THEORY AND TESTS FOR STATE VERBS
Sag (1973) gave a series of examples showing that Lakofi's tests
are inadequate and put forward his sceptical conclusion mentioned
earlier. I will argue that given (a) the characterisation of state verbs
proposed above, (b) my analysis of the progressive and, (c) the
framework of relevance theory, the problems for a discrete
categorisation, receive a natural explanation.'7
Let me mention (semantic) markedness again, this time in
relation to the progressive of state verbs. I have argued in Chapter four
that (semantic) markedness is to be explained in terms of the amount
of processing effort required in the construction of assumptions
necessary for the contextualisation of the utterance. The same account
holds for the progressive of state verbs.
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(6)	 a.	 John doesn't feel well.
b.	 John isn't feeling welL
(7) a.	 The baby resembles her mother.
b. The baby is resembling her mother more and
more.
c. ?? The baby is resembhng her mother.
(8)	 a.	 Antoinette understands Russian.
b. Antoinette is understanding Russian better and
better.
c. ?? Antoinette is understanding Russian.
All the information regarding the kind of situation that predicates with
feel, resemble and understand can be used to denote is stored in the
encyclopaedic entries for the corresponding concepts. All three are
readily used in predicating properties like feel well, resemble one's
mother or understand Russian as relatively stable nondynaniic
conditions of their subject referents ((6a), (7a) and (8a)), and all three
can be conceived of as instantiated in the form of events. The mepning
of the progressive is to be defined in terms of reference to an event
instantiating the property denoted by the predicate, and the predicates
in (6) to (8) take the progressive. However, feel well does so more
readily than the predicates resemble one's mother and understand
Russian, acceptable only in (7b) and (8b), respectively, with explicit
indications of change (more and more, better and better), but not in (7c)
and (Sc), which seem marginal at best. In terms of relevance theory,
the difference in the degree of stylistic markedness between the
progressive form of feel, on the one hand, and resemble and understand
Russian on the other, would not be seen as a difference in the
grammaticalisation of the degree of stativity or dynamicness in the
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mefinings of these verbs. It would, I believe, be explained as a
difference in the accessibility of contexts in which bilking about feeling,
resembling and understanding as instantiated in the form of events
achieves adequate contextual effects. Thus, (7c) and (Sc) are marginal
because they require (or at least may require) too much processing
effort on the part of the hearer to construct the assumptions necessary
for the contextualisation of the utterance. The adverbials more and
more in (7b) and better and better in (Sb) function as contextual clues.
They make it possible for the hearer to access the right contextual
assumptions at lower processing cost than would otherwise be required.
Simlimly, always in (9), and something in (10), facilitate the accessing
of assumptions required for arriving at the intended interpretation.
(9) Mary always knew the right answer, which I couldn't
ever do.
(10) Mary knew the right answer, which was something I
couldn't ever do.
The words always and something respectively, make it more manifest
to the hearer that the predicate know the right answer is used here
loosely to represent something like produce eukknce of knowing the
right answer. An explanation can also be given for (11) to (14) in which
all is noticeably better than what.
(11) AllflWhat Harry did to get himself shot was resemble a
Nazi.
(12) Aflt?WhatMargodidtowinatriptoMiun1wasknow
who fought the battle of Fallen Timbers.
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(13) Allt?What Mary did to get herself arrested was owe the
cop some money.
(14) AlIt?What you have to do to get busted is have a lid in
your glove compartment.
The contribution of the quantifier all to the interpretation of utterances
of the type AllXdid ... is that it gives rise to the implicature: Xdidn't
do much. If the speaker intends to convey simply the idea: The only
thing that X did ..., there are more economical ways of doing so: What
Xdid...,orXdidYand..., ZhappenedtoXbecausehedidYetc.
But, why would these be more economical than the more explicit All I
did ...? In relevance theory terms, they would be more economical
precisely because they are less explicit. The use of a redundant item
(redundant in that it explicitly expresses some meslning which would be
taken as part of the explicit content of the utterance even in the
absence of that item) increases processing effort. Implicatures like I
didn't do much ... are derived in the process of interpreting the
utterance for relevance. The extra amount of effort involved in
processing the more explicit utterance is offset if it gives access to some
effects. So, when the hearer has processed: All John did to get shot, he
will have formed the hypothesis: John didn't do much to get shot as an
implicature, i.e. as an assumption which the speaker may have
intended to communicate by using a more explicit form than was
necessary to express the proposition conveyed by his utterance. The use
of a non-agentive verb in the continuation: was resemble a Nazi, only
strengthens the implicature communicated by the first part of the
utterance, by virtue of implicating something like John did patently
nothing to bring about the state of affairs described in the first corjunct.
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Consider the present perfect and the verb seem in (15) and (16),
respectively:
(15) a.	 *The baby is resembling her mother at the
moment.
b.	 ?The baby's been resembling her mother for a
month now.
(16) a.	 *Mary is wanting something.
	
b.	 Mary seems to be wanting something.
The present perfect and the verb seem point to certain
characteristics of events. The first relates the past and the present,
while the second one highlights the role of perceptible evidence of the
state of affairs described in the complement clause by its lexical
meaning. Since the progessive points to instantiations of properties, I.e.
to events in the real world, it gives rise to the overtone of limited
extension in time and indicates the availability of perceptible evidence
of the event. Thus, both the present perfect and the verb seem may
make it easier for the hearer to process the progressive for contextual
effects. The same kind of explanation holds for the examples below.
(17) a.	 Nowadays the kids are wanting us to bring them
toys.
b.	 *The kids are wanting us to bring them toys at
the moment.
(18) a.
	
	
John is owing a lot of money to the company these
days.
	
b.	 John is owing a lot of money to the company at
the moment.
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In the absence of contextual indications to the contrary, the progressive
construction in the present tense is taken to refer to an instantiation of
the property denoted by the predicate as simultaneous with the present
conceived more or less loosely (i) as some relevant period of time
including the time of communication, or (ii) as the time of
communication proper. The adverbial nowadays, which explicitly refers
to the former, hardly poses any constraints on the temporal
interpretation of the utterance. It points to the broader idea of the
present as the temporal context against which the utterance is to be
processed for relevance, without thereby excluding the possibility that
the property denoted by the predicate is being instantiated at the time
of communication, but also without requiring that it be so. It is,
therefore, quite natural that some predicates may denote properties
whose instantiations are easier to interpret as relevant when talked
about loosely and construed as obtaining at the present in the broader
sense indicated by nowadays, than when they are described as anchored
to the time of communication proper. Consider (17b), for instance. The
verb want is normally taken to denote a disposition rather than an
event. The effect of the progressive will be to highlight the relevance
of the observable manifestations of the property, limited extension in
time, etc. It is easier to contextualiae the utterance which points to the
relevance of observable inRnifestations of the children's wanting toys
over some more inclusive period of time, as indicated by nowadays, than
the corresponding utterance with at the moment. The reason may be
that (17b) doesn't give rise to any contextual effects which wouldn't be
communicated more economically by the utterance with the simple
The children want us to bring them toys at the moment. By using
nowadays the speaker may try to draw attention to the kids' behaviour
over some period of time (the present in the broader, loose, sense) as in
(17a), and weakly communicate a range of assumptions: It is difficult
to fulfil one's children's wishes, Children are very persistent in asking
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for what they want, Children are a nuisance, etc. However, an account
on which all these arise as implicatures which the hearer derives in
search of what the speaker intended to communicate by t1king about
wanting as instantiated, predicts that (17b) should be appropriate in
some suitably convoluted context, though not an easily accessible one.
The same kind of explanation accounts for the utterances in (18).
Not only state verbs, but also, more generally, future time
adverbials with the progressive construction in the present tense,
require the expenditure of considerable processing effort. In these
examples the speaker is instructing the hearer to relate an instance of
a certain property to the present, while explicitly locating its occurrence
in the future. The future time adverbial indicates that the event is
predicated of present time only loosely, and, in English, the conflict is
resolved by implicatures about the future occurrence of the event being
predictable at the time of communication: the event is arranged
already, there are indications that its occurrence is on the way, and
others as well. As G&W (1982) point out, the possibility of using the
progressive present with future time adverbials like tomorrow is rather
exceptional, and lacking in Spanish, which also makes a distinction
otherwise very close to the simple-progressive one of English. So, if a
state verb, i.e. a verb which does not necessarily denote a type of event,
takes the progressive present with future time adverbials (like
tomorrow), requiring more processing effort than the use with any
present time adverbials (such as nowadays or at the moment), it will
predictably be acceptable with these as well. The progressive present
of hear in (19a) may easily be taken to indicate that the future instance
of hearing what the opponents have to say is already arranged.
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(19) a.
	
Tomorrow I am hearing what our opponents have
to say.
b. At the moment I am hearing what our opponents
have to say.
c. Nowadays I am hearing what our opponents have
to say.
(20) a.
	
Nowadays many conservatives are expecting
Major to win the next elections.
b. At the moment many people are expecting the
conservatives to win the next elections.
c. *Tomorrow John is expecting Major to win the
elections in 1992.
It is to be noted that hearing what one's opponents have to say is quite
compatible with the idea of prearrangement. The use of the present
tense form is justified precisely because it gives rise to this assumption,
which, if the speaker had used the will + be -ing construction, would be
lost (unless the whole utterance were made more complex, and the
iinplicature communicated by (19a) were made explicit, thus demanding
greater expenditure of processing effort). But other verbs, like expect
in (20c) are very difficult to interpret in this use. What could (20c) be
taken to mean? That on the following day there will occur an instance
of John's entertaining certain expectations regarding the elections in
1992, and that this event is somehow prearranged and already on the
way. That is very difficult to envision. I assume that (20c) would be
better in the context of John's behaviour regarding the election being
consciously planned, with the utterance being used ioosely, say as:
Tomorrow, it's John's turn to pretend that he is expecting Major to win
the next election. It should also be noted that (20c) cannot be used
felicitously merely with the import of Tomorrow John will be expecting
for it would invariably run against the principle of relevance.
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Informally speaking, the principle of relevance requires two things:
(a) that the utterance be relevant enough to be worth processing, and
(b) that the hearer should not be put to a greater expenditure of
processing effort than is necessary t#o arrive at the intended
interpretation. Since, in this case, the use of the will + be -wg
construction would invariably require less effort than the progressive
present form, (20c) would still not be consistent with the principle of
relevance (more precisely, with the second part of the presumption of
optimal relevance).
I would like to mention another two points regarding the
divergent behaviour of state verbs. The first one concerns the
unacceptabifity of the verb be in those (so-called) reduced relatives in
which its -ing form is not interpretable as an elliptical progre8sive, as
the contrast between (21b) and (22b) illustrates:
(21) a.	 *Anyone who is being a communist will be shot.
	
b.	 *iyone being a communist will be shot.
(22) a.	 Anyone who is being stubborn will have his teddy
bear taken away.
b.	 Anyone being stubborn will have his teddy bear
taken away.
All the other state verbs readily occur in reduced relatives like (22b).
So, be differs from other state verbs in this respect. An explanation
which seems quite plausible to me is that the verb be is unacceptable
in reduced relatives like (21b) because it does not make a contribution
to the propositional content of the utterance. One might as well say:
Any /Every communist will be shot. What about those verbs which are
ungrammatical in the progressive?
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(23) a.	 *The box which is containing five chocolates is on
the table.
b. The box containing five chocolates is on the table.
c. *The box is containing five chocolates.
(24) *John is having a good book.
On the approach proposed here, the progressive of verbs like know,
contain, own and some others, which are truly ungrammatical in this
construction, is explained as precluded by a state rule in the logical
entry of each of these verbs.
I have proposed an account on which (a) the majority of the so-
called state verbs should be seen as unspecified with respect to
eventhood, as their aspectual character is underdetermined by their
conceptual content, (b) the eventhood of an event verb is plausibly
treated as part of the necessary content of the concept denoted by that
verb, in terms of a mepning postu1atenference rule, and (c) there are
also a number of verbs which are marked as stative by rules of this
type. Let me now consider the feature [+ complete] associated only with
event predicates.
5.4 EVENT VERBS AND DELIMITEDNESS
In Chapter four, section 4.8,1 have tried to relate the aspectual
choice of the simple in English and the perfective of Serbo-Croat by
pointing out the difference in the linguistic meanings of these aspectual
categories and their consequences for aspectual choice in these two
languages. This section looks at the meilning and use of the simple
aspect in relation to the underdeterminacy thesis (see Chapter one).
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Process verbs readily receive a completive (i.e. delimited)
understanding in utterances such as (25), and in others as well:
(25) In the afternoon, when he goes to school, John will meet
his friends.
The form goes in the 'when-clause' is not taken to denote an ongoing
process, but a complete (i.e. delimited) event, the change from John's
being at home to John's having left/br school (with the implication that
he will get there). Consider the contrasts in (26) and (27):
(26) a.	 Mary cried (for hours) when she broke the flower
pot.
b.	 Mary was annoyed when she broke the flower pot.
(27) a. John hit the policeman and ran.
b.	 John heard the alarm and ran for miles trying to
find the shelter.
The verb cry in (26a) is ambiguous, as indicated by the adverbial in
brackets. On one reading, the verb is inchoative, it describes the onset
of the process. On the other reading, enhinced by the adverbial jbr
hours, it is just the process that is being described. The latter reading
of (26a) is typical of state predicates in Bezitences like (26b). The
erniples in (27) also illustrate the indeterminficy of process verbs with
respect to completion. On the preferred interpretation, (27a) is fairly
accurately paraphrased as John hit the policeman and started running,
while the predicate ran jbr miles in (2Th) dearly denotes an ongoing
process (in the past), but the moment of hearing the alarm is not
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necessarily construed as the onset of running. Examples like these
strongly suggest that verbs standardly included in the class of process
verbs, are, in fact, unspecified with respect to deliinitedness. In other
words, the presence of the action/event rule in the logical entry for a
verb, automatically triggers, as it were, the availability of two
conceptual formats; all change can be represented either (a) as
delimited (i.e. discrete, complete, etc.) or (b) as non-delimited (i.e. non-
discrete, incomplete, etc.). Languages differ with respect to how
systematically their verb systems reflect this universal conceptual
distinction. Slavonic languages do so very regularly, English less so,
since the linguistic meilning of process verbs of English does not spedfy
how the concepts they denote are marked for the feature of
deliniitedness. The bracketed '-' sign in TableX(Chapter two; p...)
could have been left out. The intuition that run and cry denote
[- complete] situations (rather than onsets of situations) is based on the
interpretation of these verbs in the immediately accessible context. If
one thinkg of the verb run, the first idea that comes to mind is one of
process or continuous activity. In other words, the intuition that the
verb run is a process verb (and not an achievement verb) is to be
explained in pragmatic terms. The decoding of the verb run will
provide the information that ()this verb denotes an action/evens.
Depending on the context, the verb may then be understood as referring
to an ongoing process, or its linguistic melning may be enriched such
that the verb is understood as referring to a momentary change of state
from not runmng to running. The situation with transitive verbs tsiking
singular count NPs as their direct object is somewhat different. The
presence of a singular count noun as the direct object is normally
assumed necessarily to induce the feature [+ completel. Such VPs are
referred to as predicates of the accomplishment type.
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Accomplishment VPs seem clearly to fall into two groups. The
first one includes those predicates which seem unspecified with respect
to completion, like process verbs (eg. play the sonata in (28a)). The
second group includes those which are, apparently, unambiguously
delimited.
(28) a.	 Mary played the sonata.
	
b.	 Mary was very nervous. She played the sonata for
a while, but had to stop when she was halfway
through.
(29) a.	 They built the bridge.
	
b.	 9'hey built the bridge for three years.
The simple form of the predicate play the sonata strongly invites
a completive interpretation. The verb play may denote either discrete
or continuous chimge, while the NP with the count noun sonata, refers
to a daHniited object What sort of knowledge about chiinge in a
discrete object may be relevant? First, it may be relevant that a certain
process applies to an entity to some degree. Second, it may be relevant
that the process affects the entity as a whole. Why does one tend to
assign the latter interpretation to predicates like play the sonata? The
answer lies with people's disposition automatically to mimise the
relevance of utterances. Crucially, the information that a process
affects an entity as a whole entails that it affects its parts. In other
words, Mary has played (the whole) sonata entails Mary was playing
the sonata, but not the other way round. Other things being equal,
information about a process applying to an object as a whole, will be
more relevant Clearly, Mary (has) played the sonata is a more
economical way of communicating that Mary was engaged in the
activity ofplaying the sonata, and she played the whole piece, than some
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more elaborate utterance, such as this one, would be. Of course, in
some contexts the information that Mwy played only part of the
sonata, may be more relevant, in which case the predicate play the
sonata receives a non-delimited reading, as in (28b), or the speaker may
want to point out assumptions about the ongoing activity itself as
relevant, and the progressive is the obvious form to use, as in (30a).
	
(30) a.	 Mary was playing the sonata. The lights went
out.
	
b.	 Mary played the sonata. The lights went out.
The first utterance in (30b) would normally be taken to suggest
that Maiy played the whole sonata. Also, the operation of the principle
of relevance explains why the event in the second utterance is typically
construed as subsequent to the event in the first one. When a sequence
of completed events is being related, the assumption that the order in
which they are talked about corresponds to the order in which they
occur, will characteristically be the most ninifest one when the
utterance is processed in the immediately accessible context Once the
hearer has assumed that the speaker is tilking about a temporally
ordered sequence of states of iffirg, the assumption that the temporal
ordering of these states of cdThir corresponds to the order in which
their mental representations are constructed, will also be the most
nirnifeet one in many contexts. Two possible exceptions are those cases
in which (a) there are indications in the context that the temporal
order does not matter, or (b) there are highly manifest (and even
explicit) indications that the order in which the events are talked about
is not the one in which they occurred.
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(31) A:	 Did you have a busy day?
B: Yes, I fed the cats, worked on my paper, made
pancakes, played football, went to the launderette,
and wrote a couple of letters.
(32) John lost his balance and fell. He slipped on a bnsrnj
skin.
The speaker B in (31) ii giving a list of his activities on a particular
day. On the one hand, nothing much follows from the fact that B first
did one thing rather than another. On the other hand, A's question
does not suggest that the order of the events in time is relevant. By
contrast, it is a matter of common knowledge that losing one's balance
precedes and causes one's fl1ing down. When the two events are
talked about in the same sentence, as in (82), they will be understood
as part of one and the same occasion on which John first lost his
balance and then fell. The second sentence in (32) is about the event
which is, in the light of our encyclopaedic knowledge, normally taken
as causing loss of balance, and falling down. But why is the ordering
of events in time more constrained in conjoined clauses thsn in
individual sentences? Consider (33).
(33) ??John lost his balance, fell down, and slipped on a
banana skin.
Blakemore (1987) argued that the processing of conjoined propositions
is different from those expressed by individual sentences in that a
conjoined proposition signals that the propositions which it is made up
of have contextual effects in virtue of being conjoined, whereas a
proposition expressed by an independent sentence is independently
processed against the context. John slipped on a banana skin is
perfectly acceptable in (32), where it is taken as an explanation for
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John's losing his balance and fplling down. In order to contextualise
the conjoined proposition expressed by (33), the hearer must first
establish the temporal relation between the states of sffiir described
by the conjuncte, as it is part of the propositional content of the complex
proposition expressed by the utterance. For example, John fell and the
dog bit him and ThedogbitJohnandhefell will obviouslybetaken
to describe different states of RlThir5. The order of occurrence of the
events in (33) strongly suggested by the order in which the events are
talked about, runs counter to the one favoured in the light of common
knowledge about the causal and temporal relations between events such
as slipping, losing one's balance and falling down. In other words, the
difficulty in interpreting (33) is due to conflicting processing
instructions (cf. Carston (1990:19-20)). The problem does not arise in
(32) because the proposition 'John slipped on a banana skin' is here
contextualised independently of the preceding two, although these are
used as contextual assumptions. What about the possible temporal
relations between the events in (34)?
(34) Mary played the sonata. The lights went out
The interpretation on which the first sentence in (34) is about Mary's
playing the sonata as part of the programme, and the event of the
lights' going out is construed as preceding Mary's performance wo$uld
proobably be ruled oout by considerations of relevance. Whatever the
context, if the speaker wants to communicate that the lights went out
before Mary started playing, there are more economical ways of doing
it. On one possible, and readily accessible, reading, the lights go out
after Mary has finished playing the sonata. But, crucially for my point,
an interpretation of temporal inclusion of the event in the second
sentence within the time span of the event in the first one is also
possible, as shown in (35).
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(35) Mary played the sonata for a while. When she was half.
way through the lights went out, and she had to stop.
What the example in (35) shows is that the delimited (i.e. completive)
mepning of accomplishment predicates like play the sonata is not
linguistically encoded, but is only the more salient (manifest) of the two
aspectual meanings available for all so-called process verbs. But, how
are those accomplishment predicates which, apparently, iinzimbiguously
denote delimited events to be accounted fbi'?
A number of accomplishment VPs (build a bridge, write a letter,
make a cake etc.) are putatively incompatible with for X units of time
adverbials regardless of the context, and fail other tests for non-
deliinitedness as well. One good ifiustration was given in (29b). Here
are some more examples.
	
(36) a.	 *flJohn painted a picture for an hour.
b. *flJoha built a house for three years.
c. */?Mary made a cake for an hour.
d. *flJane wrote a letter for ages, but didn't finish it.
What all the predicates in (36) have in common is that in each of them
the clliange denoted by the verb brings about the existence of the object
NP referent I believe this to be quite significant Consider the
contrasts between the pairs of utterances in (37) and (38):
(37) a.
	 Mary played the sonata.
b.	 Mary was playing the sonata.
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	(38) a.	 John built the house.
	
b.	 John was building the house.
Both (37a) and (3Th) are interpreted as entailing that there is/was a
sonata, but only (38a), and not (38b), entails that there is/was a house.
This is quite important. As the process of utterance interpretation
involves the assignment of referents to referring expres8ions, the hearer
processing the utterance for relevance will be driven to assuue that for
every referring expression with descriptive content (house, ctzke, letter)
there is a referent which fully satisfies the description. In the erniples
(37a) and (8Th) the (non)delimitedness of the change denoted by the
verb does not interfere with the interpretation of referential expressions
in the object NP. However, in (38), the object NP a house is freely
construed as referring to an existing house only if the change denoted
by the predicate is understood as complete The point is that, if a
completive reading were available for the predicate build the house,
(38a) would potentially express two propositions with different truth-
conditions depending on whether or not the event is construed as
completed. If it were possible to find a context in which the events in
(38a) and the like would receive a [- complete] interpretatio:m it would
be plausible to argue that with predicates of the accomplishment
type the feature [+ complete] should be explained as pragmaticaUy
derived. However, the best that one can do is to find contexts in which
the I- complete] reading is not really very odd. I will look briefly at
some of them and I will suggest that the grammaticaliisation of
completion in accomplishment predicates is driven by pragmatics.
Mximifiing the relevance of the utterance drives the hearer to choose
the interpretation on which the conditions for assigning rderents to
referring expressions are fully met. With predicates like these in (36)
this will be possible only if the event is construed as complete. As it
seems patently impossible to find a context in which utterances like
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those in (36) and (38a) would be fully acceptable with a non-completive
reading, the conclusion which imposes itself is that the feature [+
complete] in these predicates is to be attributed to their linguistic
meaning (i.e. to semantics rather than pragmatics). What the e!Rmples
with accomplishment predicates do show is that pragmatic
considerations may plausibly be assumed to have led to the
grammaticalisation of the feature 1+ complete] with accomplishment
vPs.
(39)	 *J0 built a house for three years, but never
finished it.
b.	 *flJohi built the house for three years, but never
finished it.
Assuming that the definite article functions as 'an indication that the
conceptual representation to be assigned is accessible at no unjustifiable
processing cost' (Kempson, forthcomlan obvious explanation for the
slight, but, according to some native speakers, clearly noticeable.
The difference in the acceptability of (39a) and (39b) suggests
itsell As the definite article indicates that the referent is readily
accessible, in those utterances in which the very existence of the
referent is contingent upon the change denoted by the verb, the use of
the definite article in the object NP will reduce the sense of the object
referent's being contingent upon the chpnge, and the non-delimited
reading should be at least somewhat less odd. This seems to be true.
If (39b) is bad, (39a) is certainly worse. Also, according to the native
speakers I have asked for judgements, the utterances in (36) seem
worse than those in (39a).
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The position of the adverbial /br x units of time also seems to
make some difference to the acceptability of a non-coinpletive reading
for those accomplishment predicates which would normally preclude
this interpretation.
(40) (?)For three whole years he built the house, but couldn't
finish it.
In (39), by the time the hearer starts processing the adverbial, he may
already have derived a completive reading for the VP. In (40), however,
the adverbial is processed first, and the hearer anticipates a non-
completive reading of the predicate. In addition to this, the word whole
in (40) indicates that it is the period of time in its entirety which is
relevant, and the progressive is thus rendered a somewhat less
manifestly appropriate form, as it would be felt to lay emphasis on the
activity itself, and not on its outcome.
Native speakers' judgements about the acceptability of the
utterances in (36) as they stand vary to some extent. So, given (a)
what has been said about the significance of the availability of referents
for object NPs, (b) the availability of forms which would unambiguously
indicate non-delimitedness (the progressive, expressions like spend X
units of time -ing, etc.), (c) the felicitous erniples like (40), and
(d) variation in people's judgements about dubious utterances such as
those in (36), it seems reasonable to explain the grammaticalisation of
completion in accomplishment predicates in terms of (a) and (b), in
other words, to explain pragmatically why certain VP predicates
grammaticalise completion. The examples (41) and (42)
seem to provide support for this view.
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(41) a.	 *John will write a letter, but he won't finish it.
	
b.	 John wrote a letter, but he didn't fin i h it.
(42) a.	 John will write a letter. Moreover he'll finish it.
	
b.	 ?/*Jobn wrote a letter. Moreover he finished it.
If the feature 1+ complete] were not part of the semantics of the VP
write a letter, then either (41a) or (41b), or both, should be acceptable
in at least some contexts, which is not the case. But, if pragmatic
considerations were not involved in the interpretation of
accomplishment VPa in some crucial way, then (42a) ought to be as
difficult (or impossible) to contextualise as (42b). The utterance (42a)
is about a state of affairs in the future, the one in (42b) a state of
fiffrnr9 in the past. I have already drawn the distinction between two
classes of accomplishment predicates: (a) those in which the process
denoted by the predicate brings about the existence of the object
referent, and (b) those in which there is a direct object whose existence
does not depend on the process. Obviously, write a letter would
normally fall under (a). But, strictly speiking, this VP could also be in
group (b). For example, if the context includes the assumption that
John always does things by half and never finishes his letters, then the
speaker may choose to predicate the property write a letter of John
without logically implicating the completion of the letter. What is
important here is that the state of siThir5 described by the utterance
should belong to a possible world, rather than to the actual world. The
first utterance in (42a) describes a state of s.ffir in the future. This
utterance would probably not be taken to assert that the end result of
kie)John's writing the letter will be a complete letter, especially in the
light of the speaker/hearer's knowledge about John's ways and habits.
But, why then is this interpretation not available for the first utterance
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in (42b)? (42b) describes a state of sffRirs in the past. When a process
which in the normal course of events leads up to an outcome, is talked
about as taking place in the future, the very fact that that process takes
place may be as relevant as the idea that it will have the anticipated
outcome. However, when an event of the same type is said to have
taken place in the past, the interpretation on which the expected
outcome was actually reached will also be more relevant, lithe speaker
intends to say that an event which normally results in the existence of
a letter has actually occurred, without having been completed, be
should say so explicitly. In this way the hearer would be spared the
processing effort involved m considering an interpretation, and then
rejecting it.
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Chapter Six
CONCLUSION
I have taken some problems that arise in the use of aspectual
categories and considered them in the light of a relevance theoretic
pragmatics. The main condusions of my analysis can be summed up in
the following points. First, relevance theory makes it possible to
explain aspectual choice while maintaining an austere sRniRntics.
Second, the relevance theoretic approach to aspect does not need to
invoke subjectivity (or any other related notion) which is notoriously
difficult to define. Three, the principled account of the semantic
features definitional of the aspectual categories of English and Serbo-
Croat makes it possible to give a natural explanation of the
correspondence of the aspectual categories of the two languages in a
number of uses. Four, the relation between language particular
(simple-progressive, perfective-imperfective) and language universal
(situation type) aspectual categories largely falls out from the
grammaticalisation of (in)completion and/or reference to instantiation
by the former. Five, the difference between state verbs and event verbs
is captured by meRning postulate-like rules in the logical entries for the
concepts which these verbs denote. Six, pragmatic factors (specifically
the processing effort required for arriving at the speaker's intended
interpretation of his utterance) explain why the aspectual contrast
between process and accomplishment has come to be grammaticalised
in some VPs rather thpn in others.
I have Bhown that explanations of problems relating to verbal
aspect which invoke the notion of subjectivity do not hold, and that
most eaniples put forward in support of the subjectivity thesis receive
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a natural explanation in terms of the relevance theory distinction
between descriptive and interpretive use. Most linguistic entities
presumed to be expressive of subjectivity are readily explained as
nstances of interpretive use.
I have taken the view that the aspectual categories of English
and SerboeCroat can be explained in terms of the gramniaticalisation
of completion and instantiation. The progressive of English and the
imperfective of Serbo-Croat grammaticalise lack of completion. The
perfective aspect of Serbo-Croat granimaticalises completion, whereas
the simple is unspecified with respect to this feature. Both the
progressive and the perfective point indexically, as it were, to a
particular event instantiating the property denoted by the verbal
predicate, while the imperfective and the simple do not. The
iniperfective differs from the simple in that the simple is unspecified
with respect to completion, whereas the imperfective has the feature
[- completel. I have argued that this characterisation of the linguistic
mepning of aspectual categories of English and Serbo-Croat is
sufficiently specific and adequate. The overtones that individual
aspectual categories receive in use and the lack of strict correspondence
between aspectual categories across languages are readily explained in
terms of relevance theory.
The standard classification of verbal predicates according to the
situation types they denote does not make it possible to explain the use
of the predicates belonging to particular categories. I have proposed an
analysis which uses S&Ws distinction between three formats in which
conceptual information can be represented, and I have argued that the
distinction between state verbs and event verbs can be explained in
terms of mez%ning postulates or inference rules in the logical entries of
individual verbs.
222
My consideration of verbal aspect in the preceding chapters is
very partial. I have focused on a restricted number of phenomena,
argued against some approaches, and proposed an account in relevance
theory terms. The analysis could be significantly substantiated in a
number of ways. A more in-depth pragmatic account of a wider range
of uses of aspectual categories could and should be given. The relation
between aspect and other closely related categories also needs spAlling
out. This is especially true of the interaction of tense and aspect which
I have touched on, as well as of the category of voice, which has not
been mentioned at all. To give but one example, imperfectivity seems
to correlate with emphasis on the role of the subject (cf Morris (1984)).
In Russian, only perfective verbs have a passive form, whereas in
Serbo-Croat some imperfective verbs have a passive form while others
do not. It seems plausible that this affinity between the passive and
the perfective and its grammaticalisation in Russian could be explained
pragmatically.
The framework could be applied to and tested on data from a
greater number of languages. Some languages like Spanish make a
distinction close to the simple-progressive one of English.
My treatment of aspect largely ignores other frameworks, such
as cognitive grammar (cE Langa'1987)), Jackendofi's (1983; 1987)
theory of concepts, various localist approaches (cL Anderson (1973)),
syntax (cf. Tenny (1987)), Word GrRnimRr (Hudson (1984; 1990)), and
others as well. A comparison of a number of analyses within different
frameworks would probably give more interesting insights. This task
would require a considerable fleshing out of the relevance theoretic
account that I have made a start on in this thesis.
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NOTES
1.The aspectual categories central to this study are exemplified
and discussed at some length in Chapter two. My purpose here
is merely to iliustrate various possible distinctions that have
been made. A reasonably detailed introductory overview is
Comrie (1976). Ridjanovic (1976) gives an overview of the terms
used in studies on Slavonic languages in general and Serbo-
Croat in particular.
2. Intuitively, the idea of an individual occurrence of the event
is more salient in (2a) than in (2c).
3. Whichever way the analysis goes, one has to account for the
fact that the utterance has only one tense form, while two
moments (or intervals) of time are referred to. So, the sentence
has one tense, but the utterance apparently communicates two
propositions and has two tenses. Rouchota (1991) gives a
relevance theoretic account of the epistemic use of will in terms
of higher level explicatures.
4. S&W (1986:38-46) give a detailed discussion of the notion of
manifestness; salience is the closest non-technical term.
5. Comrie (1976) rejects this view. The contrast between
aspectua]ly unmarked verbs of Serbo-Croat with the
imperfective ones supports the view that the iniperfective
encodes lack of completion (cf Chapter four, section 4.6).
6. The verb use is illustrative in this connection. Consider the
following situation: When one is on a bus one can be said to be
using a ticket. One talks about this situation as a process,
although it has many characteristics of a state. What makes
one think of using as an event in this case is probably the idea
that the state of affairs in question is temporary, that it involves
a specifiable beginning (getting on the bus) and an end (getting
off the bus). It should be noted that the verb u behaves like
an event verb in utterances with the present simple, such as
Jane uses her dictionaries ..., which are interpreted as habitual
(or iterative). Think to Baa Aarts for drawing this ezam pie to
my attention.
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7. Comrie (1976:113) gives the example in Russian. The same
point can be made by the Serbo-Croat translation in (12). Most
sinples (13) to (21) are taken (and/or adapted) from C.S. Smith
(1983;1986).
8. I cannot attempt to do justice to Banfleld's syntactic
arguments here. I hope to show that whether these arguments
hold good or not, they have no bearing on the analysis of
aspectual categories like the progressive.
9. See Banfield (1982:206-7) for an accoount of anaphora which
invokes the notion of subjectivity and the E node.
10. In Lyons' own words:
Modern Anglo-American linguistics, logic, and
philosophy of language has been dominated by the
intellectualist prejudice that language Is,
essentially, if not solely, an instrument for the
expression ofpropositional thought. This prejudice
is made manifest in Katz's (1972, pp. 18ff) defence
of the principle of effability; in Lewis's (1972, pp.
205ff) treatment ofnon-declaratives; In Dummett's
(1973) sustained argument to the effect that,
whereas languages might exist in which it is
impossible to ask questions or issue co,nmands, a
language in which one cannot make assertions is
inconceivable; in Chomsky's (1966, 1968, 1975)
version of Cartesian, or neo-Cartesian,
rationalism; in Fodor's (1978) formulation of the
thesis that there is a universal language of
thought, whose structure is more or less
isomorphic with that of natural languages; and in
many other influential works which, though they
might differ considerably on a wide variety of
Issues, either pay no attention at all to the non-
propositional and non-assertive components of
language or play down their importance
(Lyons (1982: 103-4))
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11. These examples are given here only by way of illustration.
The interpretation and the conditions for use of the perfective
and imperfective aspects are examined in more detail in Chapter
four.
12. Banfield looks at utterances like (1). She observes that (1)
is a contradiction, and gives a stipulative explanation.
(1) Though I think that [the fortunate girl] will be
here tomorrow, he said that [poor Winifred] 1 isn't
due till Thesday.
Arguably, in reported speech or thought the use of evaluative
words like poor and damned, each of which expresses an
attitude attributed to a SELF, 'must mean that the quoting
speaker so assented to the quoted speaker's opinions that he
"expressed" similar ones' (Banfield (1982:56). This presumably
explains why (1) is a contradiction. And the attribution of the
attitude expressed by the evaluative adjectives to the quoting
speaker even when they appear only in the embedded clause of
indirect speech follows from the principles 1E/lI and Priority
of SPEAKER'. In fact, both explanations are simply wrong. For
example, the addition of hthin the embedded clause as shown in
(2) resolves the contradiction.
(2) Though I think that [the fortunate girl will be
here tomorrow, he said that [his poor Winifred]1
isn't due till Tuesday.
The possessive his in ((2) indicates that the intended
interpretation is the one on which the words (my) poor Winifred
and, consequently, the attitude expressed by them, are
attributed to the quoted speaker. So, the utterance (1) is not
truly contradictory but somewhat difficult to process, because it
is not dear who considers Winifred to be a poor girl. The
temptation to derive the contradictory interpretation is purely
pragmatically determined. All expressions of attitude are
attributed to the most manifest subject of consciousness. In
conversation and in utterances with the pronoun I the most
mpnifest subject of consciousness will be the speaker, since there
is no requirement that the quoted speaker's words should be
reported, and the hearer's immediately accessible context does
not (or may not) include assumptions which would support the
reading on which the evaluative expression is to be attributed to
the quoted speaker. The possessive his in (2) mzkAB more
226
NO1
manifest the intended interpretation and reduces the amount of
processing effort necessary for arriving at the intended
interpretation. Both of Banfield's principles ('lE/ir and Priority
of SPEAKER') are entirely unnecessaiy, and their impact on
utterance interpretation falls out entirely from considerations of
relevance. Furthermore, there is nothing to block the
interpretation on which the quoting speaker's and the quoted
speaker's perspectives coincide. Other things being equal, the
construal on which the speaker expresses both his own and the
quoted speaker's attitude, view, judgement or perspective, may
be highly relevant in the initial context in which the utterance
is processed, and is, therefore, accessed unless precluded, either
overtly (by his in (2)), or by some highly mpnifest assumptions
in the existing context which would make this interpretation
implausible (i.e. not relevant enough to be considered by the
hearer).
13.The examples used in this section are taken or adapted from
G&W (1982), unless otherwise indicated in the text.
14. The examples (22) to (34) are taken or adapted from
Haegeman (1989).
15.rm grateful to Lorna Gibb for drawing to my attention the
difference between the periphrastic future time expressions of
English and of French to my attention.
16.The use of the present simple of sports commentaries may
seem similar to the use of this form in stage directions and
directions in general, as in recipes, for example (e.g. I peel the
potatoes, put them in an oven proof dish, and ...). I believe that
these too are instances of interpretive use. However, in these
cases the utterances are not used as interpretations of attributed
thoughts, but as representations of desirable (i.e. relevant
thoughts). I do not propose a detailed analysis here.
17.The examples (6) to (24) are taken or adapted from
Sag (1973).
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